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SUMMER 1977

COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

227 THE REAWAKENING OF INDIA
by Stanley Plastrik

232 IN DEFENSE OF MADAME MAO
by Simon Leys

234 GERMANY: THE SPD IN TROUBLE
by George Eckstein

236 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO GEORGE WALLACE?
by Jon Wiener

ARTICLES

241 TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW *by Morton H. Halperin and Daniel N. Hoffman*

EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY—NEW PROBLEMS, NEW PROSPECTS:

248 THE POSTWAR TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY *by Richard Lowenthal*

261 THE SOCIALIST LEFT IN EUROPE
by Bogdan Denitch

271 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY
by Jean-Pierre Worms

281 CAN SOCIALISM COPE WITH THE CRISIS OF VALUES? *by Robert E. Lane*

289 WAR RESISTERS IN THE LAND OF BATTLE
by Penina Migdal Glazer and Myron Glazer

COMMUNICATIONS

297 THE IQ CONTROVERSY — AN EXCHANGE
by R. L. Herrnstein and Philip Green

MOVIES

307 "HARLAN COUNTY, U.S.A." *by Nicolaus Mills;* COMMENT *by Irving Howe,* REPLY *by Mills*

BOOKS

311 REVIEWS *by Dennis H. Wrong, Lewis Coser, Joseph Clark, Henry Pachter*

321 **LETTERS**

SPECIAL FEATURE

324 SOLZHENITSYN AND LENIN
by Boris Souvarine

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1945: **BLACK BOY** 1977: **AMERICAN HUNGER**

The youthful years of this distinguished black writer are familiar to the millions of readers around the world who have made his inspiring memoir, *Black Boy*, one of the most popular and acclaimed books of our time. But what about Richard Wright's life between his departure from Mississippi and his arrival as a major talent in the literary world?

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Stanley Plastrik

The Reawakening of India

She had planned a sort of plebiscite, a "yes" or "no" vote on her rule, and was positive of the outcome. Whoever heard of a dictator losing a plebiscite election, since Louis Bonaparte invented the technique?

Everything remained under Mrs. Gandhi's control during the campaign—police, army, state apparatus, election machinery. She relaxed her almost two-year-old Emergency, but let her closest advisers know that once the election was won she would crack down hard; she would show the Opposition what Emergency rule really meant! "I am not a dictator," she proclaimed. Proof? The elections. But what empowered her to turn elections on or off, postpone them, and then suddenly call them? She made the decisions to suit herself, monopolizing television and radio. (In India, 200 million people listen to radio, in remote villages often their sole source of the news.) The identification of her Congress party and government could not have been more thorough than it was during that election campaign.

How to explain the results? It was an upheaval, a political explosion, one of the great elections in the history of democracy. The consequence: instant dissolution of the Emergency regime—the jails opened up, press censorship was lifted, habeas corpus was restored—putting an end to the climate of fear. All this amidst a peaceful transfer of power to new hands, *yesterday's cellmates*. Whether it is true that Mrs. Gandhi at the last moment attempted to draw the police and armed forces into a *coup d'état* is a matter for investigation by juridical bodies now at work. But her and her son's staggering defeats in their own carefully chosen electoral districts set the pace for the country in an election marked by a minimum of fraud (thanks to the vigilance of the Opposition) and no noticeable communal tensions. The voting indeed cut across community—Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, etc.—and caste lines.

Over 60 percent of the eligible electorate cast their votes—some 194 million people! Although 5 million ballots cast were invalid, there were 188.5 million to be counted. The voting results, by parties, went as follows:

(1) JANATA (People's party), including the Congress for Democracy (CFD or Ram) that split from Congress: 81.5 million votes = approx. 45 percent of the total.
(2) CONGRESS (Mrs. Gandhi's party): 65 million votes = approx. 34 percent of the total.

Israeli Election

Distressing as the result of the Israeli election seems, we cannot, as we close this issue of *Dissent* in late May, offer any useful commentary. It is still not certain whether the right-wing Likud will be able to form a government—though it is clear enough that the Labor Alignment, which had ruled Israel since its formation, has suffered a significant defeat. How all this will affect the prospect for peace negotiations, what needs to be done to revitalize the Israeli labor movement, such questions we will turn to in the next issue. —EDS.

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(3) REGIONAL (state and local parties): 17 million votes.
(4) NONPARTY INDEPENDENTS (unaffiliated, independent candidates): 11 million votes.
(5) COMMUNIST PARTY (MARXIST)—("Left" Communists): 8 million votes.
(6) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (pro-Russian, pro-Mrs. Gandhi): 5 million votes.

The top parties represent almost 80 percent of the vote. Most of the elected independents now support Janata. The Congress party, however, still remains a major force in the country, having polled 3 out of 4 votes in Southern India. If its purged leadership can hold the party together, it will be a formidable opposition for Janata. The two Communist parties polled under 10 percent—3 percent less than their combined 1971 results. The pro-Russian CPI lost significantly, receiving less than 3 percent of the vote, compared to 5 percent in 1971, and so will have merely a few seats in parliament. Its rival, the CPM (roughly comparable to the [West European] Eurocommunist movements), declined from 5.12 percent in 1971 to 4.3 percent, losing 3 seats. And so Communism, in whatever form, was decisively repudiated in these Indian elections.

The Janata party's results, examined more closely, are astonishing. Janata took 9 percent more of the vote than Congress, with Northern India more than making up for the poor showing in the South: in the state of Bihar, 65 percent; in Haryana, 70 percent; in Uttar Pradesh, 68 percent; in Himachal Pradesh, 58 percent; in the Delhi Federal District, 68 percent. Thus, in the lower house of parliament, Janata now will have a two-thirds majority.

THE COTERIE that surrounded Indira Gandhi—often referred to as the Kashmiri or Punjabi Mafia, consisting largely of English-educated elitists with a deep contempt for the Indian masses—is now vanquished and dispersed. In some respects, the Emergency of June 1975 was declared in order to consolidate this coterie's power. At first, Mrs. Gandhi's Emergency rule was welcomed by the country's ruling classes—industrialists, businessmen, prosperous farmers, bureaucrats, and upper-middle-class intelligentsia. Such people then saw little cause to complain about government policies. The Emergency guaranteed high prices for agricultural produce; a lid on trade-union activities including prohibition of strikes, wage increases, and cost-of-living allowances for the workers; for private industrialists, there was liberal issuance of import licenses proliferating various subsidies and tax cuts. But there was another side to this picture. Over two years' time, the bureaucracy of the Emergency regime took on a life of its own, exacting money beyond the usual amounts. With such threats as income-tax evasion charges, black-marketeering raids, government attachment procedures for recovery of land, charge of misuse of industrial and import licences, the Emergency government's bureaucracy demanded total servility to its whims and to all efforts that strengthened its authoritarian hold on the state apparatus. And so, in the end, the disenchantment of the business community was to contribute to the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi's political clique and regime.

By now the most overt digressions and forms of the Emergency regime have vanished; but much remains to be done to complete the restoration of democracy. The upper house of parliament (the Rajya Sabha)—whose members are largely appointed by state legislative assemblies and hence not representative of the popular vote—is still dominated by Congress-party members ready to block any democratic legislation. And most of the state governments too, elected five years ago, are still controlled by the Congress party. In order to undo the worst aspects of Emergency legislation (passed by Mrs. Gandhi's obedient Congress-party members), the Janata party must take hold of all this political machinery—not an easy task. The point now is to keep the political momentum going, to stay close to the people, to act. Besides, there is the issue of how far to investigate the Emergency itself. On this issue we cite a seasoned political observer, Romesh Thapar, one of the intellectuals in the sphere of Jayprakash Narayan, the moral leader of the Opposition movement. Thapar writes

The Voice of Truth

- **"Just because a man is poor and maybe cannot read does not mean that he cares nothing about his human rights. The Congress government has tried to shut my mouth and therefore the Congress loses my vote."**

— Village peasant, interviewed by William Borders, *New York Times*

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in the *Economic and Political Weekly* (April 9, 1977):

> The suspension of democratic functioning did not occur on a fateful day in June 1975. It was the culmination of a process of manipulative politics set in motion many years earlier, and very often the handiwork of supposedly democratic men. A commission should record this sorry tale so that each sector is made aware of its guilt . . . .
>
> Press censorship, the subversion of the media, the blackmail of the judiciary, the harassment of individuals and companies via the taxation authorities and public undertakings handling electric and water connections, and the use of the police and intelligence organizations to establish conformism have to be carefully surveyed to understand the mechanics of authoritarianism. Above all, we must probe the most dastardly crime committed against the Harijans (Untouchables) and the Muslim minority—in the name of family planning.

BEYOND a few ritualistic phrases, the Carter administration's response to the elections is one of indifference; matters concerning India continue at a low level of priority in American eyes. The intellectual community too was not shaken out of its anti-Indian sentiments. Writing in the *New Republic* (January 15, 1977) before the election, Nick Eberstadt of the Harvard Center for Population Studies reaffirmed the time-worn wisdom that ". . . India is not really a nation: it is an ontology, a set of beliefs and perceptions which barely hold together a people who have as little in common as the population of a single nation formed out of Ireland, Hungary, Mexico, and the Philippines." And he goes on to the deadly notion that a democratic society and economic progress are incompatible:

> The true tragedy of the Emergency is not the suspension of habeas corpus, or the convenient postponing of elections. The tragedy is that the only hope 500 million Indians have of improving their lives under the existing political-economic system is to bargain away their rights as citizens and to grant their leader *carte blanche* to cripple opposition and prepare her son Sanjay to succeed her in the Nehru monarchy.

Here, again, is the stifling weed of "left authoritarianism" that corrupts the thought of so many Western intellectuals.

Probably, by the end of this century, regardless of regime or orientation, India is bound to be one of the world's great powers—a superpower in the Chinese sense. The advance of its technology and its nuclear development point in this direction. But this ought not to be our concern at the moment. It should be, instead, the poverty of its masses, the maldistribution of its wealth and resources, the waste and corruption of its bureaucracy, the limited success of its many programs—economic

India and Intellectuals

• There is a village peasant in India who understands more about modern politics than a good many professors of political science in the United States. We quote him in a box on the adjacent page, but it's worth repeating what he says:

> Just because a man is poor and maybe cannot read does not mean that he cares nothing about his human rights. The Congress government has tried to shut my mouth and therefore the Congress loses my vote.

This peasant—and millions of Indians like him—took a historic step in the recent Indian election. They showed how false, or simple-minded, is the notion advanced by *Realpolitik* intellectuals in the West, symmetrically spread across "right" and "left," who argue that yes, democracy is all very well in advanced countries, but in such places as India (or China) where people are poor, you can hardly expect, etc. etc.

We democratic socialists have always resisted this sophistical notion, which often also contains a measure of contempt for "backward" peoples. Now it turns out that the unnamed Indian peasant understands that without democratic rights he has no opportunity to fight for his social betterment; that democracy, far from being a luxury for the wealthy, is a necessity for the poor. Whether the new Janata government does well or poorly, gratifies our hopes or disappoints them, remains to be seen; and, in a sense, is hardly the point. The point is that the people of India have shown a wonderful political understanding and human assertion. American intellectuals, and all other Americans, who care about freedom and social change, the two linked inextricably together, have every reason to rejoice. And all the deep thinkers, so smug in their assurance that economic progress in countries like India can come only through the massacre of human rights—might they not take a second look, try a second thought? •

I.H.

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A Victory Letter from Bombay

"My very dear ——

"Yes, it was a glorious victory. We played a very, very minuscule part in it, but I can still stand up and say with pride that it was my victory, our victory, the victory of all those people who had the courage to stand up when one had a lot to lose by doing so. Words cannot express the kind of involvement that swept through this country. The rich, the poor, the big, the small, the activist, and the indifferent. All felt that for the first time since Independence the fate of the nation depended on the way they exercised their judgment. People who had never bothered to vote turned up at the polls. Women who normally professed themselves indifferent to politics went through endless inconvenience to exercise their franchise. People who had not registered in time made it their business to see that some registered voter went to cast his vote for the Janata party.

"It was exhilarating. You felt that democracy was real, alive, and infinitely precious. The poorest of the poor, the most ignorant of the illiterate exercised their vote. You should have seen the slum voters! These people are usually bought *en bloc* by the Congress party. But they took the Congress bribe and went in to vote Janata!

"How can I describe the atmosphere on the night the results came out? At about 8 PM, as the results started coming in, we went out to the local Janata party office. Mrs. Gandhi and her son were trailing badly in their constituencies, but of course the Indian media did not announce this news. The Janata party got the news over the B.B.C. and started broadcasting it at their booths. By this time huge crowds had collected and every announcement that a leading Congress figure was trailing would be greeted with a tremendous roar. There was singing, dancing, fireworks, and throwing of colored "holi" powder. A group of Sikhs broke into an impromptu *bhanga;* students were jumping up and down with glee. Total strangers hugged each other; some, like me, were crying with joy. When the news of Gokhale's defeat [Minister of Law in Mrs. Ghandi's cabinet], from our constituency, was announced, it was past 2:30 AM in the morning. Despite that, the crowd came out, the streets were packed with men, women, children. When his victorious opponent, Ram Jethmalani, finally came out, the crowd was more than ten abreast. A sea of people who parted just enough to allow his car to pass. At 3:30 AM, Ram made an impromptu victory speech, and it was past 4 AM when, exhausted but deliriously happy, we staggered home."

P.

planning, population control, education, and housing.

THE MYTH of the success of Mrs. Gandhi's 20-point program for the Emergency dies a hard death. From the World Bank to former liberal American ambassadors, the tale spread that, despite everything, there was a causal link between the Emergency and India's resurgent economy. Containment of inflation, increase in grain production, sterilization of millions to sharply reduce the birth rate, major social reforms. (Didn't Sanjay Gandhi propose to end caste and the dowry system?) With these "lazy, undisciplined Indians" (to quote de Gaulle's sneering comment, "this dust of people"), only the stick can be effective!

In reality, between 1972 and 1975 prices increased by approximately 50 percent, cutting in half the real income of the peasants and workers. Since March 1976, with the Emergency still very much intact, there has been an uninterrupted rise in prices that wiped out whatever decline in inflation had previously taken place. Index figures for wholesale prices for the last week of February 1977 stood at 182.9 (1970-71 ◻ 100), surpassing the highest level reached in September 1974. (Retail prices show a similar upward trend during the first few months of the new Janata administration, indicating that the problem of inflation transcends political events.)

Indira's emergency powers had little or no effect on the state of the economy. In reality, as an Indian economist in a high government position proved (*New York Times*, January 15), the changes they instituted further tilted income distribution in favor of the *wealthier* sectors of the population, the top 10 percent. The masses received the "reward" of the banning of all strikes and union activities, the freeze of workers' wages, a token trickle-down transfer of arable land to the landless, slum-clearance by bulldozer without rehousing, and the onslaught of the now notorious family-planning program that more than any other single factor led to the election outcome. Private enterprise and the great industrial empires of the Birlas and the Tatas were awarded with a preferential carte-blanche policy, as were private multinational enterprises.

A speech delivered by Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India K. S. Krishnaswamy at the 59th Annual Conference of the Indian Economic Association (reported in the *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 15, 1977) is particularly

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revealing. Mr. Krishnaswamy pointed out that organized lobbies come forward to act on behalf of additional government expenditures as well as reduced taxation. There is a community of views embracing both the private sector of India's mixed economy and the expenditure-controllers within the government who want grants to the public sector reduced in order to lower the impact of inflation. Both groups oppose those favoring the government sector as the leading entity in economic growth. Here now, Mr. Krishnaswamy:

> When these interests collide, the outcome depends on the distribution of political power within the government . . . . When it appears politically expedient to press ahead with certain programs of investment or mass welfare, the expenditure-controllers' first gambit will usually be to try to impose cuts on non-priority or non-productive items of expenditure in the government budget, or to seek a transfer of resources from the non-governmental sector to the budget.

Under Mrs. Gandhi's Emergency, those who favored development through government initiative were losing out to those who wanted to cut back such activities. Krishnaswamy continues:

> . . . as budget deficits become large and prices rise, the development lobby finds itself weakened by the onslaughts of the middle-nand higher-income groups which have vested interests in the *status quo* and in limiting public-sector involvement in investment and trading activities . . . . Projects or programs yielding benefits over a period, as well as those that contribute to an improvement in the quality of life—such as education, health, and environmental improvements—are postponed if not abandoned . . . . It protects the prevailing power structure in society from having to yield place or accept unpalatable adjustments.

Finally, Mrs. Gandhi's 20-point program was supposedly oriented toward aiding the rural poor, the largest and poorest group in the population. The fixing of minimum wages for agricultural labor, housing for landless workers in the villages, a moratorium on recovery of private debts by court action, land ceiling laws leading to land distribution, new rural banks to reach the poor—these were among the proposals. The reality was a failure of implementation. In rural areas, the Congress party and government machinery is under control of the landed gentry that, thanks to incentive prices for agricultural surplus paid to large farmers under the Emergency, is wealthier than ever.

THE FAMILY-PLANNING program will go down as the Emergency regime's single most shameful action. Family planning in India has been set back by years, thanks to the storm of opposition aroused by the force and fraud employed. It may become statistically provable that, over the next few years, more births are accounted for than if the Emergency's program had not been put into effect.

It will be hard for India's birth-control program to regain its lost credibility. The original objective of India's national population policy, which dates back to independence days, was to build a mass movement in favor of the small-family norm. This objective has not been achieved, and resort to force to impose sterilization has created the contrary condition—a mass movement *against* family planning. Even quantitatively, if we accept the Indira government's figures, the peak of 3.8 million sterilizations during six months of 1975-76 is not impressive if we consider that there were 3.1 million during the same period in 1972-73 without any coercion whatever. Further, the demographic profile of those sterilized under duress reveals that many belonged to demographically doubtful groups: old and sickly men, people previously sterilized, etc.

The image of family-planning workers in the rural areas was that of persons using coercion and pressure, offering bribes to entice people to accept vasectomy and tubectomy. Raiding parties—they cannot be described otherwise—concentrated on the weaker and poorer villagers. Personnel from health and family-planning units, revenue and development departments, with police protection, raided villages and rounded up people, even emptying public buses. More prosperous villagers were let off. Some bought their release by

Traitors

- "Mr. Sanjay Gandhi described all those who support the Janata party as "traitors." At first, when he asked how many such traitors there were in the crowd, only three hands were raised. But, when he persisted with them and again asked the "traitors" to identify themselves, almost the entire crowd raised their hands and kept them raised till he left in a huff."

— *The Indian Express*, March 11, 1977

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providing substitutes from the poorer class; often, the entire adult population of a village fled to the fields or forests at the sight of any approching vehicle; people hid in the fields for weeks on end.

Ideologically, the disparate components of the Janata party drew closer together during the harsh experience of the Emergency. Each formerly independent party (Jan Sangh, Socialists, etc.) has accepted the two principles of decentralization of political power and devolution of economic power. Once the vestiges of the Emergency have been completely dismantled, the new leadership will turn to a consideration of these thorny yet fundamental issues. National planning for heavy industry and completion of the infrastructure? How much, how far? Revision of the national budget to channel increased funds into village planning and cottage industries? A shifting of the balance of relations between the center of power in Delhi and the 22 states and districts, so that national unity is maintained but local centers of power are strengthened? What relation between popular vigilance committees, as advocated by J. P. Narayan, and official institutions and structures?

THERE IS bound to be a fresh approach to the model of India itself and the image it wishes to present, particularly to the so-called Third World. This is why it is no exaggeration to claim that the great election of 1977 marks India's reawakening and, one hopes, the beginning of a renaissance.

Mahatma Gandhi's goal for India was "to feed the hungry and clothe the naked." The Janata party has proclaimed this to be its social policy. Since 40 percent of the Indian population lives below the poverty line (a poverty line adjusted to Indian standards, which includes two meals a day), Janata has its task cut out.

It will be a matter of decades; the initial problem is to reorient the economy in a radically different direction from the one it has taken since independence in 1947. This reorientation must begin with distribution or, rather, redistribution of the nation's products. The hand of government will be felt at all levels: procurement of grain for stockpiling to meet drought years; price-fixing; government food shops; properly financed programs in housing, education, health, family planning, etc.—above all, cutting down on rural and urban mass unemployment and underemployment. A recent study, for example, indicates that there are no less than 10,000 young Indian doctors, recent graduates, without posts or work! They are now reluctant to go into the village areas, but improved conditions and incentives could place each one of these trained men and women in a network of villages or in the slum areas of the cities. If the government fails to begin this vast reorientation of its energies within, say, the next year, the momentum of the election victory will fade and turn into disillusion. It is an enormous task that faces the new government.

P.S. — *June 15:* The Janata party's sweep of the June state elections places that party in effective control of the country's political structure. Janata now is responsible for the nation. Its first proposed national budget, drastically reordering priorities in favor of jobs and rural development, is a major step toward fulfillment of its commitment. □

Simon Leys

In Defense of Madame Mao

Without Mao there could have been no Madame Mao. This elementary truism is now being sysematically obliterated by Chairman Hua's Propaganda Department. In order to legitimize his earlier coup d'état, Hua must create, against all evidence, a myth according to which his purging of Madame Mao and of the Maoist Radicals was entirely in harmony with Mao's own original intentions. Flimsy and spurious clues are now being fabricated, alleging Mao's earlier displeasure with his wife and with the small group of people who were in fact his only faithful followers among the top leadership. . . . The truth, of course, is that Chiang Ching and her friends owed everything to Mao: they had obtained their exalted position entirely thanks to his personal initiative, and retained it only through his continuous and active protection. They had no support from the Party, no support from the army, and—needless to say—no support from among the masses (a point of much less importance, however, since in a totalitarian state, the masses have no say in the selection of their rulers). The backing of Mao's prestige alone could maintain them in power,

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against the tremendous hostility and hatred that their own political ineptitude had earned them from all quarters. They would have been toppled much earlier, had it not been for this peculiar immunity afforded them by the "Great Helmsman's" private favor. The swiftness and ease with which they were disposed of, as soon as Mao breathed his last, were but a final demonstration of this fact.

To ensure a smooth transition, Mao's successor is now confronted with a delicate task: it is necessary for Hua to claim that, by destroying Maosim for all practical purposes, he is actually faithful to Mao! This improbable message is now being dutifully broadcast everywhere. In Europe, in America, even in Australia, we can already hear the usual Peking sycophants zealously denouncing Madame Mao and exposing all the evils of the "Gang of Four." May I confess that I find their performance singularly tasteless? I myself can hardly be suspected of being an admirer of Chiang Ching—I did not wait until her downfall to begin criticizing her—but when I see how she is attacked now by people who professed nothing but respect for her as long as she was in power, I somehow wish to take up her defense. To ascribe to Madame Mao the main responsibility for the senseless violence and cruelty of the "Cultural Revolution," for the destruction of Chinese culture, and for the ruthless cretinization of the most sophisticated nation on earth—which have all taken place during the last ten years—would be akin to crediting the ass whose jaw Samson borrowed in battle with the ability of destroying the Philistines. The devastating effects of this unusual weapon derived from the hand that swung it: the very enormity of Madame Mao's havoc should not induce us to forget her own *essential mediocrity*. By herself, she was nothing but a failed actress and a barely literate demimondaine; of her own, she had nothing—neither intelligence nor talent, nor even elementary shrewdness and basic political acumen, as recent events have made all too plain. The large-scale sufferings, crimes, and ruin that we now associate with her name derived not from any evil genius of hers but from the latitude and impetus deliberately given her by Mao. It would be sheer impudence to denounce the "Gang of Four" while covering up the decisive and demiurgic role played by Mao in this matter. Yet, among Western audiences, there is generally enough ignorance to allow this conjuror's trick to be pulled off without challenge—specially when the performing artists happen to be, as is too often the case, respected political, diplomatic, or academic authorities.

WITH CHINESE AUDIENCES, however, it does not go down so easily. Popular reaction against such cynical tampering with historical evidence became so strong that recently the Party committees of Kwangtung province and of the Canton garrison felt moved to send a message to Hua Kuo-feng, demanding that a new critical evaluation of Mao's role be at last authorized. Here are some passages of this extraordinary document, which was leaked to the outside world, probably at the initiative of its very authors:

> . . . In the Party, in the army, and among the masses, there still linger a number of unanswered questions whose accumulation is somewhat hampering the full development of socialist initiative. It is only when answers will have been provided to those qudstions that the Party, the army, and the masses will be ablet o dedicate themselves unreservedly to the construction of socialism. How should we evaluate chairman Mao's position in History? . . . However great his achievements, during the long period when he was leading the Party, the army, and the state, Chairman Mao was not always infallible or without shortcomings. If we do not have the courage to criticize these, we will not help the progress of the revolutionary cause. The people have shart eyes: everyone can see for himself. If the Central Committee persists in hiding at all cost the errors and mistakes of Chairman Mao, not only will the prestige of the Party decline among the masses, but socialist initiative too will be further weakened and corrupted . . . Chairman Mao used to brand as "class enemies" all the comrades who dared to criticize him. Of course, he was right most of the time; yet, we cannot deny that many debates were terminated arbitrarily, and that many "inner contradictions" were abusively identified as "antagonistic contradictions." For instance, such cases as Peng Teh'huai's and Teng Hsiao-ping's belong to that category of abuses. Even concerning Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi, some comrades remain sceptical. . . . It is imperative that the truth be reestablished wherever it has been distorted. . . . Some comrades consider that the second decade of the People's Republic was not as good as the first and the third was worse than the second. We must face the truth which is contained in this observation. . . .

IN CANTON, at the end of 1974 under the pen name of Li Yi-che, a courageous young revolutionary wrote a political manifesto of historical momentum. On the occasion of the anti-Lin Piao campaign, then in full swing, he dared to ask the

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only relevant question: what is the point of attacking a dead individual, if we do not attempt to identify the mechanisms by which he came into power—what is the point of denouncing Lin Piao, if we do not endeavor to denounce the Lin Piao *system?* Since that manifesto was actually aimed in part at the "Gang of Four," the persecution to which Li Yi-che was being subjected since its publication relented somewhat for a while following Chiang Ching's downfall. But now the news has just reached us from Canton that he has been arrested once again. Hua Kuo-feng obviously cannot afford to let such a man go free: one of these days, *he might well have come to ask where the "Gang of Four" had drawn its power from . . .* □

George Eckstein

Germany: The SPD in Trouble

Less than five years after Willy Brandt's triumphant reelection in 1972, the German Social Democratic party (SPD) finds itself in deep trouble. Under Brandt's leadership, West Germany, the only major country on the continent without a significant Communist party, had achieved the "opening to the East." This policy, at the price of de facto recognition of the East German DDR, had paved the way for a measure of economic, cultural, and personal exchange between the two Germanies—family visits and reunions, emigration to the West for older people, release of political prisoners purchased with economic concessions, etc. These things meant much to many people.

Brandt's dynamic policy and open personality attracted the support of many intellectuals to the SPD (with Günter Grass in the forefront), and it helped the party to reach out beyond the old working-class constituency to the new white-collar middle class of technicians, middle managers, public employees, and academics. In a sometimes precarious but on the whole successful coalition with the small liberal Free Democratic party (FDP), Brandt had demonstrated the SPD's ability to handle the affairs of the nation. In the process, the SPD had completed its transformation from a labor party to a "people's party."

In his second term, however, Brandt ran into unexpected trouble, and in 1974 he threw in the sponge, hurt by intrigues in his own party, but above all by the discovery that he had sheltered a major East German spy in his chancellery. Yet Brandt did not disappear from public life. In addition to his parliamentary seat in the Bundestag, he retained the leadership of the party. In this position he was to play an important part on the international scene: in supporting Suares in Portugal and Gonzalez in Spain; in reorienting the Socialist International (whose president he became in December 1976) toward stronger cooperation with the Third World and with liberal Democrats in the U.S. and Canada. Brandt also established contact and visited with President Carter soon after the inauguration—a visit all the more important because his successor, Chancellor Helmuth Schmidt, as most of Europe's political leaders, had barely concealed his preference for Gerald Ford.

Schmidt, who comes from the right wing of the party, an ex-Army officer who had joined the SPD after the war, was a capable Defense and Finance minister under Brandt. He is a man of keen intelligence, quick decision and sharp tongue, and can perhaps best be described as the epitome of the technocrat. He is known to be impatient of obstacles, and to complain bitterly about the cumbersome requirements of parliamentary democracy: "85 percent of one's time is wasted in explaining one's decisions before 1,001 committees." He is an effective orator, but lacks personal warmth and concern for people. The magazine *Der Spiegel* quotes the Dutch socialist Sicco Mansholt (until recently head of the EEC): "Schmidt is not a politician. He is an administrator, extremely capable in organization and economics, but he lacks political flair." Perhaps because of these traits, the unquestionable success of Schmidt's economic policies—which has kept both unemployment and inflation in the Bundesrepublik far lower than in any other industrial country—has gone largely unappreciated by his compatriots. They only notice that unemployment went from zero to 1.2 million (5

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percent), with inflation remaining around 4 percent.

There are other problems, some endemic, some new. There is the burden of holding the recession-ridden European Community together. There are the difficulties of maintaining the high level of exports (almost one quarter of all production) on which the West German economy depends, one reason for the obstinacy with which Schmidt pursued the nuclear power deal with Brazil in the face of stern U.S. opposition. There is the recently stymied state of relations with the DDR—and the uncertainty about U.S. foreign policy after Kissinger. Add to all this the growing political liability of the SPD's own youth organization, the Young Socialists (Jusos), which has been dominated by radical neo-Marxist students and academics.

THE RESULT is a growing general uneasiness. Luckily, there is a distinct lack of harmony in the conservative camp: Helmuth Kohl, the moderate leader of the Christian Democrats (CDU), a kind of German Gerald Ford, is under attack from the rabid rightist Franz-Josef Strauss. Thanks to this split, Schmidt has been able to retain a narrow but workable majority in the 1976 Bundestag elections. However, the party lost its leading position in several of the Länder (states') parliaments during that year, including Rhineland-Westphalia, the most industrialized and populous among them. But the real catastrophy was the loss of the "red" state of Hesse in the municipal elections of March 20, 1977. This political fortress had been held by the SPD's traditional left wing without interruption since the re-formation of the country after the war and had produced some exemplary progressive legislation. In Frankfurt, Hesse's and Germany's largest city with a continuous SPD majority, the party's support dropped from over 50 to below 40 percent of the vote, while the Christian Democrats' (CDU) vote jumped from 37 to 52 percent, well above their own expectations. Clearly, the SPD lost not just the middle-class vote to the CDU: in addition, I understand, thousands of old party faithfuls had stayed home.

The Hesse debacle has been blamed on a number of specific matters: a well-conceived but too brusquely introduced school reform; a major administrative reform that consolidated counties, cities, and suburbs, often ignoring historical sensibilities; several prominent cases of political corruption. Add to this the Schmidt government's unpopular (national) attempt to postpone an explicitly promised increase in old-age pensions only weeks after the last Bundestag election.

All these specific items point to a deeper cause for dissatisfaction: the party in Hesse had become stale in power, was taking the voters for granted, and had ignored clear warning signals. An ingrown bureaucracy had lost touch with the people. Thus, while it had expected some losses, the party was unprepared for the landslide victory of the CDU under Dregger, a leading rightist to boot.

Since the Schmidt government has still almost three years to go until the next Bundestag election, these regional defeats need not affect it immediately. It will undoubtedly face an emboldened conservative opposition whose right wing in particular feels buoyed by success. In addition, the government has had to face several troublesome domestic crises this spring:

- Its own "Watergate" scandals of illegal wiretapping. First, that of Traube, a nuclear scientist working in secret research and suspect because of his association with the lawyer and friend of a terrorist radical (Traube has since been cleared, but not yet regained his job). Then, the bugging of lawyer-defendant conferences in a Wurttemberg jail during the two-year-long trial of members of the notorious Baader-Meinhof gang (whose presumed friends recently murdered the prosecutor in the case).
- The growing opposition to the construction of nuclear power plants, a particularly sensitive matter in a densely populated country with insufficient energy-resource alternatives. Last March, opponents scored a legal victory in their fight against a project in Wyhl (in the Black Forest area); other opponents, at the same time, have staged violent demonstrations at Brockdorf, another proposed site.

Radical youth groups have begun to seize upon this issue. Many of them, mostly students with virtually no working-class support, have lately tended to enter the orbit of the West German Communist party (DKP), which is supposedly independent but in fact Moscow-oriented. Although nationwide it never received more than 1.5 percent of the vote, the DKP was able to muster 10 percent of the vote in the university city of Giessen in the recent Hesse elections. And on that very day, the Young Socialists (Jusos) replaced their outgoing chairperson, who had managed to keep their and her own radicalism within bounds

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acceptable to the party, with the most radical of three contenders, Klaus-Uwe Benneter. This 30-year-old Berlin lawyer (the Jusos' age limit is a rather mature 35 years) subscribes to the so-called *Stamokap* theory, which sees in the modern capitalist state little more than the arm of monopoly capitalism.

The Stamokap theory, however, is not the major source of conflict between the Jusos and the party. It may hurt the party's public image among middle-class voters, but it is contradicted by the Jusos' ultimate willingness to work for reform within the system in the absence of any revolutionary prospects. The real issue is Benneter's intention to lead his group into collaboration with the DKP and its satellite organizations such as the "Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation." Such connections have long been banned in the SPD.

Benneter, meanwhile, has been talking out of both sides of his mouth: in an interview in the *Spiegel* he intimated that he might pull back from such collaboration for purely tactical reasons; in the radical monthly *Konkret* he says that he envisages a separation from the SPD. The party's Executive Committee has seized upon the *Konkret* interview to suspend Benneter as Juso chairman, and has initiated proceedings to expel him from the party. This, in effect, means a kind of split within the Young Socialist organization whose form will probably minimize the radicals' exodus. The party's right wing has long advocated such a step, and only the intervention of Brandt and his associates had kept open this avenue for a badly needed input of new blood and thereby brought a number of promising young leftists into the Bundestag and government.

The Jusos themselves have been beset by problems of recruitment because of the recent change of spirit among students who in Germany as elsewhere are now more interested in careers than in changing the world.

In a number of local organizations—the city of Munich is the most notable example—Jusos have managed to achieve control, often with disastrous political results, inlcuding the threat of secession by the right wing of the SPD. As students and young academics, Juso members have at times outtalked and outlasted the ordinary membership in long night meetings, pushing through resolutions and delegate slates after many of the older members with jobs and family had gone home. These tactics have alienated many old cadres. Besides, much of the Jusos' verbal radicalism is exploited and used against the party by the conservative press. Yet, in some other places, Jusos in office have initiated valuable reforms.

At this moment, one encounters in the party a spirit of frustration bordering on defeatism. It is particularly unfortunate that this comes at a time when the political developments in France, Italy, and the United States, and on the other hand in Eastern Europe, pose new problems and present new opportunities. Under a vital Social Democratic leadership West Germany could play a prominent role in this period. Reversion to a conservative government that is not in step with the times would thus be all the more deplorable. □

Jon Wiener

Whatever Happened to George Wallace?

Political memories are sometimes short. A year before the election, it seemed that it would be easy for any one of several Democrats to defeat the man who pardoned Nixon. What seemed difficult was for any of them to defeat George Wallace, lock up the nomination, and thus avoid a brokered convention in which Wallace would play a powerful role. Wallace was a specter that had haunted the Democratic party ever since the 1964 Wisconsin primary, in which he got 34 percent of the vote; his growing strength in 1968 and 1972 suggested that in 1976 he might finally succeed in destroying the dwindling New Deal coalition that had been an organizing focus of American politics for 30 years.

George Wallace is the man who proclaimed in 1962, "I'm gonna make race the basis of politics in this state, and I'm gonna make it the basis of politics in this country." In 1958, after losing the

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campaign for governor, he said of his opponent, "Patterson outnigguhed me. And boys, I ain't gonna be outnigguhed again.[1] Wallace's insatiable hunger to win sometimes required that he fall back on code words—"law and order," "states' rights," opposition to "busin'"—but when he denounced "welfare freeloaders, you know who they are," everyone knew where Wallace stood.

Wallace's 1976 campaign was to be built on the foundation laid in 1968 and 1972. In '68, running as a third-party candidate, his strength in the polls grew from 9 percent in April to 21 percent in September, when it looked as if he was on his way to getting 30 percent on election day, enough to deny either major candidate an electoral-college majority—an "absolute political disaster," Theodore White called it.[2] Wallace got almost 10 million votes, 14 percent of the total, and won 45 electoral votes in five Deep South states, more than any third-party candidate in this century. It was calculated that he disturbed the balance of power between the two parties in 30 states. Wallace support among white workers outside the South did not materialize on election day; they stuck with Humphrey. But in the South, Wallace won the support of 53 percent of white manual workers (compared to only 22 percent of the middle class), according to S.M. Lipset.[3] Humphrey got only 31 percent of the southern vote, more than two-thirds of which was black.

The 1972 Wallace campaign in the Democratic primaries showed him stronger than ever before. He finished third, after Humphrey and McGovern, with 24 percent of the vote. Wallace won in Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, Maryland and, most threatening of all, Michigan where, in May 1972, he got 51 percent of the vote. Many of these were Republican crossovers, but still the total sent a shudder down the spines of Michigan's liberals. And Wallace finished second in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Wisconsin, swing states essential to any Democratic victory.

The meaning of these primaries was clear to everyone: Wallace was on his way to destroying the New Deal coalition by pulling out the white working class. He sought to mobilize the white working class by appealing both to racism and to a class-conscious resentment of the elite, those who "look down their nose at every workingman in the United States and call them a bunch of rednecks." His apparent success terrified authorities on electoral politics. Theodore White was representative: he described Wallace supporters as the "blue-collared, surly men. . .frequently on the threshhold of violence. . .the workers with muscular biceps growling or grinning approval." They believed in Wallace because "he was saying what was on their minds. . .the way they said it to each other in the bars." The workers were deserting the New Deal coalition, in White's view, not so much on the basis of their interests but because "it runs against their animal instinct."[4] The Wallace primary victories in 1972 were seen as proof that America's white workers, once the basis of the party of progressive social change, had become a reactionary and racist political force.

The Republicans were ready to seize the opportunity by wooing the Wallace vote. Kevin Phillips, John Mitchell's boy-wonder theorist, laid out the Southern Strategy: a new Republican majority could by built by bringing the disaffected white workers, particularly the southerners, into the Republican party, the party that defended their interests by blocking the expansion of social programs.[5] Nixon eagerly sought to enlist the Wallace voters in his own campaign. Spiro Agnew was the incarnation of the Southern Strategy. Wallace understood the threat and denounced Agnew as a "copy-cat."

The question in 1972 was whether the southern white workers would support Nixon or Wallace. When Wallace was shot, Nixon succeeded beyond his greatest expectations, and political sociologists proclaimed the end of the New Deal coaltion. "The Nixon victory in the South was something with which history had been pregnant for almost a generation," said Theodore White, and Wallace had been the midwife.[6] "This country is going so far to the right you won't recognize it," Attorney General John Mitchell announced early in 1973.

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[1]Marshall Frady, *Wallace* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1968); see also Pat Watters, "George Wallace—Persistent Presence," *Dissent*, Fall 1975, pp. 318-21.

[2]Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1968* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 347-48.

[3]Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[4]Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973), p. 92; White, *1968*, pp. 349, 401.

[5]Kevin Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969).

[6]White, *1972*, p. 343.

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II

BUT WALLACE was not conceding his followers to the Republicans. Where his 1972 campaign had been a patchwork affair, poorly financed and run by amateurs, he emerged in 1976 determined to run an effective national primary effort, despite his paralysis from the waist down.

Those familiar with the new rules reforming campaign-financing and the Democratic delegate selection process saw Wallace as the principal beneficiary of these changes. The new federal spending rules, which banned large contributions, were a disaster for the regular party leaders who had always been supported by the big spenders, while Wallace had a list of half a million small contributors. He rapidly raised $3 million and was the first candidate to qualify for federal matching funds under the new law. The end of the winner-take-all primary would give Wallace substantial delegate blocs in the many states where he finished second or third. He also expected to gain from the fact that many more primaries were scheduled for 1976, since he usually did better in primaries than in state caucuses, which tended to be controlled by the party regulars. In addition, more of the southern states, his natural base of support, were to have primaries.[7]

Ten candidates were running in addition to Wallace, all of them liberals or "centrists." The best guess about what would happen was that several of them would win a few states each, but no single leader would emerge who would be capable of locking up the nomination before the convention and thereby shut out Wallace. And so Wallace would arrive with the largest single delegate block, probably 15 to 20 percent. Although this would not be enough to get him the presidential nomination, it would empower him to play a powerful role in a brokered convention.

Republican Southern Strategy conservatives hoped to repeat their 1972 triumph in 1976 and keep the southern white workers out of the Democratic party, more or less for good. *National Review* publisher William Rusher organized a "Committee on Conservative Alternatives," which would build the New Conservative Majority out of the ruins of both the post-New Deal Democratic party and the post-Watergate Republicans. He proposed a Reagan-Wallace party, "conservative" and "populist," united against the "Eastern Establishment-university-foundation-media-bureaucracy axis." The Gallup Poll obligingly went out and asked a cross-section of the American people what they thought of Mr. Rusher's idea and found that, in the spring of 1975, 25 percent of all Americans said they would support a new right-wing party organized along Reagan-Wallace lines—about 7 percent more than were willing to call themselves Republicans. Kevin Phillips took to the pages of *Newsweek* to argue for the Reagan-Wallace ticket, Rusher's committee prepared to get a position on the ballot, Wallace kept his options open, and conservatives hoped Reagan could be persuaded.[8]

As the primary season began, the worst fears of liberal Democrats were realized. The Gallup Poll published early in March, before the first primaries, indicated that among labor union members, always the core of the Democratic alliance, Wallace was virtually tied with Humphrey as the favorite candidate. And Wallace usually ran better in the primaries than the polls indicated. "Forget the polls," a politician told the *New Republic's* TRB. "Wallace voters keep it a secret."[9] In Wallace's first contest, the South Carolina precinct caucuses on February 29, he got more than any other candidate—28 percent, against Carter's 23 percent (with 43 percent voting for an uncommitted slate).

Massachusetts was next for Wallace, the only state that had voted for McGovern, and the Alabama governor finished a stunning third in the popular vote, with 18 percent. "Can you believe that?" he chortled. Even more ominous for the New Deal coalition was that the winner, Henry Jackson, had gained first place only by outbidding Wallace's efforts to capture the racist vote in the white working class. Jackson met with Louise Day Hicks, and he ran full-page newspaper ads in Boston that said, "I Am Against Busing"; the ads accused Wallace of engaging in antibusing talk without action, and concluded that Jackson was the "one candidate who has a plan that can stop it."

The first- and third-place finishers had both run

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[7]Ken Bode, "The Democrats' Wallace Problem," *New Republic*, Oct. 25, 1976, p. 6; see also James T. Wooten, "Wallace's Last Hurrah?" *New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 11, 1976, p. 14.

[8]William Rusher, *The Making of a New Majority Party* (Mission, Kansas: Sheed, Andrews & McMeel, 1975); Kevin Phillips, "A Reagan-Wallace Ticket," *Newsweek*, May 19, 1975, p. 13.

[9]TRB, "The Woodwork Vote," *New Republic*, Dec. 20, 1975, p. 2.

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campaigns that appealed to racism; the *New York Times* editorial concluded that the lesson of Massachusetts was that "the old Democratic coalition is vulnerable to being split apart by racial issues." The Democrats could never capture the White House without the blacks and liberals, but Jackson the front-runner would find it difficult to win their support after his Massachusetts campaign. A refusal by blacks and liberal whites to support Jackson would make a brokered and deadlocked convention more likely.[10]

Jackson had not succeeded in winning over the bulk of the Wallace voters. Jackson lost Boston to Wallace; in the city as a whole, Wallace got 23,000 to Jackson's 17,000, and Wallace ran five to one ahead of Jackson in South Boston, the working-class Democratic stronghold preoccupied with busing. Nearly two-thirds of the Wallace voters, interviewed after they cast their ballots, refused to name a second choice should Wallace lose; they suggested they would bolt from the Democratic party if Wallace was not the nominee. Wallace himself was keeping the door open to a third-party candidacy.

Wallace thus emerged from his first two contests high in the polls, a winner in the South, his natural base, and doing dismayingly well appealing to the racism of northern white workers. The combination looked fatal to the Democratic party. More than ever, after Massachusetts, Wallace was the man to beat, and if there was a man who could beat him without alienating the blacks, he would probably become the nominee and glide into office over the inept incumbent.

The Florida primary on March 14 was to be the critical test of Wallace's strength in 1976. However "different" Florida might seem as a southern state, Wallace had won a stunning victory there in 1972, with 42 percent of the vote, an incredible 23 points ahead of the second-place finisher, Hubert Humphrey. Wallace got as many votes as the next three candidates combined; he carried every county in the state.

[10] *New York Times*, March 4, 1976, p. 30; Paul R. Weik, "The Wallace Message from Massachusetts," *New Republic*, March 28, 1976, p. 9.

- "Why are you in the hole?
- "Me? Because I was against Teng Hsiao-ping," said the first.
- "Me? Because I was for Teng Hsiao-ping," said the second.
- "And why you," said these two to the third who kept himself apart.
- "Oh, me? It's different. I AM Teng Hsiao-ping."

—Pierre Rigoulot, "The Revolutionary Situation in China," *Les Temps Modernes*, February, 1977

III

ENTER JIMMY CARTER: he had been campaigning against Wallace in Florida for more than a year. He built one of the biggest organizations ever seen in the state, and made 34 visits there in 15 months. He hoped for a respectable second-place finish, which would show that Wallace's strength was on the wane and that Carter was a front-runner. And Carter was steadily making progress within the South, defining the primaries as a Carter-Wallace contest. A poll of Democrats in seven southern states asked who voters would favor in a Carter-Wallace contest. In September 1975 Wallace had 51 percent and Carter only 29; in January 1976 Wallace had slipped to 42 percent, and in March, before the Florida primary, Carter pulled ahead, 47 to 34.

Wallace also knew that Florida was a crucial test, and he lavished his resources on his campaign there, spending $200,000 and three weeks in the state. His issues were classically racist and reactionary. At the end of the campaign, fearful that he was slipping, he turned more and more to the old code words, emphasizing his hostility to welfare recipients, busing advocates, and criminals, "you know who they are."

The best predictions for Florida were that Carter would split the anti-Wallace vote with a resurgent Jackson, permitting Wallace to win and depriving Carter of the strong second-place finish he wanted, not far behind Wallace and well ahead of Jackson. Jackson had the priceless commodity, "momentum," coming out of Massachusetts, which enabled him to argue that since he had beaten Wallace there, he was a better alternative than Carter.

On March 9, Carter got 35 percent to Wallace's 31, Jackson running a poor third with 23. Wallace ran fully 10 percentage points behind his 1972 total. The rest, as they say, is history: the next week

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Carter overwhelmed Wallace in Illinois, 48 to 28 percent, and the following week Carter smashed him in North Carolina, 54 to 35, another state Wallace had carried by an overwhelming margin in 1972. Having been beaten by Carter in three straight primaries, Wallace saw the handwriting on the wall: "I've lost the election."

From this perspective, the principal question posed by the primaries is, why did the Wallace candidacy collapse so quickly? The columnists said he never had a chance in 1976 because of his health. But they hadn't said that when he was the first to qualify for federal matching funds, when the early polls showed him a front-runner, or when he beat the other candidates in South Carolina and finished third in Massachusetts. Wallace was beaten because Carter successfully claimed Wallace's "populism" for himself, while joining it with an antiracist politics, thereby allying working-class whites with blacks. In Florida, Carter was in his "anti-Washington" phase, denouncing "Washington insiders," calling for "a new face," one who would "cut the bureaucracy down to size"—an issue that had been nurtured by George Wallace. Carter tapped the same resentment against patronizing upper-middle-class northerners that Wallace mobilized; white southerners supported Carter, Robert Coles argues, because they believed he would defend them against the "big interests. . .who have ignored, cheated, exploited, and scorned" them.[11]

Carter's most significant achievement was bringing this southern white populist constituency into a coalition with blacks on the basis of a rejection of racism. Carter refused to use the code words that not only Wallace but also Jackson had fallen back on. "To run my campaign on an antibusing issue," he said in Florida, "is just contrary to my basic nature. If I have to win by appealing to a basically negative, emotional issue, which has connotations of racism, I don't care to win that way." (In what has become a familiar Carter procedure of taking-both-sides, he added that he did not favor busing.)[12] Thus the principal lesson of the Wallace defeat was that the southern white working class can be won to an openly antiracist position if it is part of a broader populist attack on "the big interests" and "Washington insiders."

A white gas-station attendant outside Americus, Georgia, told Robert Coles, "I think Jimmy Carter will keep his eye out for the average person, like myself. I believe we'll be on his mind a lot." Can this constituency avoid feeling betrayed by Carter's hasty embrace of "the big interests"? Carter hopes they will be satisfied with humble talk and ostentatious symbols of folksiness (Jimmy carrying his own luggage, wearing leisure suits to cabinet meetings, refusing to ride in his limousine). The betrayal of populist promises by the antiracist President may push white working-class southerners back toward the politics of racism. If a new George Wallace, or even the old one, rises to power calling on their newly sparked resentment over being sold out again, Jimmy Carter will share much of the responsibility. □

[11]Robert Coles, "Jimmy Carter: Agrarian Rebel?" *New Republic*, June 26, 1976, a remarkable article; see also James T. Wooten, "The Well-Planned Enigma of Jimmy Carter," *New York Times Magazine*, June 6, 1976, p. 16.
[12]*New York Times*, March 4, 1976, p. 20.

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Top Secret: National Security and the Right to Know

The Secret Bombing of Cambodia

On Sunday, March 16, 1969, President Richard Nixon and about six senior national security advisers approved a proposal to bomb neutral Cambodia. Their decision, and the 15-month bombing operation that followed, remained secret for more than three years from most officials of the executive branch, from all but a few members of Congress, and from the public.[1]

The proposal to bomb Cambodia was not a new one. Ever since President Lyndon Johnson had escalated the American intervention in Vietnam in 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had repeatedly recommended such an action, as well as ground operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. To the extent that these proposals were known, there was substantial congressional and public support for them. In well publicized hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Joint Chiefs' requests to bomb additional targets in North Vietnam were sympathetically received, and subsequently this authority was largely granted by President Johnson.[2]

Although the formal proposals to bomb Cambodia were all stamped "Top Secret," it was widely known in Washington that the Joint Chiefs favored this further expansion of the war. They eagerly testified in secret before congressional committees, using the argument that from the military perspective, targets in Cambodia were part of the theater of operations. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces were using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary for base camps and supply lines.

Civilian officials of the Johnson administration, however, doubted that even a sustained bombing campaign would do much good. Intensive bombing in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos had not succeeded in preventing the movement of supplies or in effectively curtailing enemy attacks. Moreover, the independent and neutral status of Cambodia introduced serious diplomatic and legal obstacles to an acknowledged military operation in that country. For those reasons the skeptics sought to avoid public discussion of proposals to widen the war, fearing that pressure from hawkish elements in the public and Congress would secure implementation of those plans.

By the closing months of the Johnson administration, public opinion had shifted in

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a dovish direction. The outgoing President responded by curtailing and then ending the bombing of North Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs, sensitive to the mood of the Administration and the country, did not press for a reversal of these actions nor did they then renew proposals to bomb Cambodia.

It was the inauguration of Richard Nixon on January 20, 1969 that brought these proposals back to life. The military will routinely submit proposals previously rejected by civilian officials to a new president or secretary of defense. Thus, on February 11, 1969, General Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, recommended and requested authorization to conduct B-52 strikes in Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs forwarded this proposal to the President through Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The memorandum, once again, was stamped "Top Secret"; this time neither testimony to Congress nor conversations with the press hinted that the military were seeking to escalate the war. Although some potential congressional and public support for escalation still existed, the military had reason to believe that by now the great majority of the public opposed expansion of the war. The new President's attitude, however, remained to be discovered; the indicated tactic was one of quiet persuasion.

Richard Nixon needed no convincing. The incoming President and his principal foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, were already bent upon a Vietnam strategy favorable to the Joint Chiefs. It called for two very different messages, one to Hanoi and its allies and the other to the American people. The public would be led to believe that the United States was withdrawing from Vietnam. At the same time the North Vietnamese must be convinced that the United States would escalate the war unless it was settled on terms satisfactory to Washington.

SECRECY WAS an essential ingredient of this strategy. Certain members of the executive branch, if they learned of threats or contingency plans to escalate the conflict, might bring these to the attention of Congress and the public. Undoubtedly, a great public outcry would signal Hanoi that Nixon could not carry through his threats. Congress might even pass legislation making escalation illegal and mandating a speedy withdrawal of American forces.

Thus the Nixon-Kissinger plan was disclosed to the smallest conceivable circle of advisers. Initially, this consisted of a small group on the National Security Council staff and in the Pentagon and CIA. After the decision to bomb Cambodia was made, the circle had to be expanded somewhat. The Secretaries of State and Defense were brought into the picture along with their personal staffs; certain military officers in the field also had to do the detailed planning for the attacks.

There was some military advantage to be gained from initial surprise, but the Pentagon had not proposed or expected that an ongoing bombing program would be kept secret. That decision came from, and served the political requirements of, the President and his White House national security adviser. Their directive, ordering the commencement of B-52 bombing raids under the code name of MENU OPERATIONS, provided for the strictest secrecy. Knowledge of the operation was limited to those who had a "need-to-know" in order to carry out the bombing campaign, while others, including officials within the executive branch, were excluded. To account for the bombing sorties actually flown, the missions in Cambodia were reported, through classified channels, as if they had occurred in South Vietnam. Accurate reports were transmitted through a separate, limited "black channel." Even officials with "Top Secret" clearances, including the Secretary of the Air Force, were deceived. General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, later told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, had the Secretary asked him about it directly, Wheeler would have regarded it as his duty to lie about the bombing.

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Of course, those who deceived their colleagues had few qualms about misleading Congress and the public. Prior to May 1, 1970 (when the United States publicly initiated ground and air operations in Cambodia), Congress and the public had been frequently assured that country's neutrality was being strictly respected. This was the position taken in secret congressional testimony, as well as in public speeches of the President and others. For example, in his nationally televised speech on April 30, 1970, announcing the American invasion, President Nixon told the American people with regard to enemy bases in Cambodia that:

> For 5 years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese communists began to expand these sanctuaries 4 weeks ago, we counselled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders.[3]

BETWEEN March 18, 1969 and May 1, 1970, 3,695 B-52 sorties had in fact dropped some 105,837 tons of bombs on Cambodia. This was not disclosed even after May 1. The MENU OPERATIONS were not officially acknowledged by the Administration until July 16, 1973, and even then the disclosure was not voluntary and spontaneous, but a grudging admission of what had become known despite vigorous attempts at concealment.

The White House did claim in 1973 that 13 "key" members of the Senate and House—all vigorous proponents of escalation—had been apprised of the bombing as early as March 1969. It is curious that of the nine members from this list still living in 1973, only four could definitely recall having been informed, while three others firmly denied it. At any rate it is certain that the established procedures for providing secret information to responsible congressional committees were not employed; no debate was held in which opposing views could have been presented. And whatever informal "consultations" occurred did not entail a meaningful accountability to the electorate for this program, either on the part of the members allegedly involved or of Congress as a whole.

The systematic, illicit efforts to keep the MENU OPERATIONS secret were not entirely successful, but they committed the White House so fully to a course of secrecy that measures even more drastic were necessary to prevent calamitous embarrassment. On May 9, 1969, a front-page article in the *New York Times,* by Pentagon correspondent William Beecher, reported that the United States had begun bombing Cambodia. Pentagon spokesmen refused to confirm the *Times* report, and neither Congress nor the press cared to pursue the matter further. In the relatively trusting pre-Watergate atmosphere, the story was simply unbelievable. The Administration's strategy—persuading the public that it was ending the war—had succeeded so well that, without official confirmation of the *Times* story, no one was prepared to pursue its allegations.

However, the Beecher article prompted suspicion that there might be a serious leak in the innermost councils of government. National Security Adviser Kissinger telephoned FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to request an investigation. Without seeking judicial warrants, a series of wiretaps was initiated, eventually covering the phones of 17 government officials and reporters; the program lasted for 21 months. No evidence of leaks was ever uncovered, nor has the source of the Beecher story ever been identified.[4]

In May 1973 the story of the wiretaps surfaced dramatically in the press, when the interception of Ellsberg on one of the taps was reported at the Pentagon Papers criminal trial. Still the Administration would not admit to the Cambodian bombing operations; some other explanation for the taps was necessary. Although other leaks were cited, these did not convincingly explain the surveillance program either in terms of their timing or magnitude.

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BY THIS TIME the political forces working for disclosure had reached irresistible proportions. The decisive step finally was taken by one Major Knight, who repented of his role in forging after-action reports to hide the Cambodian bombing. Knight's letter to a senator led to the successful questioning of Air Force Chief of Staff General George Brown; and the candid testimony of that officer was confirmed in writing by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.

High officials of the State and Defense Departments hastened to deny responsibility for the deception, stating that they had not recommended secrecy. The White House, unable to join in the general round of buck-passing, finally claimed it had been protecting the then Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk. The Prince had acquiesced in the bombings, White House spokesmen implied, on condition that they be kept secret. If the United States had announced its missions, Henry Kissinger explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Prince Sihanouk would have been forced to protest; the United States would have had to halt the bombing.

This rationale on diplomatic grounds was subject to numerous serious objections:

• The Nixon Administration never produced solid evidence that it had negotiated with Sihanouk about the bombing. Hints that an agreement took shape in conversations between Sihanouk and Chester Bowles or Mike Mansfield brought prompt denials from the Americans named.

• The Cambodian government in 1969 and 1970 had in fact frequently protested to the U.N. about the acknowledged American policy of allowing our fighter planes to cross their border while engaged in "hot pursuit." These complaints received almost no press attention in the United States and were successfully ignored by the Nixon administration, suggesting that protests about B-52 bombings could also have been ignored.

• The assertion that public outcry, even if embarrassing, would have forced the United States to stop the bombing was simply disingenuous. For one thing, there remained the justification that the area under attack was entirely under North Vietnamese control and that no Cambodians lived in the area. The Administration could have offered to stop the bombing as soon as Sihanouk regained control of the territory and prevented Hanoi from using it as a base camp. Beyond this, it is unclear why our hands would have been tied by world public opinion over Cambodia when they were not in the case of North Vietnam.

• The explanation offered by the White House did not even pretend to justify the continued secrecy and deception after May 1970. By then, Sihanouk had been deposed. The United States was publicly bombing Cambodia at the request of the new government, which had condemned Sihanouk for collaborating with the North Vietnamese. A public admission of the earlier bombing would not have embarrassed the new leaders.

• The Administration's rationale did not explain the need to deceive high U.S. officials and congressional committees who were taking testimony in secret session or the need to engage in illegal wiretapping.

In fact, the President's argument seemed to suggest that an emergency whose very existence is secret justifies illegal measures that are also secret, and that none of this need ever be revealed. In confining himself to the assertion that it was not possible to bomb openly, the President failed entirely to meet the contention that, therefore, he should not have bombed at all. Indeed, the White House rationale went well beyond the difficult if ancient proposition that, in emergencies, it is proper for a president to set aside constitutional limitations if he "throws himself upon the country" for approval at the earliest opportunity. For no voluntary disclosure was made or ratification sought until long after any conceivable emergency had passed.

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ALL IN ALL, it was difficult to escape the conclusion that the real reason for four years of deception was simply to prevent Congress and the public from performing their constitutional roles in declaring war, appropriating funds, raising and supporting armies, debating policy guidelines, and evaluating the performance of elected officials. The President's total disregard for the constitutional values at stake prompted the House Judiciary Committee to consider an impeachment article based upon the secret bombing. That article was not accepted by the committee, because of the feeling that prior administrations, and Congress as well, were in large measure responsible for creating a climate in which such conduct may have appeared permissible.[5] Nevertheless, most members agreed that the President's conduct was indeed highly improper.

Following Richard Nixon's resignation the political climate changed dramatically. Secrecy appeared to carry such risks, both for presidents and for the bureaucracy, that some observers thought that the problems of excessive secrecy had greatly shrunk, if not vanished altogether.

The abuses of the past were attributed in part to the personalities of Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson. Both were said to be unusually secretive men, whose private inclinations were reinforced by the knowledge that they were pursuing policies that lacked public support. Gerald Ford, in contrast, was considered to be "the most open president since George Washington"; his Administration, it was promised, would not be marred by attempts to keep important initiatives hidden.

Moreover, it was said, secrecy in the past had been encouraged by public indifference. In the post Vietnam/Watergate era, the executive branch would not dare try to keep secrets and in any case would not succeed. On the contrary, executive officials argued vigorously that the pendulum had swung too far toward openness. They not only resisted efforts to liberalize the formal secrecy system, but insisted on the need to tighten it in the name of national security. The Nixon administration had asserted as much after the Pentagon Papers episode, and the Ford administration continued the argument as well.

Intervention in Angola

ANY ILLUSIONS that the problem of secrecy had been solved were shattered by the disclosure that the Ford administration had secretly intervened in a civil war in Angola. Although the episode became public much more quickly than it might have in the past, this was not because the President or the bureaucrats volunteered the information. Nor did disclosure occur soon enough to avert a serious embarrassment for American foreign policy.[6]

In the spring of 1975, with the Portuguese determined to withdraw from Angola and grant the African nation its independence, violence erupted among three groups competing for power. One group, the MPLA, had been receiving substantial Soviet aid for years in its struggle against Portugal. The other two groups were being helped by pro-Western African governments.

At this point a debate took place within the Administration—confined effectively within the President's inner circle and the bureaucratic subsystem relating to covert operations—about whether to aid the factions opposing the MPLA. Few if any in Congress or the public had any idea what was being discussed before a decision was reached.

Indeed, when Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis resigned, no one even suspected that his resignation was connected with Angola. Neither the formal secrecy system, the informal code of officialdom, nor the "new" political climate impelled this official to make public his reasons for leaving the Administration.

The decision to give military assistance to two factions in the Angolan civil war, potentially creating a serious great-power confrontation, was made without any public

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debate about the importance of Angola to the United States or the implications of a victory there by one faction or another. Nor was there discussion of the impact of this operation on the prospects for continued détente, for normalization of relations with Cuba (now heavily involved in assisting the MPLA), and for improved relations with other African and Latin-American countries. It is true that, as required by legislation passed in 1974, six congressional committees were later notified that a small covert operation was already under way. (These committees—the Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations Committees of each House—have established small subcommittees to receive CIA briefings about covert operations.) In this instance, many of those briefed were incredulous that the United States had in 1975 taken on such a commitment in secret. Those who opposed the action, however, felt unable to make the operation public. Short of so doing, they saw no way to stop the intervention.

Travers Clement

Travers Clement, national secretary of the Socialist Party, U.S.A. from 1939 to 1942 and manager of Norman Thomas's campaign for the presidency in 1940, died of heart failure May 4, 1977 in Switzerland, where he had been visiting. He was 77 years old and lived in Bethel, Conn.

During his years as top executive of the Socialist party, Trav, as most friends called him, also edited the party's official weekly publication, the *Call*.

With his wife, the late Lillian Symes, he was co-author of a well-known book of radical political history, *Rebel America*, published in 1934 and reissued in paperback in 1972. In addition, both he and Lillian Symes helped the international socialist leader Angelica Balabanoff write *My Life as a Rebel*, published in 1938.

From 1947 to 1948, Clement was an editor of *Modern Review*, a monthly published by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs. He also served for a time as a contributing editor of *Dissent* magazine.

During the fall of 1975 Senator Dick Clark, chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, learned about the covert program under way in Angola. He asked for and received a full briefing on the program, but he too felt that he could not discuss the program in public or seek to stop it at this point.

Only after subsequent reports of the American operation appeared in the press to the accompaniment of a great public outcry was prohibitory legislation introduced by Senators Clark and John Tunney. The Senate, after a secret session and over the strong objections of the President and the Secretary of State, voted to end all American assistance to Angola. In January 1976 the House sustained the Senate action. Much of the opposition in Congress was based on the specifics of the Angolan situation, but it was bolstered and embittered by the secrecy of the attempted intervention.

The Administration's attempt to confront Congress with a *fait accompli* ended in great embarrassment, which could have been avoided by timely consultations. The "lessons of Vietnam," it would seem, are not easily learned by energetic officials, no matter how conscientious. When pressed to explain its actions, the Administration's reply was no more convincing than had been Richard Nixon's defense of the secret bombing of Cambodia. Spokesmen claimed that the American objective in Angola was simply to bring about a negotiated withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban troops and the formation of a representative, indigenous government. To do so meant (a) maintaining a military balance of power and (b) avoiding an open confrontation, from which the Soviets would not back down. Thus, there had to be military intervention, and it had to be secret.

This simplistic argument ignored the meaning that American secrecy would have for Soviet decision-makers. Covert American intervention would lead the Soviets to conclude that the operation lacked substantial backing in the United States. A public

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commitment might have been taken more seriously by the Soviets. As it was, they proceeded to escalate the scale of the conflict to the point where the American military assistance could not be kept secret, and in fact it was the Ford administration that was forced to back down. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Angolan intervention was kept secret, not to help the Russians get out, but to help the Americans get in.

Drawing Conclusions

IN THE AFTERMATH of these episodes, many outside the executive bureaucracy have come to agree on the need to reexamine the way our government balances the public's right to know against the requirements of secrecy. The lessons of these cases now seem very clear. The executive branch today has the capacity to conceal, for substantial periods of time, information that would significantly contribute to legitimate public debate on major issues. Recent presidents, however diverse in personal character and political circumstance, have all betrayed a disposition to use this power of secrecy in ways that are hard to justify in terms of straightforward national security concerns. The results have been costly for the nation at home and abroad, as secrecy has delayed the correction of divisive and irrational policies. In some cases, moreover, the attempt to prevent or punish unwelcome disclosures has led to significant infringements of our civil liberties. □

Notes

[1]U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, "Bombing of Cambodia," in Impeachment Investigation (Richard M. Nixon), Book XI, Statement of Information, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [hereafter G.P.O.], 1974).

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, *Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,* Report (G.P.O., 1974), pp. 217-19.

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, *Bombing in Cambodia: Hearings* (G.P.O., 1973).

"Press Conference of Melvin Laird, Jan. 29, 1974" (reprinted), in *Impeachment Investigation (Richard M. Nixon), op. cit.,* Book VII, Part I, pp. 298-300.

Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).

[2]U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 90th Congress, 1st Session, *Air War Against North Vietnam: Hearings,* Parts 1-5 (G.P.O., 1967).

[3]*Presidential Documents,* 577.

[4]The best discussion on the 17 wiretaps of newsmen and government officials and on the more general subject of national security wiretaps are to be found in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, "Minority Memorandum of Facts and Law: White House Surveillance Activities and Campaign Activities," Statement of Information, *Impeachment Inquiry Report,* Book VII, Parts 1-4 (G.P.O., 1974). See also David Wise, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1976), pp. 31-106. The legal issues raised by the tapes are largely beyond the scope of this study.

[5]*Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, op. cit.,* Report, Nos. 93-1305, pp. 218-19.

[6]For fuller background on the Angola episode, see *CIA's Secret War in Angola,* Intelligence Report, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1975). U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activity, 94th Congress, 1st Session, *Hearings,* Nov. 20, 1975. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, *Hearings,* March 14 and October 8, 9, 22, 1974. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 1st Session, *Nomination of Nathaniel Davis: Hearings,* Feb 19, 1975. □

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Richard Lowenthal

The Postwar Transformation of European Social Democracy

This paper aims neither at a comparative documentary study of successive party programs adopted by the governing, or potentially governing, social democratic parties of Northern and Central Europe, nor at a history, however sketchy, of the policies pursued by each of them in the last three decades. It aims, instead, to present what appear to be the most significant trends in their outlook and practice. Illustrations will be chiefly taken from the development of the German SPD, because it is most closely known to the author, but comparative glances will also be cast at the British Labour party and the social democratic parties of Scandinavia.

The four articles in this section—written by Richard Lowenthal, Bogdan Denitch, Jeam-Pierre Worms, and Robert E. Lane—were originally papers presented at the Conference on Democratic Socialism, held by the Research Institute on International change, Columbia University, on October 7, 1976. They appear here with the permission of the Institute. —EDS.

The Post-Keynesian Change in "Reformism"

IN THE social democratic movement before the First World War it was usual to distinguish a "revolutionary" from a "reformist" tendency: the dividing line was the attitude toward the existing state. Reformist acceptance of functioning within the given constitutional framework generally prevailed in those Western democracies where government was responsible to democratic control and where the principle of equal suffrage was fully or approximately applied (at least for men). Revolutionary preparation for the overthrow of the political system was a matter of course under Czarist despotism in Russia and in

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some of the Balkan countries. In Central Europe, where the German and Austrian empires combined the ultimate power of the monarch with free elections to a parliament of limited influence and with considerable scope for trade union activity, the dominant outlook among the social democrats was a combination of revolutionary rhetoric with reformist practice, with "revisionist" or "left radical" minorities calling for greater consistency in one or the other direction.

After the formation of the Communist International, most of the revolutionary wing joined it and became formally committed to the revolutionary overthrow of "bourgeois democracy" and the goal of party dictatorship. The remaining democratic socialist parties became reformist defenders of the old and new democratic states, and many of them repeatedly joined coalition governments with nonsocialist parties or, like the British Labour party, formed minority governments that depended on nonsocialist toleration. "Reformism" in practice could have only meant piecemeal social improvements of the situation of the working class, though most of the party programs retained as a definition of the socialist goal nationalization of the large corporations in at least key industries and banking.

The world economic crisis of 1929-32 became the starting point for a major change. On the one hand, a policy of pure defense of the social achievements of labor proved impossible in these conditions, as the fate of the German Social Democrats proved most dramatically. On the other, in Sweden, where a brilliant school of economists had developed the "Keynesian" ideas independently and indeed ahead of Keynes, the Social Democrats won a majority in 1932 with a program calling for state intervention of a primarily fiscal and monetary type to overcome the crisis and restore full employment. The Social Democrats thus acquired a control of the Swedish government that was to last, practically without interruption, for 44 years. Franklin D. Roosevelt's electoral victory that same year was also followed by a broadly successful, though very imperfectly conceived, policy of "priming the pump." By contrast, in Germany, where the Social Democrats had rejected the advice of trade-union economists to adopt a program similar to Sweden's, the desperate demand for a strong, active government to create work contributed to the collapse of democracy and to the rise of Hitler's dictatorship—and it was the Nazi regime that created full employment, within the framework of massive rearmament.

The negative lesson of Germany and the positive example of Sweden caused a number of social democratic parties to adopt programs of "planning for full employment" in the following years. For the Norwegian party (which had once belonged to the Communist International and had retained dogmatic Marxist traditions long after it left the International in 1923), the adoption of such a "full employment" plan became in 1934 the occasion for the party's emancipation from dogma, for its return to the Socialist International, and, in 1935, for the formation of a long-lasting labor government. In Britain, the adoption of Keynesian ideas by the Labour party was first advocated by John Strachey in 1939, and incorporated in Labour's postwar election program by Herbert Morrison. Backed by the national experience of prolonged mass unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s and followed by full employment in wartime, the adoption of Keynesian ideas contributed vitally to Labour's victory in 1945.

Commitment to "planning" for full employment and steady growth thus became a central part of the social democratic program on an international scale. But that meant a change in the nature of "reformism" as hitherto conceived: the improvement of the workers' lot by piecemeal reforms, while still important, now took second place to a deliberate attempt to change immediately the dynamics of the capitalist economy as a whole. This macroeconomic policy could well be described as a synthesis of earlier "reformist" and "revolutionary" concepts, accom-

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panied as it was by the nationalization of key industries under the first Labour majority government, and also under the postwar government of France in which the socialists participated. At the same time, it was combined with a continued firm commitment to the Western type of pluralistic democracy under the rule of law, and to its defense against all internal subversion and external pressure on the part of the Communist parties and powers—all of which became defining characteristics of the democratic socialist parties.

"Autarkic" Austerity Planning— or Growth in a Worldwide Framework?

BOTH in England and in Germany, though not in Sweden, the transition to full employment policies had first been made in a war economy—by Hitler before the war and by the British coalition government during it. In both cases, it had thus been born amidst critical shortages of foreign exchange and foreign supplies. Hence the concept of planning seemed to comprise not only monetary and fiscal planning of the total volume of economic activity but such "physical planning" for austerity as the limitation of imports, the rationing of food, and the allocation of raw materials. In Britain, because of the massive loss of foreign assets, such austerity conditions continued for some years after the war. In defeated and destroyed Germany with its worthless currency, austerity conditions continued up to the currency reform and the beginning of the Marshall Plan.

When primary necessities are scarce, rationing on the basis of equality is indeed the alternative to the injustice of "rationing by the purse"; hence in the early postwar years both the British and German socialists came to see austerity planning as a necessary part of social justice, and therefore as a necessary part of "socialist planning." The German Social Democrats opposed Ludwig Erhard's 1948 decision to dismantle the rationing and allocation regulations, which proved an immense success; and the British Labour party continued many wartime regulations longer than the people thought necessary. More than that, both the British and the German parties long continued to hold a concept of planning as primarily *national* planning. This concept was based on the memory of planning measures that had emerged as a means of national self-protection in the face of the collapse of the international currency and credit system during the world crisis. It was based also on the memory of the role of such measures in the fair distribution of later shortages. This association of "socialist" planning with national sovereignty was the basic reason for the German Social Democrats' initial opposition to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in a "capitalist" framework, and for the prolonged opposition of British Labour to the European Economic Community.

Yet, in fact, a policy of full employment and steady growth proved compatible with the abandonment of "autarky planning," the restoration of a functioning credit network, and an intense division of labor among the industrially advanced democracies. This was so thanks to three interrelated postwar developments: (1) the adoption of a high-employment and growth policy (however imperfectly executed at the time) by the leading Western economic power, the United States; (2) the creation of a new, flexible world currency system at Bretton Woods; (3) the initial American policy of granting massive credits for international reconstruction, notably the Marshall Plan. The combined effect of these policies has been the unparalleled quarter-century of high employment and steady growth that followed the end of World War II. This period of increasing affluence and social security could not have been brought about by a pure capitalist "free-market economy," as some of its ideological defenders maintained, nor by "socialist" national planning for austerity, but only by the actually practiced methods of monetary and fiscal planning for high employment and

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steady growth operating in a worldwide market economy.

The Scandinavian Social Democrats have never been addicted to the doctrine that the fair distribution of shortages, however inevitable at certain times, was something inherently "socialist." The German Social Democrats got gradually cured of it by experience, without adopting the opposite doctrine of a "free-market economy" defended by their domestic opponents. This enabled them in 1966-67, when the absence of a well-planned high-employment policy produced a recession in the Federal Republic, to enter the Grand Coalition government with a Keynesian plan that proved successful and helped to pave the way for the Social Democratic victories of 1969 and 1972. The British Labour party—operating in a country where periodic balance-of-payments crises, brought about for other reasons, permitted no steady growth—has never completely overcome the belief of many of its intellectuals and trade union leaders that Britain could do better if more physical "controls" were imposed, and that this would somehow be more socialist. That is one of the principal reasons for the continuing gulf between the party's leadership in government on one side, and the majorities at its party congresses on the other.

The Gradualization of the Old Issues

THE ABANDONMENT of the belief in detailed physical planning by the social democratic parties (with the partial exception of British Labour), and the acceptance of the need for Keynesian "global planning" by most nonsocialist parties (including since 1967 those of the Federal Republic), have greatly diminished the traditional difference between socialists and nonsocialists in the field of general economic policy. Of course, practical differences remain on many concrete economic decisions, but it has become difficult to formulate them in terms of general ideological principles. They are differences of degree, of priorities, and of group interests—not of concepts of the economic system. The same applies to the achievements of the "welfare state," which have largely been the handiwork of the democratic socialist parties: the "bourgeois" parties have generally accepted them as part of the given economic and social landscape, and only criticize specific defects in their operation (defects to which the democratic socialists are not insensitive either).

A similar development has taken place with regard to the issue of nationalization. The nationalized industries in Britain and France—not to mention those in the Soviet bloc—have not been felt by their workers to be different in style of management from privately owned, capitalist industries. From the workers' point of view, they continue to represent an alien power. (The growing importance of demands by the workers or their representatives for a share in the management of both private and nationalized enterprises is the reverse side of the disappointment.) Neither have these nationalized industries generally shown superior efficiency. While many of the complaints about the inefficiency of nationalized enterprises are partisan exaggerations, referring to industries that suffer from such structural handicaps as do the coal mines and railways of Britain, the fact remains that nationalization has not generally been able to overcome such handicaps. Finally, the belief that nationalization would give the government an additional lever for steering the economy as a whole—e.g., by direct decisions to make or postpone investments at a given time—has also been eroded as the financial complications of such decisions have become apparent.

As a result, generally, the British Labour leadership has not bowed to the pressure of its left-wingers for new measures of nationalization, notably of the banks and insurance companies, even when such demands have commanded a majority at party congresses. The German Social Democrats regard nationalization as a weapon of last resort rather than an important part of their program. The Social Democrats of Scandinavia have built up a number of new industries and mines that are state-owned, but in their decades of

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government have not nationalized any existing enterprises. The issue, on the whole, is hardly alive any more.

Finally, there are now hardly any differences of principle between democratic socialists and their opponents on foreign policy and defense. Within three years after the end of the war, Soviet suppression, persecution, and "forced fusion" of the democratic socialist parties of Eastern Europe succeeded in uniting the Western social democrats in the realization that their very existence would be threatened by any further Soviet advance. Accordingly, they have supported Western unity on such constructive programs as the Marshall Plan, but also on resistance to such Soviet encroachments as Stalin's Berlin blockade, the Soviet-supported Korean War, and later Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum and his Cuban missile crisis. Attitudes to defense have varied in accordance with national situations: the Austrian, Swedish, and Swiss social democrats have joined with most other parties in their countries in affirming their neutrality and, of course, the Finns had no choice. But in the NATO countries the social democrats have generally supported NATO; the one important temporary exception—the initial opposition of the German SPD to a West German "defense contribution"—was based on specific wishes for American military assurances and specific hopes for German reunification by four-power-negotiation, not on any pacifist or "neutralist" principles. In fact, the opting by the German Social Democrats for Western democracy has been clear from the early days of Kurt Schumacher and Ernst Reuter.

Differences between social democrats and other parties have of course existed, and continue to exist, on concrete questions of diplomatic policy and military expenditure. Social democratic leaders have generally argued, not always convincingly, that they could negotiate with the Soviets to better effect than their opponents, and that they could reduce the burdens and diminish the risks of competitive armaments. But these, again, have been generally questions of degree, with the notable exception of the dramatic controversy over the *Ostpolitik* of the German Social Democrats. However, even that policy has been conducted within the framework of a general Western, and particularly American, policy of détente. It has resulted in removing some specifically German territorial disputes that the Western powers had no inclination to make their own, in improving security, and in diminishing the causes of friction in Berlin.

One issue about which social democrats in many countries have been more critical of American policy than have their opponents has been the war in Vietnam. But even this has had no influence on the practical policy of social democratic governments, except in neutral Sweden. Here, however, we are approaching a policy area where consensus is generally less developed—that of relations with the Third World, to be discussed later.

We have described the "gradualization" of old party conflicts in such vital areas as economic planning, nationalization, foreign policy, and defense. By the early 1960s, the apparent weakening of differences between the major parties of "left" and "right" in the Western democracies had become a general topic of discussion among political analysts. The Godesberg program of the German Social Democrats, adopted in 1959, and their subsequent explicit acceptance of the policy of Western integration initiated by their Christian Democrat opponents, which paved the way for the Grand Coalition of 1966-69, are viewed as the classic examples of this more general process. However, since then a number of new, divisive issues have increasingly come to the fore, greatly influencing the policies and programs of the democratic socialist parties. These are the issues of equality by redistribution and of equalization of chances by educational reforms; of participation by the workers in management, and of "democratization" in general; of the control of inflation and the role of the trade unions in it; of the adaptation of planning to the new awareness of environmental problems and the "limits of growth"; and of the changing

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relationship between the industrially advanced democracies and the poor, less developed countries.

From Equality by Redistribution to Equality by Education

IN A BOOK on socialist theory published during the 1950s, the late British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland stated categorically that "socialism is about equality." According to this view, the primary difference between the democratic socialists and their conservative opponents did not concern such structural economic questions as the degree of planning or the share of nationalized ownership of the means of production, but the struggle to overcome or maintain the social gulf between the classes—a gulf that had always been felt particularly deeply in Britain.

Most democratic socialists understood that an approach to economic equality relying on raising directly the share of wage incomes within the national income, or on reducing directly the income differentials between the wage-earning and salaried occupations, would be severely limited by economic laws. The latter attempt would also be severely limited by the resistance of trade unions and professional associations. Hence economic egalitarianism had to rely in the main on a secondary redistribution of income and (as far as possible) of capital ownership, by taxes on one side and social security benefits on the other. The effort at such a secondary redistribution by progressive taxation of income, by social services including free medical treatment and public old-age pensions, by public provision of low-cost housing for the lower income groups, etc., was greatly facilitated throughout the postwar quarter-century by the steady increase in total national income. This increase generally permitted an "upward" equalization in which the lower income groups benefited absolutely and relatively, while the higher groups lost only relatively. The approach achieved its greatest successes in Sweden, where it had been practiced for the longest period, but it began to reach a saturation point there in recent years as the tax progression came to be resented as excessive by a growing part of the electorate. It had its most dramatic postwar start in Britain, with the introduction of National Health Service and the housing policy conceived by Aneurin Bevan, but part of the gains were lost there in later years as (under both Labour and Conservative governments) economic growth continued to lag behind other advanced Western countries and as new forms of marginal poverty emerged. It made also considerable progress in West Germany during the long period of nonsocialist rule, but in part under the pressure of the strong Social Democratic opposition, which shared in framing the housing law and in passing the introduction of "dynamic," i.e., index-based, old-age pensions. That process has continued under socialist-led governments even during the recent recessions.

Results in the redistribution of capital ownership by taxation have generally been far less substantial, despite such measures as stiff English death duties and West German introduction of "capital-forming savings" as an addition to workers' wages. The basic problem here is to find ways to transfer a share of capital ownership to wage-earners without discouraging investment. Plans for putting a growing share of capital in the workers' hands through legislation, such as the American workers have achieved by tariff agreements about pension funds, have played a growing role in West German and Swedish public discussion in recent years, but have not yet passed into law.

In addition to efforts to achieve greater equality through redistribution, democratic socialists have always known that essential equality of individual chances depends to a large extent on the structure of public education. They have always fought, not only for free elementary education, but for free secondary and finally tertiary education for all those whose parents could not afford to pay. The expansion of scholarships to grammar schools and universities in postwar Britain—and the corresponding expansion in

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the number of universities—has in fact caused a major change in the social composition of the educated classes.

A new concept of the way to equalize educational chances, which was adopted by the British, Swedish, and West German social democrats in the postwar period, was the idea of the "comprehensive school." Under this system, children of all social classes should be taught together for the first five or six years and then be sorted out for different branches of the educational road according to their natural talents and efforts, as measured by general results in class or by an examination. As a principle of social justice, this idea has come to be widely accepted. In practice, however, there have been a number of failures where the system was introduced before enough comprehensive schools had been built and enough teachers trained for them. There have also been many complaints about the psychological pressures created among children by the approach of the examination.

Before the new system could be consolidated in England or Sweden, and indeed before it was at all widely introduced in Germany, the struggle for its introduction and consolidation was overtaken and complicated by the impact of a new didactic ideology. According to this ideology, what had been regarded as differences of natural talent had also to be largely attributed to the different family environment in which children grow up; hence the task of the school, from an egalitarian point of view, was not to open the better career to the more talented, but to equalize the "natural" inequality by special efforts for the less gifted pupils, even at the risk of slowing down the more gifted ones. This prescription, however questionable in its consequences, could be understood in the special context of dealing with disadvantaged racial minorities in the United States, where it had partly originated. In the different context of Western Europe, it had only ideological zeal to recommend it and was likely to do serious harm to the general level of school education. Moreover, the combination of the introduction of the comprehensive school with experiments in the new didactics exposed the former to the criticism that it was conceived as an instrument not for the equalization of opportunity, which was widely popular, but for the equalization of results, which is clearly rejected as an ideological fad by the majority everywhere in Europe.

Inside the social democratic parties, the struggle about this new concept of equality has not yet been concluded. In a number of cases, social democrats have favored experiments on the basis of equality of results. However, the reaction of the electorate is likely to force them back to the more limited concept of equality of opportunity—a concept clearly more appropriate for a society that depends on the maximum performance of its citizens in international competition.

Participation and "Democratization"

ONE OF the principal new themes introduced into social democratic discussions in the course of the postwar era has been that of the participation of the workers—or rather of their representatives—in management ("Co-Determination," "*Mitbestimmung.*") This concept arose as a goal for West German trade unions as a result of their early role on the boards set up by the Anglo-American authorities for the management of the "decartellized" enterprises of the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr—and as a result of the West German Social Democrats' failure to achieve the nationalization of those enterprises and the introduction of a "socialist planned economy," either under occupational rule (when General Lucius Clay vetoed a "premature" decision on nationalization), or after the creation of the Federal Republic, when they had no majority. As a result of both developments, the West German trade unions began to regard their own generalized representation on the boards of all major West German corporations as a substitute for "socialist planning" by the government.

A second root of the international debate on "workers' participation" has been the

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introduction in Tito's Yugoslavia in 1950, two years after the break with Stalin, of a system described as "workers' self-management." Under this system, the "management committees" elected by the workers' councils of nationalized enterprises could elect the director, subject to the agreement of local and national authorities, and share with him in the running of the enterprise. The workers also reaped a share of the profits.

A more general reason for the spreading interest in the idea of workers' participation in management, also underlying the Titoist experiment, was the spreading disappointment with the fruits of nationalization for the workers of both East and West. By the time the demand of the German trade unions was actively taken up by the German Social Democrats as part of their immediate program, it was no longer regarded as a substitute for nationalization, in the sense of a second-best, but preferable to it. The social democratic leaders probably had no illusions that enterprises with 50 percent or slightly fewer trade unionists on their board would be necessarily easier to control by government directives. But they welcomed the idea of strengthening the direct interest of the workers, and specifically the trade unions, in the prosperity of the economy. This argument gradually made the idea also more acceptable to other West German parties and finally led to its application, in modified form, beyond the coal and steel industries to all enterprises employing more than 2,000 people. The German law falls short of the union demand for a 50 percent share by reserving one of the seats on the workers' side of the board to salaried executives. It also seeks to combine the right of the workers to direct election of their representatives with the eligibility of "outsiders," i.e., trade union officials, which had been opposed by the nonsocialist parties.

Since then, the German example has led to widespread discussions about the desirability of imitating it in other West European countries, prompted more by the example of "social peace" in West Germany than by militant trade union pressure. The British trade unions in particular are still largely opposed to what many of them, like their American colleagues, regard as involvement on the employers' side of the negotiating table, while the most militant French confederation, the independent but pro-Socialist CFDT, is committed to more far-reaching demands for "autogestion" or workers' self-management.

The rise of more radical demands among the French left is, in fact, part of a general upsurge, beginning with the students' revolt of the middle 1960s, of demands for "democratization" transcending both the institutions of political democracy and the field of industrial democracy. This participatory upsurge, expressed in demands for the democratization of universities and schools, of news media and churches as well as in the mushrooming of local "citizens' initiatives" is based on the general argument that parliamentary democracy combined with bureaucratic administration has become too remote to be "relevant" to the issues that really concern people. It should therefore be at least supplemented by the democratic self-government of "all concerned" in those various places—if not replaced, as the more radical groups have argued, by an idealized type of "Council (Soviet) Democracy."

The social democrats have generally tried to channel this upsurge—in Germany by adopting the formula that democracy should be "extended to wider fields of social activity"—without yielding the prerogatives of the elected parliament and of the government based on it to autonomous decisions of "those concerned." In the process, they have in several countries—notably in parts of West Germany, in Denmark, and the Netherlands—accepted forms of "democratization" of the education system that are clearly in conflict with its function for society as a whole, and that have combined with the didactic egalitarianism discussed above to lower the standards of many of those institutions. More recently, the impact of experience has led to the partial correction of such measures. At the same time, the shock of

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the participatory upsurge may have led to a healthy increase in the sensitivity of politicians in general and social democratic politicians in particular to the need for timely consultation with those locally affected by central administrative decisions.

The Struggle against Inflation and the Role of "Concerted Action"

EXPERIENCE has shown and economic theory explained that the combination of full or near-full employment with free price formation in the market and free trade unions is inseparable from at least a moderate inflation. The growing share of the populations of advanced countries engaged in such "post-industrial" activities as government, education, and health care, in which the share of wage costs in total costs is far above average and the growth of productivity far below it, has been diagnosed as another permanent inflationary factor. Democratic socialists have generally agreed with the majority of expert opinion that such a moderate inflation—in Western Europe for two decades an average of 2-3 percent per year—is not too high a price to pay for the benefits of full employment, steady growth, and improving social services.

However, the problem became far more serious when inflation began to accelerate in the middle 1960s under the impact of the increasingly negative American balance of payments, caused in part by the Vietnam War and in part by inflationary forms of capital export, "infecting" the world economy because of the dollar's privileged position in the Bretton Woods system. Accelerating inflation not only interferes seriously with the calculations of investors and leads to harmful waste of capital; it also embitters the distributive struggle, particularly between the part of the working population that is sufficiently well-organized to force regular adjustments of its income to the rising price level, and the receivers of fixed incomes and the small savers. Because this period of accelerating inflation preceded and continued into a worldwide recession, the distributive struggle was further sharpened.

In these circumstances, it was natural that a general search for methods to "control" that struggle, and specifically to achieve a moderation of wage demands, should begin in the advanced Western countries. Methods proposed, and partly tried, have ranged from imposed wage-and-price controls to suggestions for institutionalizing the major interest groups in a kind of corporative chamber so as to bring them under government discipline—and also to the now familiar methods of "concerted action," i.e., voluntary regular consultation of the major interest groups by the government on the state of the economy and on a desirable economic policy. The social democrats, linked as they are to the trade union movement, generally have advocated sticking to the voluntary method—apparently the least drastic remedy.

In practice, the creation of quasi-corporative institutions has not been tried in any democratic country. The method of imposed price-and-wage limits has been tried with litte effect in the United States, and has failed dramatically under the British Conservative government, whose resistance to massive wage increases was broken by equally massive strike action.

By contrast, the method of voluntary consultation or "concerted action," when practiced by social democratic governments close to the unions, has proved remarkably successful. It has limited inflation in Sweden to a level there regarded as tolerable, and reduced it to a much lower level—by now 4 percent—in the Federal Republic. Most dramatic has been the case of Britain, where a Labour government coming to power when the situation was completely out of hand, following the unions' victory over its Conservative predecessor, at first allowed the inflation rate to increase even further, until the unions themselves had to face the fact that recovery from threatening national catastrophe depended on them alone. At this point, the government proceded from consultation to actual extra-parliamentary negotiation,

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obtaining the vital consent of the unions to wage restraint in return for the pledge of specific changes in taxation. It seems likely that this pathbreaking example, known as "the social contract," may be followed in future crises and in other countries, turning the big organized interest groups not into corporative institutions but into a recognized part of the constitutional reality, even while they retain their independence.

Environmental Protection, Limits of Growth, and the Need for "Structural" Planning

THE CRITICAL YEARS since the late '60s have also brought a new awareness both of the dangers of the despoliation of the environment and of the "limits of growth" throughout the advanced industrial world. The common characteristics of both problems are that they point to the destructive aspects of the recent unparalleled unleashing of our productive forces, and that they cannot be solved by the automatism of the market alone.

The damage caused to our natural environment by modern techniques of production has assumed proportions that make preventive and remedial action imperative. Preventive action involves the transfer to the polluter of communal costs caused by pollution, and the imposition of conditions or outright bans on methods of production shown to be potentially or even inevitably harmful. In other words, it requires that public policy no longer confine itself to regulating the total rate of investment by monetary and fiscal measures, but influence the direction of investment by means of taxes or conditional subsidies, imposed safety measures, or outright bans.

The "limits of growth"—which in general are not absolute limits, but foreseeable dangers of the exhaustion of specific raw materials or sources of energy—require similar action, because the market is apt to react with price increases only when much of the damage has already been done. Again, public policy—and more likely than not *international* public policy—will have to take responsibility for timely action to stop or slow down the growth of production lines and techniques that are wasteful of potentially scarce and at the moment irreplaceable materials, and to encourage lines and techniques that are material-saving or energy-saving. And again, such action—even if it makes the least possible use of bureaucratic regulation and the greatest possible use of monetary incentives and disincentives on the market—amounts to a critical step in the transition from purely global planning of the *volume* of investment to structural planning of its *direction*.

Such conclusions will hardly find a congenial reception among political parties closely tied to specific interests that may be negatively affected, or among parties wedded to a doctrinaire belief in a "free market economy." Conversely, these conclusions are likely to be accepted as natural by proponents of democratic socialist thought. In fact, internal discussion in the German Social Democratic party in recent years has largely revolved around the issue of "investment control," with the party's Young Socialist left wing (the Jusos) stressing the need for new institutions to enforce control by making major investments dependent on specific permission. At the same time, moderate leaders are warning against the danger of wasteful bureaucratic methods approaching those of Soviet planning, and they are stressing the need for primary reliance on monetary incentives and disincentives that would work through the market rather than trying to replace it. With this cautionary provision, the principle of "investment control" or "structural planning" has indeed been incorporated into the 15-year program adopted by the Mannheim party congress of 1975.

Although they acknowledge that control of the direction of investment in the light of the need for long-term conservation of resources is likely to imply a slowdown of economic growth, the Social Democrats have resolutely turned down the concept of "zero growth" advocated by some leftists. Zero growth is not considered inevitable, and it is unacceptable not only because of its likely consequences for

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the internal distributive struggle but also because of the vital interest of the poor and underdeveloped countries in further growth.

Relations with the Less Developed Countries

ONE OF the great new problems for the industrially advanced democracies is the dangerous deterioration of their relations with most of the less developed countries (LDC). This tendency, dramatized by the oil crisis and by a number of debates and votes in the United Nations, is welcomed by the Communist powers, but due in the main not to their diplomacy and propaganda, but to the serious worsening in the economic situation of a majority of LDCs over a prolonged period.

On one side, the total amount of development aid offered from all sources—private and public, Western and Eastern—has always been insufficient; and none of the major powers has come near to meeting the standard of allocating 1 percent of its national income for that purpose. On the other side, the price relation between the raw materials exported by many of those countries and the industrial machinery imported by all of them has been extremely unstable. More, during most of the postwar period—except for the Korean and Vietnam War booms and the immediate aftermath of the oil boycott—this price relation has tended to change heavily to the disadvantage of the raw-material producers. The result has been that many of the LDCs have lost more on the commodity markets than they have gained from development aid. Their indebtedness has increased to the point where many can no longer bear the burden.

Beginning with the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, a steadily increasing number of LDCs have therefore united in more and more specific demands for what they call a "New Economic Order." They have concentrated on proposals for "indexing" or other forms of stabilization of raw-material prices, and for preferences for the sale of the products of their light industries in the markets of the advanced countries. Prior to the oil crisis, these demands found very little echo among the "rich" nations; since then, the need for negotiations on these matters has come to be generally recognized, but progress continues to be exceedingly slow.

It is therefore an important fact that the social democratic parties of some of the smaller "rich" countries, notably Sweden and the Netherlands, have shown an early sympathetic understanding for the plight of the LCDs, and that their example has begun to influence party opinion in some of the bigger Western democracies. The small nations, under social democratic leadership, have advocated, on grounds of distributive justice and not merely diplomatic expediency, a search for ways to meet the demands for raw-material price stabilization in substance. While they recognize the argument of leading Western economists that some specific proposals, such as the tying of commodity prices to an index of prices for industrial machinery, are impracticable and would be highly inflationary if put into practice, they insist that such arguments are no alibi for doing nothing, and that the burden rests on the West to find better ways of meeting the real grievances of the poor nations.

The real cause of the resistance of some of the rich countries, strongly resented by the poor, is, of course, that any effective measures along this line would amount to some substantial international redistribution from the rich to the poor—a course that is prima facie unlikely to recommend itself to the electorate of the rich countries. A second obstacle is that the most practicable measures, such as price stabilization by means of international buffer stocks for raw materials, would be contrary to the received doctrine of a "free world market." All the more important, therefore, is the initiative of the social democrats of some of the smaller countries and their growing influence on opinion in some of the bigger parties, such as the German SPD. It may be said that the latter party has by now been officially converted to the need for a serious effort to meet the demands of the

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poor countries, even though the West German coalition government, under the influence of its Liberal Minister of Economics, was until recently a major opponent of such measures.

Conclusion: The Question of Relevance

FIRST of all, democratic socialist parties are parties committed to Western democracy. Some of them, such as the German, Austrian, and Norwegian parties, have had to overcome the ambiguities of a powerful Marxist tradition to become fully conscious of that commitment, although it had long been implicit in their practice. Others, such as the Danish and Swedish parties, have never had such a tradition—while the British Labour party experienced a substantial irruption of Marxist ideas as late as the 1930s but was able to digest it. But all of them have had an important share in the broadening or in the very creation of democratic institutions in their countries, and all of them have been most consistent defenders of those institutions when they were threatened from within (as in Germany and Austria in the 1930s) or from without (as by Hitler during and by Stalin after the Second World War).

Second, democratic socialists are committed to socialist values. These values may be variously defined. The German Social Democrats speak of "Freedom, Justice, and Solidarity." But it must be understood that the socialist concept of justice implies more equality and social security, and the socialist concept of solidarity greater emphasis on communal needs, than the automatism of a market would produce by itself—just as the socialist concept of freedom implies the active participation of the citizen and not only his right to be left in peace. Also, democratic socialists believe in the universality of those values; and this implies an *international* solidarity that cannot be indifferent to the absence of freedom and justice anywhere, including the injustice of international distribution.

But values may be interpreted in two ways in political debate. They may be seen as a guide to an ideal society, to a utopia where they are fully realized or "maximized"; or they may be viewed as criteria for choice in dealing with practical problems as they arise. The first approach is that of the ideologist who, owing to his youth or his specialization, is remote from practical experience. The second is that of the practical politician who despite his "pragmatism" has not renounced a commitment to his basic values. A living socialist party needs both types. Without the ideologist, it ceases to produce cohesion and commitment among its members and followers; without the pragmatist, it ceases to be relevant to the political issues of the day.

The foregoing analysis has given examples both of issues where democratic socialist parties have been and are extremely relevant to the major issues of our time, and of issues where—misled by one-sided experience or lack of experience and building ideological programs on that basis—they were not. The early "Keynesianism" of the Swedish social democrats was extremely relevant to the problems of the world economic crisis; the failure of the German Social Democrats to adopt a comparable program in time made them irrelevant to the crisis that led to the rise of Hitler. Again, the Labour party's commitment to wartime planning and to immediate postwar austerity was extremely relevant to the survival of British democracy; but the ideological fixation on national austerity planning as if it was a socialist goal made them largely irrelevant to the postwar development of Western Europe. The struggle of the social democratic parties to achieve greater equality and social security by secondary redistribution was extremely relevant, and so was the struggle for equal opportunity in education; but both, and particularly the latter, were damaged by irrelevant ideological concepts of a utopian kind of equality. The concept of workers' participation in management has proved relevant both to the individual worker's status and conditions of work and to continuity of production and social peace, and so has the development of "concerted action" into a mechanism of actual negotia-

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tion between democratic government and the great, organized interest groups. Together, these innovations may become as central to the coming period of Western development as the "welfare state" was for the quarter-century after the war. Yet ideological experiments in "democratization" of functional institutions seem to have proved irrelevant and harmful. I believe that the struggle for extending public control of the direction of investment so as to take the "limits of growth" into account will be as vitally relevant as the ideological formula of "zero growth" is irrelevant. And I am convinced of the urgent relevance of negotiating a fairer deal for the poor, underdeveloped countries—despite the irrelevance and utopianism of some of these countries' concrete ideas.

Finally, there is one vital issue for the future of the industrially advanced democracies where the socialist outlook may have a contribution to offer: the need for greater international cooperation, and indeed for international institutions with powers of decision. The struggle against inflation and recession would have utterly failed if the major industrial nations, instead of seeking a common way out, had each tried to save itself by "beggar-my-neighbor" policies (as they did with disastrous effect in the world crisis of 1929-32). The struggle will not be finally won until a new world currency system is established under the management of an international institution. The control of investment with due regard to the "limits of growth" cannot be effectively undertaken by any one industrial country, if its competitors continue to approach these limits heedlessly. The negotiation with the poor countries has to be conducted by the advanced countries with a common policy, not in order to "negotiate from strength" like a cartel, but because no single country can make the necessary sacrifices unless its competitors join in. Democratic socialists are, of course, as much tied to national interests, and as liable to nationalist blinkers, as are other people; but their basic commitment to universal values and an internationalist outlook should enable their more far-sighted leaders to cast aside the blinkers and look beyond a narrow conception of their national interest. If, by accomplishing that, they can help to improve our international cooperation and to establish the international mechanisms of decision we need, and gradually to develop forms of democratic control for them, that might be the most relevant task of all. □

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Bogdan Denitch

The Socialist Left in Europe

From their very formation, socialist movements in Europe experienced an internal tension in theory and organizational practice. This duality can be expressed as "socialism from above versus socialism from below" and "bureaucratic versus spontaneous organizational theories." Until the Bolshevik Revolution, there was a loose left/right division in the Socialist International, often leading to intense factionalism and splits with regard to the kind of organization that socialists should favor.

A second cleavage, coinciding at times with the first, centered on attitudes toward the existing social order and estimate of its openness to fundamental reforms. This created divisions, loosely speaking, between reformism and revolutionary socialism.

Both of these cleavages were still further complicated by the tendency of socialists to distinguish between maximal goals and immediate strategies and tactics. Maximal goals were often stated in cataclysmic terms by socialist movements that in practice were committed to day-to-day struggles for reform, to the building of trade unions, cooperatives, etc. This was nicely illustrated in the Italian socialist movement around the time of World War I, when a compromise between the left and right wings was institutionalized by the adoption of *both* programs. The left wing's program became the maximum program, and the right wing's the minimum program.

In practice, of course, it was the minimum program that guided the day-to-day life of the party. The maximum program was reserved for passionate May Day speeches. If anything, it served as a barrier to the serious adoption of a minimal program, since it managed to frighten off potential middle-class supporters. Thus "maximalism" thwarted the rallying of the support of stable majorities for the socialist parties. Today "maximalism" is seen as a burden by most social democratic parties and, in the post-World War II period, a number of them shed their programmatic heritage in order to become mass parties of social reform. Historically, Eduard Bernstein has won the ideological battle in European social democracy, which in practice has adopted his statement: "The final goal is nothing, the movement everything."

Socialist parties in Europe attract a number of different clienteles. Some are attracted primarily to the Fabian task of reforming and humanizing the existing social order, while others are stirred by the vision of an egalitarian society sharply discontinuous from the existing social order. Both left and right wings are endemic or "natural" tendencies in the socialist movement. Left wings rearise in the mass parties despite their historic tendency to split away and form alternate sects or parties. And right wings are always there.

Traditionally, one of the left wings' major focuses has been the youth organization of the socialist parties. Generation after generation of socialist youth seems to rediscover the themes of the socialist left, often without much of a sense of continuity with long-

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established traditions, and therefore often repeating the fate of earlier socialist left movements—splintering factions followed by a breakaway, and attempts to set up "purer," more principled movements.

Historically, these left-wing splits, with the major exception of the Communist one, have been doomed to sectarian isolation. Usually, such groups have later sought reentry into the mass socialist party. Workers who form the main social base of socialist parties tend to be tenaciously conservative in their organizational attachments and intensely loyal to whatever is the primary workers' party in their country—and left-wing split-offs have rarely affected the mass base of these parties. The classic dilemma of the socialist left has always been that, while their program presumably responded to the needs of the industrial working class, it succeeded primarily in attracting younger intellectuals and ideologues rather than the bulk of the socialist workers. For a split to make sense, one had to assume that it was easier to attract workers to a radical or left-wing socialist program from *outside* the existing mass socialist party rather than through a struggle for a majority within it.

Two possible assumptions could lead a left wing to form a separate organization: there are masses of unorganized radical workers and others *to the left* of the existing socialist parties who would respond to a new organization—or the party is internally so blocked by bureaucratic constraints that no serious possibility remains for internal change. While the second may often have been the case in practice (except perhaps for the period immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution), the first has never really been true. The terrain to the left of the existing mass working-class parties appears amorphous and more suited to small transitory grouplets and sects than to the formation of a new mass party aspiring to win a majority within the working class.

The Communist-Socialist Split

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION transformed the left/right dispute by providing an example of a victorious revolution in a backward country, and also an apparently exportable organizational model—that is, a disciplined party committed to the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois social order. This is why the early Communist movement attracted such diverse followers in the various European countries, ranging from revolutionary syndicalists to small groups of Marxist sectarians, from traditional maximalists to left-wing socialist youth and the more radical trade unionists. And their tie with the revolutionary center in Moscow, in turn, provided some stability for the early Communist movements, giving them a measure of legitimacy.

The cement that held together the socialist and social democratic parties was their massive electoral and organizational base; the cement that held the Communists together was loyalty to the Bolshevik Revolution as institutionalized in the new Soviet state and the Communist International. Both the Socialist and the Communist parties had built-in constraints to discourage internal groups that were in programmatic disagreement from breaking off and setting up independent organizations. In one case, isolation from the mass socialist base and trade unions; in the other, isolation from Moscow. Thereby, some organizational continuity was assured to both.

But this neat division between revolutionary socialists, organized in the early Communist parties, and reformist social democrats was not to continue. In a number of countries the new Communist parties did not manage to obtain a substantial organizational base. The mechanical transfer of Russian practices into the early Communist parties turned a number of these parties into sects with little relevance to their own countries. And, most important, by the '30s the Soviet experience began to look less and less attractive. As a result, the new groupings of the socialist left in the '30s tended to be attracted to splinter parties that emerged from the Communist parties, or to set up their own institutions, or work as factions within the existing socialist parties.

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The Post-World War II Left and the Cold War Period

THE POST-WORLD WAR II SITUATION differed drastically from the prewar scene. From 1945 to the late '50s, the Cold War was a central foreign-policy issue, and the European Communist parties, with the exception of the Italian one, were rigidly isolated domestically.

The Cold War had two major impacts: on the one hand, the disillusionment with Soviet reality and its imposed replicas in Eastern Europe; on the other, the dependence of Western Europe on its alliance with the United States, with the implicit limitations this entailed in domestic policies. Europe, immediately after World War II, desperately needed Marshall Plan aid and American credits, and it seemed to need the NATO shield for its very self-preservation. The prospects for a radical transformation of the capitalist order were thus limited in two important respects: measures that would provoke the United States into cutting off credits were unlikely to be undertaken by any West European government, and the alliance with the United States militarily stabilized the continental *status quo*.

With the Communists excluded from normal political processes in France and Italy, a left majority was impossible. This meant continued centrist or conservative governments and a further gradual domestication of the social democratic parties. The result was to limit sharply the range of options available to European social democracy. In 1959 the German Social Democrats removed from their program an earlier emphasis on class struggle, formalizing what by then was reality for the Socialist International as a whole.

The socialists appeared to be committed to no more than creating extensive welfare states on the Swedish model and the role of junior partners in an anti-Soviet Western alliance. Within that framework, several strands of the post-World War II socialist left emerged. The most significant, perhaps, was the Bevanite group in the British Labour party, whose continuity was assured by its paper, the *Tribune*, and by a base consisting of traditional radical trade unionists, socialist youth, and some intellectuals.

The Bevanites concentrated on a critique of the moderate domestic program of the British Labour party and the foreign-policy alliance with the United States. They argued that the welfare state in Great Britain, while undoubtedly a major achievement, maintained the basic class structure of British society and in effect helped to stabilize British capitalism by nationalizing those sectors of the economy that were financially unattractive.

The Bevanites revived the debate about nationalization that had been troubling European socialists for some time. The extension of state ownership of the means of production and exchange can be proposed for several reasons. One, associated with the Fabians and the Labour party's right wing, stresses the view that socialization of industry is necessary for efficient production and planning and that it can gradually be made acceptable to broad sections of the population, primarily through proof of its efficiency. In this perspective nationalization of services indispensable to the entire economy should be begun, and a nationalized industry should be run in a hierarchical manner not particularly different from the private economy. The major difference would presumably be that no profits would be paid to shareholders. In Britain this was hardly a problem, since the industries taken over had been chronically undercapitalized and were losing money.

The left wing approached the problem from a sharply divergent point of view. The Bevanites argued from the basically egalitarian premise of socialist thought. One nationalizes in order to strip the ruling capitalist minority of its economic and social base of power. What is required is a massive socialist takeover of the economy, which, whether compensating the former owners or not, would deprive them of the major levers of economic and political power. The major industries should be taken over, whether they are losing or gaining financially, in order to

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equalize the distribution of power in the society. The industrial hierarchy would be reorganized so as to place authority within the nationalized economy in the hands of elected public bodies. The Bevanites and their successors were never quite clear as to the degree of workers' control they envisaged. What they did say was that the practice of the Labour government of appointing retired admirals and generals to head the nationalized industries, while pleasing the middle-class moderates, perpetuated the upper-class domination of British industry in the nationalized sector.

In foreign policy, the Bevanites and their allies tended to deemphasize the ties with NATO, seeking to replace NATO with a looser defensive alliance. They wanted both to loosen ties with the U. S. and Nato, and *not* to expand the British military capacity to a point where such dependence would seem unnecessary.

In France, the post-World War II socialist left had firmer ideological roots, particularly in the large Federation of the Seine, but it operated in a drastically different milieu. To begin with, in post-World War II France the CP rather than the SP (SFIO) was the larger and more cohesive workers' party.

Since most of the unions were dominated by the CP, the French SP kept losing its working-class base and was becoming a party of lower government functionaries and, in the South, of small-town reformers. Thus the SP participated in governments that had embarked on a series of bitter colonial wars leading to defeat after defeat. The lines between left and right wings were very sharp, and the resultant tendency to break away from the SP (SFIO) led to repeated attempts to set up new parties—ranging from the RDR, which included Sartre and other left-wing intellectuals to the PSU, which is an almost classic left socialist party.*

Because the French CP was so powerful and the French pay such close attention to ideological questions, the ideology of the French left had to be sharply defined. Thus, unlike their British and Scandinavian comrades, the French left socialists developed an analysis of the Soviet Union describing it either as a "state capitalist" (i.e., a non-socialist) state, some new type of exploitative social order, or, borrowing from the Trotskyist tradition, as a "degenerated workers' state." In general the French socialist left criticized the French Communist party from the *left*, attacking it for its internal bureaucracy, caution, and lack of meaningful domestic program. However, the French left tended to fracture—and by the '60s even the PSU had several highly organized factions. The PSU did not really emerge as a significant force until the revitalization of the French Socialist party under Mitterand in the last several years.

Convergence Theories and the European Left

THE FINAL PERIOD of the postwar era saw the development of polycentric tendencies in the Communist world and the disillusionment of many Communist activists after the Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolt. This polycentrism led to a thaw in European left-wing politics. By the late '60s several factors had changed the strategic relation between Socialist and Communist parties in Europe. The primary one was the stabilization of the Cold War, so that Russia was no longer seen as an *active* military threat to Western Europe.

There were other important factors: the development of independent regimes in the Third World and the growth of neutralism and nonalignment; the polycentric breakdown of the Soviet bloc into a number of divergent structures—Russia, China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, etc.; the gradual emergence of the Italian and French Communists from the enforced political ghetto of

*SFIO: Section Française, Internationale Ouvrière — predecessor to the present SP (Partie Socialiste). RDR: Rassemblement Démocratique Républicaine — an attempt, in the late '40s, to form a broad left-socialist party. PSU: Partie Socialiste Unifié — present left-socialist party.

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the Cold War; and the reemergence of class cleavages in European politics. This last factor in many ways was the most immediately important for the new growth of the socialist left.

Throughout the '50s, the unprecedented prosperity of the welfare states and their apparent success in stabilizing the economic cycle led to "postideological" analyses of the European and American societies. Both American and European analysts celebrated the "death of ideology" and the concomitant death of a class-conflict-oriented politics. The very class structure of modern industrial society, which had given rise to the mass socialist movements, was now assumed to be in flux, and the middle-class styles and values would become the norms for the majority of the population. The working class was slowly losing its class identity and was merging into the middle class, coopted by the growing consumerist temptations of an increasingly prosperous and stable Europe. In short, Europe was being Americanized and European parties were presumably going to respond to the new reality by becoming less ideological and more prone to consensus.

This convergence theory applied not only to the non-Communist advanced industrial polities. The more daring theorists saw it as a historic worldwide phenomenon, for the bureaucratic despotisms of the Communist bloc would *also* begin to behave more and more like all modern industrial polities. Liberalized Communist states would become increasingly technocratic and, during the '60s, the golden era of East European liberalization, one found East European experts echoing their West European colleagues. Class conflict was a thing of the past; modern, efficient management would assure undreamed-of prosperity; radical transformation in the Communist bloc would lead to a similar evolution into modernity.

In this optimistic milieu the prospects for a socialist left appeared marginal at best. Neo-Marxist theorists both of the Frankfurt school and of its equivalent in Eastern Europe, the *Praxis* group in Yugoslavia, tended to reduce their critique of the existing social order to attacks on bureaucratic drives they saw as endemic to the modern industrial order. Alienation was now seen as the most acute form of exploitation—not the alienation in the process of production stressed by Marx, but the alienation of promethean intellectuals and frustrated youth.

The intellectual socialist left, mostly student-based, around such British journals as *New Left Review*, grew somewhat in the '60s. But, with few exceptions, its members were concerned with the poor and the *Lumpenproletariat* rather than with a working class, which they saw as sluggish and coopted. The left socialists tacitly shared many assumptions of the theorists of mass society, with this difference: that, instead of celebrating, they deplored. The intellectual socialist left in England and elsewhere had few or no ties with the working class, and sometimes even revealed an antagonistic attitude toward trade unions and workers' economic demands.

During this period hostility to the U. S. grew continually because of the seemingly endless Indochina war. Revived theories of imperialism saw the U. S. as an imperialist power devoted not to progress and modernization but to the maintenance of a world *status quo* that increasingly doomed the Third World to poverty and dictatorial rule. The student rebellion in the '60s was in part directed against the complacency of their own societies, heightened by the fact that there was a drop in the prestige of the intellectual professions for which the students were being prepared. Here at last were seemingly broad and growing strata "to the left" of the organized radical movements on which some sort of new politics might be based. Most of the student organizations of the '60s were profoundly antiorganizational, and when organizations did emerge they tended to resemble the familiar sects and splinters of the past.

Two new poles of attraction had developed for radical dissidents in modern industrial societies: an abstraction known as the Third

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World, and another known as Communist China. Since both were relatively unknown, one could project upon them whatever utopia one had in mind. For the student left, China and the Third World played much the same role as the Soviet Union had played for an earlier generation of European leftists. However, no equivalent *organizational* focus was provided, and this particular leftism therefore soon began to disintegrate. What finally remained were Europe's mass social democratic and Communist parties, and within their orbits new programs began to emerge.

The New Working Class and Workers' Control

SEVERAL of the theoretical developments that occurred in the middle '60s still affect the strategies and programs of left socialists today.

- The first, developed in France, dealt primarily with the socialist transformation of advanced industrial societies, taking into account the shifts in occupational structure after World War II. The French writer Serge Mallet, in agreement with a number of American and European sociologists, studied the large number of white-collar workers and professionals who had appeared in the welfare state. Instead of seeing this as an enlargement of the middle class, which would threaten the parties of the left, Mallet saw the "new working class" as an intellectual salaried class, subject to factorylike conditions and hierarchical discipline, within increasingly bureaucratized sectors of the economy and society. This "new working class," said Mallet, has nothing to fear from social ownership of the economy and tends to link its particular demands to those of industrial workers.

Mallet argued that the masses of professionals and technicians would be driven by their *life condition* to organize analogously to industrial workers and that both could unite against the capitalist order. He pointed out that in France unions of professionals and technicians tended to be more militant than blue-collar workers in raising issues about control of the work process.

French teachers and technicians had long been organized in Christian and independent unions. These federations, originally organized by the Christian trade-union movement and now dominated by an alliance of left-wing socialists and left-wing Catholics, adopted a program stressing self-management, equality, and radical social transformation. This movement was paralleled by similar developments among left Catholics in Spain and Belgium and formed a new "objective basis" for the revival of a socialist left. A more conservative version of the "new working-class" doctrine, as adopted by the majority of the Socialist party in France, gives it a radical technocratic bent that makes it attractive to middle-class radicals and professionals.

Mallet's theory also provides a theoretically useful way for socialists to analyze student radicalism and discontent. Rather than being purely ideological, it can be seen as reflecting the discontent of the future members of a new exploited class now being formed in the universities. The training that the students receive presumably enables them to generalize about their social condition and makes them more volatile once they enter into the work process. The significant aspect of student radicalism is therefore the radicalization of the younger professionals who provide the class-based organization of socialists with indispensable technical cadres for the running of a modern economy.

- The second development affecting left socialists today has been the growing interest in workers' control, as distinct from various "participation" schemes, within the European labor movement. Demands for workers' control presuppose a far more radical reordering of society than mere nationalization. As such, workers' control is the link between the ideas of the French socialist left, the left-wing movements in the British Labour party, the German Jusos (Young Socialists), and similar new left-wing currents within some Cummunist parties of the West. It revives classic Marxist and early Bolshevik

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themes but does so under new circumstances and in the presence of a far more educated working class than existed in the past, and with material conditions for workers' control that are far superior to those in relatively underdeveloped Yugoslavia.

- A third set of themes leading to a revival of left-wing socialist politics is related to the growth of multinational corporations in Europe's economies. Theorists of neocapitalism within the socialist movement tend to stress the supranational character of the capitalist system and the difficulty of coping with it strategically within the framework of a nation-state. The tendency is, therefore, to think in terms of European strategies—or, first, West European and then European strategies—to prevent individual socialist governments from being penalized by a flight of capital and to carry out transnational trade-union actions dictated by the fact that corporations can now shift production from England to Germany, from Italy to France, etc., when faced by workers' militancy in a single country.

Left-wing socialists argue that even traditional trade-union strategies, favored by right-wing socialists, require international cooperation by trade unions and socialist parties, and in countries where there are Communist as well as socialist parties, they require Socialist-Communist cooperation. The implication here, of course, is that class politics are again assuming a primacy.

Euro-Communism and Strategic Opportunities for the Left

GENERALLY, the socialist left in Europe has gained from the disintegration of the old monolithic Communist bloc. The growing independence of the Communist parties of Western Europe makes possible coalitions and left-wing majorities in France, Italy, and Spain, perhaps even in Greece, Portugal, and Iceland. The very fact that such majorities exist gives debates over programmatic alternatives an urgency they did not have in the past. With the left united, at least electorally, the tendency of socialists in France and Italy to participate in centrist governments is discouraged. The development of Euro-Communism opens up the prospects for social transformation in Western Europe, while the difficulties within Eastern Europe make the Soviet-dominated bloc appear less monolithic and threatening externally.

The single major gain for the socialist left that arises out of the new developments within the Communist world lies in the freeing of Europe's working-class movements from identification with the Soviet "model." In the past, the identification of the European Communists and of some European socialists with the Soviet experience indeed frightened off many potential supporters of the left. Today no major working-class party in Europe finds it necessary to defend the Soviet Union. And from now on most of these parties will be judged more and more on the basis of their own programs and politics.

The difficulties that the classic social democratic parties in Britain and Germany have had in maintaining a degree of enthusiasm and support among younger workers further encourages sections of those parties to move the the left. They now can do so, for they are freed of the fear of involvement with Moscow and of U.S. intervention. European socialism is becoming increasingly autonomous in terms of its domestic politics, and under these circumstances the normal left-right division reasserts itself.

The Socialist Left in Western Europe

THE DEVELOPMENT of a New Left in the '60s made several contributions to the traditional workers' parties. One is a systematic revival of Marxist and neo-Marxist thought, emphasizing primarily the ideas of the young Marx, of Gramsci, and of a few Trotskyists such as Ernest Mandel. The second was the activation of fairly broad groups of younger intellectuals, often graduates from ultraleft student radicalism into the left wing of a mass party, which now act as ginger groups within the parties. In a number of socialist parties, they have acted as a bridge between the relatively

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antiquated party cadres and younger technicians, intellectuals, and professionals.

The broader left wing in the British Labour party (BLP) centers around the *Tribune* group and has many prominent spokesmen, both among Labour MPs and in the Cabinet. Wedgewood Ben and Michael Foote are typical. The approach of this BLP left can be summarized as Bevanism in modern dress. Basically, it is still wary about European solutions, and is left-wing insofar as it feels that nationalization and social-welfare measures ought to be radically extended beyond the present Labour party program. It is also increasingly open to demands for workers' control. Its insularity, however, cuts it off from the European socialist strategies.

Today the French left is a potpourri, drawing on numerous strands of thought, but acting more or less in concert with the Socialist party. The French left, both in and outside the SP, differs from François Mitterand, the party's leader, in several respects. To begin with, it does not support Atlanticism and NATO, but instead would have France—that is, a socialist France,—be oriented toward the formation of a socialist Mediterranean bloc, which would in turn develop ties with the nonaligned bloc and the Third World. Insofar as the French left socialists do have a defense policy, and it is not clear that they do, they support the concept of *defense in depth*, or a general "people's" defense. In practice this means defense policies based on the Swedish and Yugoslav model: a powerful, independent deterrent (short of atomic weapons), calculated to up the costs of any invasion to a prohibitive level, but outside of formal systems of alliances.

The argument of the French left socialists regarding internal French development concentrates on the need to break up the highly bureaucratized centralism of the French state, which they see as the major prop for French capitalism. Social and economic differences in France are extreme, while the privileged strata are more compact and powerful than in the rest of Western Europe. Therefore, the left socialists argue, rapid extension of social ownership in the French economy would be more broadly acceptable than in the northern countries—but, given the experiences with state-run industry, that extension cannot maintain popular support unless it is coupled with workers' councils. This places the French left socialists in conflict with the Communist party, which is suspicious of worker-control schemes and stresses centralized state control and planning.

In France alone, there now appears to be a viable left majority—a left majority that goes beyond traditional social democracy. In that fact lies both temptation and a promise. Since the French left coalition now probably has more than 51 percent of the electorate, concessions toward middle-class parties are unlikely, and no left-coalition partner thinks in terms of an Italian-type "historical compromise." Therefore the program of a French left government is likely to be more radical than any of the proposals put forward in Italy by the CPI. On the other hand, the French establishment is both more homogeneous and powerful, as well as more prone to extralegal solutions, than its Italian equivalent. The problem of a socialist transition in France is therefore more acute than in Italy.

Socialist strategy in France is further complicated by a key difference between the French CP and the Italian and Spanish ones. The French CP supports a left alliance with the socialists, provided—and always provided—that the CP maintains its hegemony within the working class. Put in a different way, the French Communist party concedes the desirability of a number of parties forming a socialist government, but it only accepts the notion that those other parties represent strata other than workers. The Italian and Spanish CPs, however, see the coalition as including not only non-working-class parties but accept, at least theoretically, the possibility of *several* "legitimate" working-class parties.

Specifically, the contribution of the French socialist left to the French left electoral bloc is a stress on the condition of migrant workers, a

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Mediterranean orientation, and an emphasis on workers' councils and decentralization. All of these themes resonate in sectors of the French electorate and therefore give the French socialist left a potential mass base outside of the traditional trade unions and party militants. The weakness, however, is that this emphasis of the French socialist left makes almost certain a predominantly intellectual and middle-class composition.

The program of the Swedish Social Democratic party was considerably affected by a left wing that may well become more powerful as a result of the electoral defeat of the party. This left wing voiced a critique of the Scandinavian welfare states, which they see as maintaining gross class inequality through the control that a relatively small number of corporations has of the economy. Scandinavian welfare states are often described by left-wing Scandinavian socialists as tending increasingly to neocorporatism rather than to socialism. In their view the emphasis the social democratic governments have put on taxation of income, rather than to attack ownership, has created resentment among the middle strata and even the more skilled workers toward high tax rates—without decisively attacking the major strongholds of class power, which still exist in the corporate sector. They argue that in Sweden, for example, under the social democratic government, there was far less social ownership of the economy than there is in France or Italy. Their critique of social democratic gradualism is that it neither mobilizes the traditional working class nor draws younger middle-class and intellectual elements into the movement. They stress the need for a more drastic discontinuity, which alone could make the workers' councils effective and rally enthusiastic support to the left. In other words, if the workers' councils are *gradually* extended into the economy, they will be perceived by the workers as yet one more bureaucratic trade-union operation limited to activists and the already committed. Therefore, the establishment of workers' control has to be dramatic and has to occur parallel to and outside of the formal trade-union structure.

Like their British counterparts, the Scandinavians—even the Scandinavian left-wing socialists—tend to be programmatic rather than ideological, and to be constrained by criteria of efficiency and consensus. They are more involved in nontraditional programs than the majority social democrats, supporting feminist, student, and anti-imperialist issues. They thus inject a more radical tone into the movement. However, the left socialists are not merely more radical than the social democratic parties; they seek to make changes that would decisively tip the social power in their countries. Their growing influence is likely to sharpen class and political cleavages in Scandinavia, and since they attract especially the younger and newer supporters of the parties, they appear to be the ascendant wing.

In Germany, the Jusos, or young socialists, form a substantial sector of the Social Democratic party. The Jusos, whose leadership consists mainly of former students and some middle-class professionals, are influential in a few major unions. They represent an increasing problem for the party leadership, since their growth in the party, though not necessarily in the electorate, is used by the Christian Democrats to frighten off middle-class voters. The Jusos, unlike their British and Scandinavian counterparts, are more explicitly Marxist. They have grown in part because of the extraordinarily cautious program of the majority Social Democrats.

All of the basic reasons for the existence of a socialist left exist in Germany: major class differences, an economy firmly dominated by the private sector, a welfare state that has made few major advances in a decade, and a nation that too obviously is the major U. S. ally in Europe. Two other matters give the German left a special character: one is the massive presence of foreign workers who occupy the bottom of the class ladder and are, to all appearances, a permanent factor in German society; the second is the prosperity of German capitalism, which creates more

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options for economic and social change than is available to the stagnant economies in Britain and Italy.

THERE IS a classic dilemma in any possible strategic calculation regarding the future of European left-wing politics. As a social democratic party moves toward respectability, it makes limited inroads on the traditional middle-class vote, which in any case tends to prefer centrist and conservative parties. The *new* middle class, or Mallet's "new working class," tends to be, if anything, more radical than the mass social democratic parties themselves. The domestication of a social democratic party, it seems, encourages passivity and inactivity among workers and sharply limits the party's ability to mobilize massive enthusiasm for its program.

Welfare-state measures of the classic social democratic type tend to reach their limits relatively early, and do not deal effectively with the type of economic difficulties that have characterized the European economy in the recent period. And they do not generate more work or cope effectively with inflation. These problems require more drastic restructuring and redistributive measures. A move to the left, however, has its own attendant risks, and one of the major distinctions between left- and right-wing socialists is in how they estimate this calculus. The Jusos, for example, believe that a breakthrough is possible by offering a more radical socialist program that would mobilize the traditional support of social democracy and extend it among the younger voters who are not as yet integrated into the value nexus of the capitalist system. The German social democracy, they argue, is too established to be viewed as a vehicle of social change, and that explains its inability to advance today politically. In foreign policy, the Jusos' goals resemble those of the Italian Communists. They look forward to a socialist Europe, independent and acting as an alternative to the Russian and American blocs, and while for the time being they are ambivalent about the necessity of maintaining the NATO shield, they are clear about their Europeanism, that is, in their assumption that socialist developments in Western Europe will facilitate progressive social change in Eastern Europe. They are for an extension and a deepening of the *Ostpolitik*, assuming that increasing ties with East European countries will help liberalize those regimes, and that within a liberalized East European Communism class politics will push toward an extension of workers' power against the Communist bureaucracies.

To summarize: out of a number of different sources, a left-wing socialism has been reborn within and near European social democracy. Its roots can be seen: in the economic crisis that now has shaken up Europe after two decades of uninterrupted prosperity and economic expansion, in the disillusionment with U. S. leadership in world affairs, in a new sensitivity to the problems of the Third World, and in a general feeling that social change again is realistically on the agenda.

Then, too, there are such developments as the new Euro-Communism, and the prospect of a Mediterranean bloc in which Communist and Socialist coalitions would dominate. But a major factor can perhaps be found in the exhaustion of social democratic reformism whose rightward drift in the '50s and early '60s was not substantively reversed. The welfare state is taken for granted, as a given. The question is, what lies beyond? The present majority response in the socialist movement is "more of the same," and while that appeared to be a solution in a Europe seen as stable, prosperous, and politically immobile, it is inadequate today, when faith in the present system has been substantially shaken up and a new generation of young intellectuals and worker activists is emerging on the scene. □

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Jean-Pierre Worms

The Rise of the French Socialist Party

The resurgence of the French Socialist party first became apparent in the 1973 general election; it was confirmed by the near-victory of its leader, François Mitterand, in the 1974 presidential contest. In the subsequent by-elections the Socialists made further headway, giving the united left, for the first time, a majority. Since then, with approximately 30 percent of the popular vote, the Socialist party has emerged as the undisputed winner in most national and local by-elections and in the general county elections of 1976. The party also has won many new cities in the 1977 municipal contest, and now most observers agree that it very likely will lead the united left coalition to victory in the 1978 general parliamentary election. This spectacular rise and new, apparent stability of the French Socialist party indeed may be considered one of the major political phenomena in recent West European history.

At first glance, this phenomenon may seem to be an anomaly both in France and in Europe at large. The situation of the French Socialist party has no parallel in Europe (with the possible exception of the Socialists in Portugal, despite obvious differences).

The Scandinavian socialist tradition, undoubtedly the most successful experiment in democratic socialism in the West, with its impressive record in reducing material, social, and cultural inequalities among classes, seems to have great difficulty in deciding where to go next. For most Scandinavian socialists radical change lies in the past. The English, German, and Austrian traditions of social democracy offer no more and no less an alternative to the Conservatives and Christian Democrats of their respective countries than does the Democratic party when confronting the Republicans in the United States: realistic improvements in the prevailing system. Radical change is neither behind them nor ahead—it is not on the agenda. In Italy and in Spain, the two Latin countries that, like France, have strong socialist traditions, the socialist parties have great difficulty in maintaining a modicum of political credibility in the face of the extraordinary rise of a new type of Communist party, successful in its claim to be the vehicle for radical democratic change. Indeed, nowhere in Europe does one see another socialist party that champions a radical concept of democratic socialism coupled with a radical strategy for implemen-

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tation, enjoying the same process of growth and within reach of majority support throughout the country.

On the national scene, the case of the French Socialist party may also seem curious to many political observers. After all, it was one of the major victims in the fall of the Fourth Republic. And not long ago it seemed that Gaullism, with its dash of populism, had crushed any hope of its regeneration. The upheaval of May 1968 found the Socialists unable to offer inspiring leadership to a demanding generation of political activists. And with the 1969 presidential election, in which the Socialist candidate received little more than 5 percent of the vote, the bell seemed to have tolled for a democratic socialist party in France.

What, then, brought about this swift and drastic change? What indeed is the character of this new French Socialist party? Who are the French Socialists? What is their strategy for victory and how, if they achieve victory, do they intend to use it?

A major factor, certainly, is the character of its leader, François Mitterrand: his profound political shrewdness, his deep republicanism, his capacity to touch popular sensibility and to establish a current of direct representation overriding all other loyalties (including Communist loyalties). All these traits have been abundantly described in the press. His own writings, of considerable literary talent, offer us the best understanding of the evolution of this complex personality and its qualities, which undoubtedly are responsible for his capacity to establish his authority inside and outside the party, and to catalyze the hopes of millions for a new and plausible alternative to present French society.

Other well-known positive factors are intrinsic to the general political situation in France: the failure of Gaullism without de Gaulle and of Giscard's brand of reformism, and the French Communist party's inability to attain the position of its Italian counterpart. It is necessary to note these well-known factors in order to stress that the lack of credibility of the Communist and "reformist" alternatives undoubtedly gave the Socialist party an opportunity to present itself as the only plausible vehicle for change.

But favorable circumstances and an exceptional personality are not enough to explain the astonishing growth of the Socialist party. The very process of this growth must be analyzed in greater detail, for it offers a rare example of the complete regeneration of a very old party in its organizational structure at national and local levels, in its national and local elected representation, its rank-and-file membership and popular base, its ideology, strategy, and governmental platform—a regeneration resulting in some inevitable wear and tear but in minimal waste of what remained valid of the old structure and political heritage. In other words, the strength of the present Socialist party lies, to a great extent, in a merger of the old and the new—the successful attempt of the new to revitalize and integrate the old.

Three phases in this process can be observed:

1969-71: Laying the foundation.
1971-74: Building a new party.
1975-76: Consolidating for victory.

Laying the Foundation

IN 1969, THE SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière)—the old Socialist party, heir to Jean Jaurès and Léon Blum—was in pitiful disarray. Since 1945 it was in a state of slow but steady decline, which was accelerated in the last years of Gaullism.

Before the Fifth Republic, the SFIO's participation in a number of centrist maneuvers, systematic practice of a double standard for talk and action (a doctrinaire, orthodox Marxist ideology, combined with opportunistic participation in all types of governments), but, mainly, direct responsibility in the Algerian War, had closed most channels of recruitment for the party. The left-leaning young cold-shouldered the SFIO and either went to (or rather through) various leftist groups or engaged in other forms of

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social action—youth movements and student unions. The intelligentsia and liberal establishment gave politics a wide berth or founded political "clubs." Gaullism hastened the growth of these "clubs," most of them associations not directly engaged in normal political action (electioneering, forming local chapters, etc.) but rather in preparing technically sound and politically credible left-wing alternatives to Gaullist policies. Democratization of French society and "modernization" of socialism were their common aims. However, under the leadership of François Mitterrand, who had obtained a surprisingly large vote when opposing de Gaulle in the 1965 presidential contest, some of these "clubs" federated into the Convention des Institutions Républicaines and started "normal" political-party activity. An electoral alliance was established with the SFIO and what was then the Radical party. This alliance, named the Fédération de la Gauche Démocratique et Socialiste (FGDS), presented candidates in the 1967 parliamentary elections with reasonable success.

However, the new generation of 19- to 25-year-olds, whether students or not, seemed to remain uninterested in politics. There was talk of the "depolitization of youth" and "the end of ideology." Then came May 1968, which caught everybody off-guard. In its wake, the June general election called by de Gaulle was disastrous for the left. 1969 provided the referendum on regionalization, de Gaulle's resignation, and a miserable score for the Socialist candidate in the presidential election that carried Pompidou to the Elysée.

The party now was faced for the first time with the real possibility of definitive collapse, in terms of membership and public support. Anxious to preserve the historical heritage of French socialism and to safeguard the considerable Socialist strongholds in local governments and in the unions, its leader Guy Mollet did the unthinkable: he resigned in favor of a "renegade," Alain Savary. Earlier, Savary had resigned from Mollet's government, and then from the SFIO, in opposition to Mollet's Algerian policy; he then founded a dissident party and finally formed a "club."

Savary's first aim as the new organizational head of the Socialists was to rebuild the party with three elements in mind: a clear political line; recruitment and rapid access to responsible positions within the party hierarchy for club members and for the new generation of militants aroused by 1968 but discouraged by its sectarian offshoots; the preservation of the "heritage" of the SFIO and whatever power base it still possessed in the country.

The clarification of the political line was simple: the rejection of any form of "third-force strategy." For such "third-force strategy," by excluding the Communist party—and with it the large section of the working class it influenced—would inevitably carry the Socialist party to the right and to a position of buttressing "bourgeois" coalitions. This, Savary reasoned, had been the basic cause for socialist decline: this had put the Socialist party into a position where it could not offer a credible alternative, neither radical nor reformist. Why would people turn to socialists for a middle-of-the-road policy, rather than to a center party that publicly and sincerely advocated such a policy?

Rejection of a "third-force strategy" in turn now implied that the Socialist party would forgo any prospective governmental responsibility unless, at least, Communist support was included. Hence it was necessary to explore a possible entente with the Communist party. Conversations were initiated on a number of fundamental issues; the result was a "*constat de convergences et de divergences*," which was to be submitted to the 1971 Congress in order to determine whether there was adequate ground for proceeding toward an alliance with the Communists.

Clarification of the political line brought rapid results. Party membership almost doubled in two years (to approximately 80,000), and the party cadres were considerably renewed—not so much at the national level as in about half the county federations (Fédérations Departementales).

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However, this renewal was dampened somewhat by Savary's refusal to end his alliance with Guy Mollet, partly out of a sense of decency toward the man who had stepped down for him, but also because Mollet's support seemed necessary for the preservation of the "old heritage" in the continuing renewal process.

Simultaneously, discussions began with the Convention des Institutions Républicaines, whose merger with the Socialist party was considered an essential step toward regrouping all currents of democratic socialism in the same organization.

Building the Party, 1971-1974

UNIFICATION took place in 1971 at the Epinay Congress, which most observers consider to be the birth date of the new Socialist party. François Mitterrand was elected First Secretary, defeating Savary by a narrow margin.

At the time, the majority of commentators focused on the tactical alliances inside the party, which had produced Mitterrand's victory. Few stressed the nature of the political choice made in the process. The Epinay Congress made a strategic decision that to some (Savary and his friends) seemed a risky venture but ultimately proved the key to the rapid ascent of the Socialist party: it opted to accelerate the negotiations with the Communist party for a detailed governmental program.

Savary was more circumspect; he wished to resume discussions on fundamental issues that still divided Socialists and Communists, and then to negotiate an alliance explicitly stating agreements and disagreements.

Mitterrand's position might be summarized as follows: Let us terminate discussion on fundamental issues with the Communist party since we already know what we cannot agree upon; no benefit can be derived from highlighting disagreements now. Instead, let us elaborate a detailed program of government for the normal five-year span of a legislature, and negotiate with the Communist party for a common government program on this basis. The option meant an alliance covering the whole spectrum of governmental policies but within a precisely limited time schedule, stipulating only those changes that could be managed during that period.

Mitterrand's strategy proved extremely successful. The Communist party was so eager to appear as a party "*comme les autres*" with legitimate governmental capacities that it agreed to most of the program suggested by the Socialists. The Socialists were able to boast that they had made only a few and minor concessions in the common platform. Yet the mere existence of that platform afforded the alliance the gigantic potential asset of presenting a credible alternative to the existing government. It also started a deep social movement within the working class, which had always considered the split between Socialists and Communists a tragic source of weakness in opposing their common antagonist.

The question now was, who would most benefit from the alliance: who would reap the harvest of the "*dynamique unitaire*"? Obviously, the right sneered at this tactical choice and predicted rapid Communist domination of the Socialist party. A poster exhibited throughout France during the 1973 general election illustrated that attitude: it pictured Marchais flaunting a hungry grin directly above a worried-looking Mitterrand, with the caption: "WHO WILL EAT WHOM?"

The first electoral test of the alliance in the 1973 parliamentary elections proved that nobody was "eating" anybody. Both parties had benefited: the Communist party more in terms of the number of elected members to Parliament than in electoral support, the Socialist party with huge gains in the electorate and a considerable increase in parliamentary representation.

The Communist and Socialist parties each received about 20 percent of the national vote; the total vote of the left was approximately 48 percent. This figure included the returns for

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the third member of the Common Program, the Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche, which had split from Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber's Radical party. The figure also included the vote for various small leftist parties, principally Michel Rocard's PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié), which was critical of the alliance but never failed to step down in its favor before the second ballot.[1]

Arithmetically, the situation contained no mystery. If the united left was to be successful in acquiring new allegiance in the electorate, it was clear that the Socialist party rather than the Communist party would benefit. Why should electors who had hitherto voted further right suddenly move to the extreme left, and not to the more "moderate" left represented by the Socialist party? But why not, one might ask, stop at the most moderate fringe of the alliance and vote for the Radicaux de Gauche? The reason was that the credibility of the alliance was founded on two factors. First, there had to be a renewal of political principles, ideology, and personnel, demonstrating that the alliance represented a deliberate departure from the worn paths of the Fourth Republic. The Socialist party reflected this impulse to a far greater extent than did the Radicaux de Gauche, whose members were still mostly old-timers who had shied away from Servan-Schreiber's style and methods. Second, there had to be a clear perception that the alliance was balanced and not weighted in favor of the Communists. Reinforcing the Socialist party then became the most rational way toward this end.

This last point had, of course, been the core of the strategic choice made by the Socialist party. The 1973 election proved the argument to be readily understood and spontaneously shared by the electorate.

The *"dynamique unitaire"* in the country and the Socialist party's growth accelerated considerably in the months following the 1973 general election. Members had been intensely mobilized during the campaign and, encouraged by the results, went about transforming increased public support into increased organizational strength. New chapters were created: sympathizers became card-carrying members.

Pompidou's death in 1974 precipitated a presidential election—exactly one year later. The campaign required renewed effort from the rank and file: recruitment was stepped up even further. But it was not only a "socialist campaign." François Mitterrand had been "invited" to stand separately and independently for the three components of the alliance. He was, therefore, the only candidate of the left and the candidate of the union of the left ("*candidat unique de la gauche*" and "*candidat d'union de la gauche*"). However, the decision had ultimately been his own: he wished to be a candidate wielding wider appeal not restricted to partisan loyalties. The campaign headquarters, although mostly staffed by socialists, was separate from the party seat. As the campaign gathered velocity, as crowds and enthusiasm grew, and as the polls revealed the steady rise in favor of Mitterrand, victory seemed possible. Influential fringe-watchers of the alliance joined the campaign: various experts and especially top civil servants; leaders of non-Communist-controlled unions and social organizations that had hitherto remained independent or aloof from partisan political action; and left political leaders, notably Pierre Mendès-France as well as the imaginative leader of the PSU, Michel Rocard.

Mitterrand obtained 49.3 percent of the vote. He received an overwhelming majority among the working class and the young, with a comfortable lead in the under-50 age group and the salaried population in general. Thus it became clear, as Mitterrand said when he heard the final results: with "*le monde de la jeunesse et le monde du travail*" on its side, "*la victoire gauche est inéluctable.*"

Two conditions had to be fulfilled for this

[1]French elections always take place on two consecutive Sundays: the first ballot allows each party to count its votes. Only main contenders remain for the second run, the others standing down in their favor or withdrawing without indicating preference.

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to become reality: complete reunification of the democratic socialist forces and clarification of the new Socialist party's identity. In order to prepare the ground for reunification, François Mitterrand called a meeting of all proponents of democratic socialism who had joined his campaign. This meeting (les Assises du Socialisme) was held three months after the presidential election and comprised three delegations: one from the Socialist party, one from a section of the PSU led by Michel Roccard, one composed of leaders from various social organizations and from the CFDT (the second largest workers' union—successor to the Union of Christian Workers). A weekend was devoted to spelling out their agreement on a "projet de société." Subsequently, participants of the Assises, who were not yet members, joined the ranks of the Socialist party at its regular congress in January 1975.

Consolidating the Party: 1975-1976

THE SECOND CONDITION for victory, and probably the most important, was the consolidation of a party whose growth entailed risk of excessive diversity in attitudes and ideologies.

Clearly, all this had to be remedied for the Socialist party to face major challenges ahead: possible and increasingly probable victory at the 1978 parliamentary elections with a mandate to change the basic structure of society through democratic political procedure.

A glimpse at the Socialist party in early 1975 was enough to reveal flaws requiring rapid attention: first, it was a highly heterogeneous group of men and women, most with little theoretical background or political training; second, many of its rank-and-file rode the "*dynamique unitaire*" wave with a touch of naive ecstasy; and third, it had been remote from governmental responsibility for over 15 years, and its many newcomers had little or no knowledge of the specific procedures and constraints of government action.

The party, therefore, concentrated all its energy on instructing members in order to create somewhat more homogeneous attitudes, behavior, and expectations, and on clarifying the relationship between socialist identity and the "union of the left" strategy. Of the 150,000 members in 1975, the majority were eager young people taking their first political step. These neophytes also constituted at least half of the lower and middle ranks of party officials. Although a minority, members with previous political experience made up half of the lower and middle hierarchy and filled practically all top positions. A higher proportion of ex-SFIO members was found at the grass-roots level whereas ex-members of the Convention des Institutions Républicaines, of the PSU, of clubs and social movements were in senior echelons indicating the role they played in the process of renewal.[2]

This variety also reflected great diversity in attitude and ideology: from orthodox Marxism strongly laced with Leninism to social democracy; from adherents of etatism to proponents of self-government; from staunch custodians of secularism to Christian moralists and humanists, etc. Many of these persuasions were more sentimental in nature than structured and explicit ideologies. But in a party with statutes sanctioning proportional representation of "undercurrents" at all hierarchical levels, this heterogeneity might provide fertile ground for conflict. Indeed, many observers of the Socialist party have asserted that without Mitterrand to arbitrate unrest and to convert an authority emanating from support among the electorate into authority within the party, it would soon fall victim to internal contradictions.

Above all, doctrinal fragility could be all the more dangerous because of the alliance with the Communists, who had observed the rise of the Socialist party with apprehension, especially after the by-elections that followed

[2]These figures are rough estimates based on personal observation and not on statistical study.

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the 1974 presidential contest gave the socialists an eight-point lead among the electorate. The Communists also strongly resented the growing receptivity to the Socialist party within the working class, which the Communists were accustomed by force of habit and Leninist theory to consider their own preserve. Communist reaction was swift when Socialist-party recruitment started on the factory floor and factory chapters were organized. A number of anti-Socialist campaigns were launched, the most violent in autumn 1974, denouncing what the Communists called "antiunitarian" conduct. Everything the Socialists said or did was scrutinized for deviation from the "unitarian" line. Such criticism could create doubt or even guilt among the new members of the party who had joined under the impetus of the "union-of-the-left" strategy.

The Socialist party, therefore, spent the months following the 1974 presidential election in: (a) renewing the governing bodies of the party and, in the process, ousting from the Secretariat those who had sympathized with Communist criticism or had utilized it for extending their influence within the party; (b) elaborating and voting on a doctrinal text ("15 theses for self-government") that clearly defined a new, non-Leninist concept of socialism; (c) discussing and voting on the text of a special "report" on Socialist-Communist relations.

The Socialist party now had a sheaf of basic "texts" spelling out its specific identity and its concept of the alliance. On the basis of those texts it then launched a vast educational program for members as a priority for 1975-76.

What then are the doctrinal principles of the Socialist party? They define a free, open, pluralistic socialism, aiming at the expansion of self-governmental structures and processes. "Free" signifies absolute guarantee of all "formal" liberties and rigorous respect for universal suffrage as well as freedom from new forms of alienation related to knowledge and culture, social and economic exchange, natural and organized environment. "Pluralistic" signifies respect of free expression of all political parties, unions, and other organizations irrespective of ideology; it also means strictly differentiated institutional structures and processes (administration, government, legislature, parties, unions, etc.). "Open" signifies receptivity to other countries and also to initiative, innovation, and change, thereby emphasizing that no specific "model" can be advanced as a final goal for the construction of socialism. "Aiming at self-government" signifies the progressive development of institutional structures that permit control and decision-making by those most directly affected—whether in economic, social, or cultural fields. This implies the establishment of workers' control in the factory, consumer control over goods and services, decentralization of the state, and diversification and development of formal political processes.

In economic terms, all this implies maintaining a large private sector, with public ownership applied only to banking, credit institutions, and monopolistic concentrations of economic activities directly or indirectly nourished by public policies (i.e., manufacture of armaments, pharmaceutical products, etc.). The development of democratic economic planning should rely more on contractual mechanisms and indirect incentives within the market than on administrative rules.

As to the clarification of its conception of the alliance with the Communist party, the Socialist party reasserted its fundamental strategic choice, which has not wavered since 1969 and is now shared by all within the party. At the same time, the Socialist party clearly stipulated that this does not exclude, but on the contrary necessitates, permanent competition and tension between the allies. "*L'union est un combat*," was a Communist slogan at the height of controversy with the Socialist party. This could also be the Socialist motto—a struggle to guarantee at all times the right of each party to self-determination and

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existence in its own right. "*Pour dire oui,*" Mitterrand declared at the last Socialist party Congress, "*il faut pouvoir dire non.*" The alliance is not, therefore, considered to be sacred and everlasting: it is the result of a conscious choice in a specific historical context, always subject to reassessment. Its ultimate fate does not preoccupy the Socialists: it could remain a conflicted but solid alliance; it could lead to a reunification of the Socialist movement if the fundamental aims, attitudes, and conduct of the Communists were to evolve; it could lead to a decline of Communist influence to marginal status within the alliance. The Socialist party has not discussed any of these hypotheses: the party considers it enough to be in such a position of strength as to maintain freedom of choice at all times. A balance of power increasingly favorable to the Socialist party would seem to offer that guarantee. Such a balance, however, does not stem only from electoral and organizational strength. It also depends on the social base of each party and its mobilizing capacity.

Initially, the Communist party enjoyed considerable strategic superiority in this area. It controls the largest union federation, the CGT, and many social organizations (tenants' associations, youth movements, women's movements, etc.). Its Leninist concept of the predominance of "the" workers' party over all "conveyor belts" ensures types of control that the Socialist party refuses to consider, regardless of their apparent "efficiency."

Yet even at the beginning of the renewal process, the Socialist party was not unarmed in the contest for a strong social base. It wielded great influence over a very large independent union, the Fédération de l'Education Nationale (whose membership covers all levels of education from primary to university and research institutions), as well as in the third largest workers' union, Force Ouvrière (which, however, had become increasingly conservative after the split with the CGT and now has a primarily white-collar membership). Furthermore, the Socialist party's radicalization assured it wide sympathy within the CFTD (the second largest and very militant union), and even some support in the CGT itself.

The Socialist party has also developed support and opened channels of communication with the many but relatively new organizations fighting for both urban and rural environmental improvement. The Communist party has great difficulty in gaining sympathy among these groups, whereas the Socialist party's support for self-government, autonomous countervailing power for consumers, residents, and all other sociocultural associations spontaneously meets the demands of most of these new organizations.

Finally, and probably most important of all, is François Mitterrand's considerable appeal among the working class. Every opinion poll over the last two years has shown the depth of the personal loyalty he fosters among workers, including Communist voters. This personal loyalty is steadily being transformed into loyalty toward the Socialist party.

Although the social base of the Socialist party now seems to be comparable in strength to that of the Communists, it is nevertheless different in its structure. The Socialist party has rejected the Leninist theory of the primary role of the working class in relation to "satellite" classes and has elaborated on the concept of *"front des classes"* first proposed by Gramsci. It refuses to consider the working class as monolithic (thus effectively rejecting the notion that only one "workers" party is legitimate), and defines its social base in terms of the coalition of different classes or fractions of classes around a common political outlet for their various aspirations for change. This is obviously a more flexible, evolving, and democratic concept of a social base—but it also implies a social base more difficult to secure.

The "conveyor-belt" theory is, indeed, a direct result of the Communist party's monolithic concept of its social base. The Socialist party's pluralistic concept implies

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renunciation of any form of direct and manipulative channels of control. Mutual respect for each organization's independence is the maxim for its relationship with unions and other associations. This implies that influence can only be effective if these social organizations recognize that the Socialist party's policies offer the best political vehicle for their demands. It is obviously a more exacting way of maintaining influence than through the mechanical device of party agents heading social organizations. Nevertheless, in this very difficulty lies a great advantage: an absolute obligation to elaborate truly "representative" political options. Ultimately, pluralistic democracy could here again prove to be more efficient than bureaucratic forms.

Toward Victory

VICTORY now seems within reach for the Socialist party at the next parliamentary elections. Some vital prerequisites have been assured, yet the process and problems of gaining and holding government responsibility lie ahead, and numerous specific obstacles have to be surmounted.

The first is the French Constitution, which provides no easy means of resolving conflicts between the President of the Republic and an opposing majority in the National Assembly. This has invariably been the reason why the present majority has refused normal democratic alternation. During the 1973 parliamentary campaign it argued that the Assembly must be of the same political hue as the President; similarly, in the 1974 presidential campaign it argued that the President must be of the same political hue as the Assembly. The 1973 argument is already being aired for 1978. Should this interpretation of the Constitution be accepted, it would mean (since presidential and parliamentary elections take place every seven and five years respectively) that the French people only have a right to change political direction without a constitutional crisis every 35 years—the lowest multiple both of seven and five! A compromise will, therefore, have to be found whereby Giscard will accept the right of an elected left majority to form its own government to implement its own policy.

Such a compromise appears to be the only reasonable resolution to the constitutional deadlock, but it may be difficult to reach. However, Mitterrand's statement that he sees no reason for Giscard's departure should the left win, and Giscard's statement that he intends to complete the presidential term whatever the result of the 1978 election, may facilitate a solution.

The Common Program elaborated in 1972 for the 1973 election was valid for the normal five-year period of the legislature. It will have to be renegotiated so that economic and social changes after 1973 may be taken into account.

Discussions on up-dating the program were started on a limited number of issues two years ago, but progress has been slow and will obviously have to be accelerated before the next election. Clearly, the later this takes place the stronger the Socialist party's position will be at the negotiating table. In the meantime, the party has prepared itself for government responsibility. Members of the directorate have been designated to cover all fields of government action and to prepare technically sound proposals. Experts have been at work since the 1974 presidential campaign, and many in the present leadership will undoubtedly be ready to serve a new democratically elected government. The main problem, therefore, is not one of "competence" but rather of the new government's capacity to face relatively unpredictable difficulties both within and outside France.

Inside France, the victory of the left will undoubtedly unleash an upsurge of expectations and a vast social movement that will place extremely strong pressures on the new government. Such a movement will obviously serve a useful purpose in checking the inevitable resistance of established and threatened powers. However, increased demands upon a government with limited latitude could multiply difficulties. This will be the first time that the communications

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channels set up between the Socialist party and its social base will be put to the test.

The major foreign-policy problem will obviously be the attitude of the United States and other Western democracies. The Socialist party's international positions are extremely clear: respect for existing commitments including the Atlantic Alliance; reinforcement and democratization of European institutions. These are not opportunistic stands but the result of an assessment of the necessary international guarantees required for the development of an autonomous socialist experiment in the West. Neither in France nor abroad is the strength of this conviction doubted. Some say the problem lies with the Communists. It is true that the French Communist party, unlike the Italian, has always been hostile to common European institutions; nor have they, like Berlinguer, ever considered the Atlantic Alliance as proper protection for a government with Communist participation. Yet the Socialists obtained from the Communist party precise and public assurances on this point, and a commitment to existing alliances and European institutions was written into the 1973 Common Program. There is no reason why those guarantees should not be renewed.

Yet nothing can persuade the United States and other democracies to consider a French socialist experiment with benevolence if they choose not do to so—nothing, that is, other than self-interest.

Some Final Remarks

THE AMBITION of the French Socialist party is to blend a sense of vision and a radical attitude toward social change with a highly pragmatic and realistic approach to the problems of power and the instruments of social change. Therein, perhaps, lies the secret of its appeal to the French public. It seems as if the "ordinary citizen" senses that a global and radical crisis calls for global and radical solutions and yet has learned to be extremely wary of those who present such "solutions" without true "political capability."

The test of implementation lies ahead when the French Socialist party will have to prove, in deeds, its ability to blend such "power realism" of method with radicalism of vision. Should not such an experiment be considered with the utmost interest by all faced with a similar challenge? □

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Robert E. Lane

Can Socialism Cope with the Crisis of Values?

Turning inward, many social critics have recently focused on the qualities of experience offered by the democratic, relatively affluent society they know. This experiential critique (as I shall call it) has multiple targets but two main themes emerge from the discussion: the loss of subjective well-being, and the loss of purpose, value, commitment—in an ambiguous but important word, the loss of *meaning* informing life's experiences. These are subjective, psychological themes, contrasting with a larger body of previous criticism dealing with institutions and practices; they internalize what was external, and ask of these institutions and practices "How do they feel?" rather than "How are they structured?" or "Are they just?"

The experiential critics, whose indictments I shall examine in a moment, are a mixed group, not all on the left, a group whose members often disagree with each other. They include Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, Philip Slater and Theodore Roszak, Hannah Arendt and Sebastian de Grazia, Lewis Mumford and Jacques Ellul, T. W. Adorno, and to some extent Jürgen Habermas. They are to be constrasted with such institutional critics on the left as the Webbs, Harold Laski, R. H. Tawney, and Thorstein Veblen, or, among contemporary social critics, with Barrington Moore, Kenneth Galbraith, and Michael Harrington. What the experiential critics see and others do not is that we have often confused external conditions with internal personal meanings, social message sent with personal message received and, above all, circumstantial change with experiential change. (But the institutional critics are stronger in their treatment of equity problems.)

I propose to sketch a socialist answer to the problems set forth by these experiential critics, especially the problem of value loss. The need for such an answer, and the socialist advantage in dealing with the problem, are both increased by the central fact that the quality of experience in a society does not take care of itself. Attention to economic problems, to productivity and income distribution, does not guarantee the solution to experiential problems. Further, in the domain of experience, there is no suggestion of an "unseen hand," no evolutionary mechanism, no dialectic of experience, no cybernetic device that moves society from routine, unfulfilling, daily experiences for a large share of its members toward a more fulfilling, purposeful, felicitous agenda of experience. At the same time, the idea of government-managed experience (as contrasted, for example, to government-managed incomes policies) is frightening and, to tell the truth, initially unattractive. If that is so, is there a socialist answer to the experiential critique?

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Let us first examine the indictment of the experiential critics and then seek some initial outline for an adequate socialist answer.

The Experiential Criticism

THE INDICTMENT is leveled at modern industrialized society, sometimes specifically capitalist, sometimes couched so as to embrace Communist and mixed societies as well. Its central theme, I think, is value loss: the lost capacity for transcendent vision, either secular or religious, the loss of our powers of reflection and perspective regarding ourselves, the loss of socially given meanings, the loss of emotionally charged symbolism, a lost capacity for endowing the self with value. The theme recurs throughout the 11 points made below, but it is especially the case with the first.

(1) Modern society has lost its capacity to develop in its members some sense of purpose that transcends their immediate interests and goals, thus denying them a source of meaning in their lives other than immediate, philosophically and humanly trivial, pleasures and instrumentalities. It focuses on means, not ends; its philosophy, dominated by science, copes well with explanations (efficient causes) but not purposes (final causes); it enshrines a false objectivity in people's consciousness, an objectivity that inhibits purposeful thinking and is life-impoverishing.

(2) Modern society fails to provide its members with ethical norms or sanctified mores necessary to guide them through the endless choices presented, thus not only failing to help them decide what to do but also failing to help them know what they ought to do or what to expect from others.

(3) Modern society so attenuates its high culture, so intrudes its mass culture into everyone's (including the intellectual's) consciousness, that civilization itself is eroded. In the same vein, it is said that modernity degrades its great symbols through which meaning once flowed like blood transfusions—the condensation symbols of religion, the symbols of national history and consciousness, the elevating symbols of transcendent vision—thus robbing life of "enchantment."

(4) Rational calculation and an emphasis on cognition has (a) fractured the image of man, (b) split mind from emotion and crushed the latter, and (c) weakened the imagination, the creative side of man. "Cold intelligence" has taken over; Weberian rationality has triumphed; Parsons's universalism has proved its historic force, not in creative acts, as he would have it, but in the destruction of humanism. This is Ellul's triumph of technique.

(5) Partly as a triumph of this instrumental calculus, our pleasure, play, psychologically free time have all been banished from the kingdom of modernity. "Pleasure . . . must in some way yield energy for the economy" (Philip Slater); the world of work has so permeated our leisure world that there is no real leisure to be found, or, if it is found, it will be harried and harassed, rather than rejuvenating and refreshing. *Homo Ludens*, who survived the Puritans, has been murdered by the Moderns.

(6) Modernity has deprived its subjects of their sense of identity, thus robbing them of the enjoyment and security of an integrated personality. "To be oneself in such a world is not a tautology, but a problem" (Marshall Berman). We cannot state with any conviction or clarity the answer to the question, Who am I?

(7) In modernity, we cannot relate easily or lovingly to one another. Instead, we treat each other as abstractions, or as machines, or as instrumentalities for our own purposes. As Mumford says, we are "unlovable and incapable of surrendering to love"; as Fromm says, we develop "marketing personalities," selling our protean personalities to the highest bidder.

(8) Modernity—because of its competitiveness, its role and status conflicts, its stimulus and decision overloads, its insecurities—is uniquely marked by strain and anxiety. The consequence is either compulsive

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striving to relieve these insecurities, or defeated resignation and apathy.

(9) At the same time, modernity offers to many only the most prosaic life: routine without reason, boredom without relief, experience devoid of enrichment, interpersonal relations without warmth, struggle without purpose. In short, the modern man might say: "How weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable seem to me all the uses of this world."

(10) The sense of "unfreedom," a stifling sense of constraint, abounds in modern society, due to the multiple technological constraints on unplanned action, the throttling of spontaneity, the bureaucratic rules and procedures, the impersonal controls of the marketplace, the meritocratic standards of human worth. For all its democratic freedoms of speech and association, modern society is thus experienced as humanly unfree.

(11) And finally, in this abbreviated list of indictments, modernity is said to induce a sense of helplessness or powerlessness. The authorities are too distant to be moved by individual petition, bureaucracy is too cumbersome and rule-bound to yield to protest; since there is no easy "exit" from "the system" (in spite of the occasional drop-out) one can only acquiesce and make a separate peace. The institutionalization (in schools, hospitals, senior citizen homes, and so forth) of much of the population contributes to this sense of helplessness—a case, perhaps, of decision-underload.

The indictments are overdrawn, poorly documented, rarely include a comparison with experiences in other societies, sometimes contradict each other, do not specify the incidence or frequency of the pathology, reveal great ignorance of cause-effect relationships, and, such as they are, offer solutions only in the most global, unsatisfactory terms. But they have bite.

BEFORE FRAMING a democratic socialist answer, let us imagine two cherished ideals have been achieved: we have won the kind of justice that Rawls has argued for, and we have established, more or less, some minimal socialist ideals. First, on the matter of justice, we note that the contract behind the "veil of ignorance" has been signed, that everyone has agreed that the society he is about to enter will have no more inequality than is compatible with the "difference principle," namely, that only those privileges for the more advantaged will be allowed that improve the position of the least advantaged. Rawls's kingdom has come to pass and justice has finally been achieved. Does this, by itself, help to provide men with purposeful lives, give them norms for guiding those lives, enrich their culture with symbols of great meaning, provide them with secure identities? Of course, Rawls did not pretend that it would; but the point is that our attention to frameworks of justice and equality, however important they may be, have distracted us from paying attention to the subjective qualities of living in those frameworks.

Moreover, we do not know that persons living in an equalitarian society are themselves more moral, happier, or more fulfilled, or that daily experiences are enriched with purpose. Indeed, since the income distribution of modern societies is generally more equalitarian than that of traditional societies, and since it is precisely the quality of experience in modern society that is the target of the indictment, however valuable equality may be in ethical terms, it does not answer the experiential indictment.

Second, imagine that the socialists have come to power and have greatly enlarged the public sector, socialized many industries and brought others under public control, established a planned society, produce for use and not for profit, distribute income more or less according to needs and require effort according to ability. Would it follow that men, in their daily lives, were relieved of role-strain and other sources of anxiety, that they did not manipulate each other, that they had secure identities, and that the prosaic life (in these enlarged bureaucracies!) had been banished?

While it is true that the humanist socialists (including humanist Marxists) have addressed themselves to these questions,

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sometimes drawing on the utopian socialist tradition, there is still a large gap to be filled.

Limiting the Scope of the Self-Regulating Market

THE BEGINNING of an answer, I think, lies in the contrast between the market and other forms of organized decision-making. Markets provide efficient and responsive allocations of goods and services and must be relied upon for these purposes in a decent socialist society, but they are destructive of social values. This is for several reasons.

First, the discipline that interprets the workings of the market, economics, claims for the market a value-free position. Economists, the champions and priests of the market, report that their discipline is not about value creation or transmission, which Mancur Olson assigns to sociology, but rather about "the ways in which people strive to obtain whatever it is they want" (Olson). Moreover, "modern economics makes no distinction among ends because it considers them all equally legitimate" (von Mises). Rather, says von Mises, economics is about "rational action." "The economic pattern," says Joseph Schumpeter, "is the matrix of logic." While it may be that living economists, as distinct from the aspirations of their interpreters, do not survive the strain of such ascetic pretensions, the institution around which the claims are built, the market, reflects this value-void concept. In this respect it is quite unlike other social institutions, such as churches, families, governments.

Second, the principle that facilitates value erosion, the principle of substitutability, is integral to the market system. It requires the substitutability of people for each other, things (capital) for people, land for things. Thus, if *the self* is substitutable for others in the marketplace, a person will have trouble defining his own uniqueness, his identity. If *others*, in the important economic arena, are substitutable for each other, if they are different only in their productive capacities, society seems to invite us, or at least to train us, to treat each other in this fashion. Further, under market conditions, *geographical places*, binding communities together, such objects of reverence as in the concept of "homeland" become merely real estate. And *time* set aside for ceremonial or symbolic reverence, as in special holidays, becomes homogenized in economic time budgets so that no time is special: an occasion for celebrating historical continuity, or national beginnings, or heroic sacrifices. In these ways does the principle of substitutability erode the sources of value.

The third reason for thinking of the market as a value-destroying institution lies in the relationship between money and utility. Money, fungible resources, was, of course, not invented by capitalism, but as Schumpeter points out, the monetary unit was employed by capitalism to facilitate economic rationality, a rationality that, he says, had a "conqueror's career" in almost all other aspects of life. But we are beginning to discover empirically, what has been suspected by many all along, that the relationship between money (as income) and many kinds of life satisfaction, including a sense of purpose, is weak. In one study, standard of living is a less important source of a sense of well-being than noneconomic activities and less important than family felicity.[1] In another, it ranks behind interesting work, friendship, a sense of competence and appreciation on the job, as well as good family relations.[2] Further, in a third study, this very sense of well-being is strongly linked to a sense of purpose and commitment.[3] What has confused us on this point is, first, that for the poor, money does indeed buy a relief from misery, but not happiness, not a positive sense of subjective well-being. And, second, the culture has led those above the subsistence level to believe that increased income will buy

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[1] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers, *The Quality of American Life* (New York: Russell Sage, 1976), p. 76.

[2] Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, *Reports on Happiness* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965).

[3] Philip Shaver and Jonathan Freedman, "Your Pursuit of Happiness," *Psychology Today*, 10 (August 1976), p. 75.

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some comparable increase in subjective well-being. But, for those above a subsistence level, the relationship does not hold—at least the studies on subjective well-being find that the relation between income and life satisfaction among the better off is quite tenuous. For our purposes the point to be made is that a market society deprives us of the real sources of value, of life satisfaction and purpose, by distracting us with a false promise, a false equation. This is not an accidental feature of the market, for the modern market can work only through price, the monetary unit. A socialist society, which employs that market for allocation of goods and services but confines the market to a smaller area of society, minimizes the value-destroying features of the market.

The fourth reason for believing that the market is a value-destroying institution lies in the comparison between extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Using the term "intrinsic rewards" to mean the satisfactions that a person believes he derives from an activity, quite independent of pay or praise—many psychological studies now find that extrinsic rewards, especially pay, *diminish*, rather than complement, the satisfactions that people receive from otherwise enjoyable activities.[4] But the market deals only with extrinsic rewards, with pay for service. In this sense, a market society tends to subtract pleasure from some activities. This principle is limited to those cases where the activity itself is enjoyable; it does not, therefore, apply to many work activities where the problem lies more in job enrichment or work redesign. And the principle does not tell us how to develop alternatives to wages in a socialist society, or how to distribute those wages. But it points to an inherent feature of the "free labor market" characterized by monetary incentives and rewards that might more easily be avoided by other reward systems, including those characteristic of subsistence agriculture, independent artisans, the professions, various kinds of self-employment, communal organizations (even after due allowance is made for the mixed motives and satisfactions involved in these cases). Bureaucratic socialism offers no relief from extrinsic rewards, but the professionalization of work, where the rewards lie partially in fulfilling internalized standards, offers some clues.

Values as Social Products

THE REDUCTION of the scope and importance of the market would not, by itself, create the lost values, meanings, purposes that form a common theme in the indictments of the experiential critics. The second argument for believing that socialism can handle these problems better than capitalism rests on the Durkheimian premise that meaning and value are social products. This means, contrary to the arguments of the existentialists, that without social support, only the strongest, best educated, unusual person can, out of his own experience, forge a set of purposes and values that give orientation, justify sacrifice, and produce commitment. There is important and welcome evidence that people in modern Western societies are experiencing a kind of "sociological release," are, indeed, codifying their own experience to create idiosyncratic patterns of thought.[5] But even allowing for this long-term and continuing process of individuation, it is true that most people can no more create their own life-giving values than they can create their own religions. They need help.

Since purposes, values, meanings (emotionally charged symbols) derive their nourishment from the culture of a society, the matter may be put in another form: should the culture of a society be left to market forces, to private enterprise, or should it not be the joint responsibility of public (governmental) and private agencies, the mixed cultural economy? The answer is not wholly clear. In the West

[4] Bobby J. Calder and Barry M. Staw, "Self-Perception of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 31 (1975) pp. 599-605.

[5] See e.g., Robert E. Lane, "The Effects of the Market Economy on Political Personality," prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5, 1976.

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(whose experience is most relevant to this discussion) the appraisals of private and public culture-producing institutions reveals a mixed balance of results. Private commercial *television*, supported by advertising, in general trivializes culture, homogenizes it, and commercializes it; private *educational institutions* seem more immune to these evils, indeed, in many ways they are better custodians of culture than public institutions; privately supported *religion* thrives where publicly supported religion declines (and is often "unfair" because of its coercive tax on noncommunicants); and direct private *support for the arts* (museums, galleries, opera, dance, theater fellowships for writers) seems no better or worse than similar public support—but public support is increasing in most Western countries where the market is found insufficient and philanthropy fails to be adequate. What is quite clear, however, is that neither the sale of cultural services in the market nor advertising support, two market-oriented devices, serve the interests of high culture, from which high purposes and enduring values flow. Some mixture of public and private "philanthropy" is necessary. That is, to some degree, the support and creation of culture must be provided by agencies that are independent of market pressures, as well as independent of political pressures. What the democratic socialists offer, then, is not a monopoly of cultural institutions, but a sense of responsibility for cultural nourishment in all its diverse manifestations.

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But if we shift our glance from the individual trying to create values and look beyond the institutional support that might nourish those values to the larger society in which these problems are embedded, a major question comes into view. Can a commercial society generate values and commitments, a sense of some heroic purpose to life, a transcendental vision (for some, anyway) of larger purpose, an amelioration of the dailyness of life? Would not the ethos of such a society, as anthropologists use the term "ethos," tend to erode such a transformation, cheapen its ethics, mock the brave efforts of the culture-producing institutions? Cassirer argues that it is more important to think of man as *animal symbolicum* than as *animal rationale*, because the second depends on the first, and it is through the uses of meaningful symbols in art, science, myth and religion that "we can understand the new way open to man—the way to civilization." But such symbolic enrichment may not be able to stand commercialism or withstand the powerful market forces offering daily reinforcement to monetary symbolism, a symbolism to which no such greater purpose easily attaches. Without moral elements, symbols fail to enlarge purpose; alternatively, if the monetary unit becomes a moralized symbol, the moral vision is itself eroded. Some sense that the society itself is purposive, has a rationale, is morally defensible, is probably required.

I think it is the case that the commercial culture and the bourgeois society were morally defensible and congenial to a sense of purpose for at least two centuries because they could justifiably focus on institutions and practices, rather than on experiences and their subjective meanings. Democracy, freedom from constraint, freedom of contract, equality of opportunity, the reduction of poverty are all worthy ideals, but, as discussed, they deal with externals. With the new emphasis on the subjective, the nature of experience, and the problem of value-loss, these justifications no longer serve adequately to justify the commercial culture and the institutions of capitalism.

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This culture and these institutions are themselves the sources of value loss, the erosion of the kinds of experience the experiential critics reveal to be sadly missing.

The change from a focus on institutions and practices to experience, individual purposes, and meanings represents a major reinterpretation of culture, comparable to that in Weber's analysis of the transformation of non-materialist Calvinism into the Protestant work ethic, in Durkheim's analysis of the transformation from mechanical to organic solidarity, in the problem Merton diagnoses as the mismatching of ends and means—the social inattention to ethical norms to guide the ends of "success," in Rieff's interpretation of the decline of the "renunciatory ethic" and the rise of the more permissive and remissive Freudian ethic. We have little experience in conscious social determination of these cultural values, but they are crucial to the experiential critique and, to that extent, crucial to the case for democratic socialism. Can an experiential socialism guide, without dictating, the development of these norms and values, avoiding the pathologies, say, of the Chinese cultural revolution? Laissez-faire in these respects has not been entirely felicitous, nor yet entirely disastrous. Can democratic socialists do better?

The reasons for thinking that socialism can do better in value creation and maintenance have to do with (a) the nature of the theories themselves, (b) their postures toward the individual, and (c) the difference between markets and organizations. On the first point, capitalism represents a justification for an institutional framework within which each person can pursue whatever values he chooses. As reported above, capitalist economics "makes no distinction among ends because it considers them all equally legitimate." But socialism and socialist economics embody substantive principles around which collective purposes and justifications may be built: equality, justice, fraternity. It is more than a framework for individual action; it is a *shared condition* within a framework. Both are utopian, both are idealistic, but it is possible for capitalist economists to wash their hands of all value questions (other than rationality), while socialist economists cannot. Values other than rationality can, of course, inform market economics, as Okun reveals in his discussion of *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-off*, but they are not inherent in the market economist's discipline. This is not the case for the socialist, hence he must argue the case differently: efficiency in pursuit of equity. If, as Galbraith argues, efficiency is an overrated value in modern society, there would be a gain in this shift of emphasis in any case, but the gain emphasized here is the enlistment of substantive purpose: the question, "Efficiency for what?" finds an answer.

But let us look more closely at the claim that market economics is value free. It rests in fact upon at least the following: efficiency values (implied by rationality), freedom values (especially of contract), and individualistic values, in the sense that each person is held to be responsible for his own life circumstances—broadly speaking, equality of opportunity. Without these informing values, the market would not work rationally. Further, while these three capitalist values represent important elements in any reasonable value arsenal, they do not help answer the indictments of the experiential critics. I may be efficient—but who am I? How can I inform my life by the principles of free contract? And, given equality of opportunity and responsibility for my own fate, what opportunities are worth having and what fate shall I choose? Thus even if we ignore the market economist's claim of indifference to ends, and uncover the values underlying the single value they profess, rationality, these values are not the right values for this time; they do not help with the problems outlined by the experiential critics.

The second argument for the superiority of socialism as a value-creating system of thought (and practice) has to do with the posture of the two systems toward the individual. The capitalist posture is one of *social irresponsibility*, as reflected in the idea

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of individualism mentioned above. The severities of this idea have been greatly mitigated by the welfare state, but, as conceived, this applies only to economic welfare, not to those other aspects of being that lend dignity and purpose to life. The contrasting socialist principle is one of *solicitude*, of shared responsibility for each other's fates, including all those matters that make a person less than he might be. The difference between the two systems of thought might be captured, not by the old cliché regarding individualism versus collectivism, but by a difference in emphasis: the capitalist system may be thought to *rely* upon the individual, while the socialist system *cares* about the individual. *Caring* about the individual means attention to those circumstances of life that impoverish it, regardless of whether this is economic or value impoverishment. It is a humane principle, because its focus is on the way the needs of the person reflect the deficiencies of society, rather than on the deficiencies of the individual's character that make him need what he does; not, therefore, on the failure of the unself-reliant individual.

Finally, to return to an earlier theme, the differences between markets and such social organizations as firms, government bureaus, unions, even universities, is the difference between value-eroding and value-creating institutions. In their historic mission to substitute something better (more efficient, more popular) for something established and traditional—no mean historical task—it has been the business of markets to destroy old values, myths, communities, friendships, religions, symbols. Bureaucracies, human communities (including those within capitalist firms) resist such changes; they adopt technological changes more slowly, unless they are faced with competition or outside challenges. They are conservators of value. But to the extent that the central problems facing modern societies are no longer those of the traditional societies from which we sprang, and are, instead, the uncertain meanings of our experiences, the dominance of the market is no longer justified. Market rationality has served its historic purpose. The intelligent concern for the welfare of the individual in a society where more decisions are made by calculated purpose, and fewer by anonymous market forces, would be more felicitous of *our* human condition.

In the end, the central contemporary argument for socialism is not that planned production will make us richer or reduce waste, not that nationalizing the means of production will improve social efficiency (for it may not), not even that socialism is more equitable in its distribution of goods and services (though that is important), but rather that market-oriented societies, having done their productive and destructive work, no longer adequately serve our current needs. They erode the sources of value and purpose, trivialize life, complicate the search for identity, and fracture human relations. In these respects, another kind of society, embracing socialist principles, would do a better job. □

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Penina Migdal Glazer
and Myron Glazer

War Resisters in the Land of Battle

Legally, Israeli conscientious objectors have no official status. They fall under a broad statute that allows the Ministry of Defense to deal with special cases and to declare such people unfit to serve. In practice, exemptions are rare. Military service is an obligation for all men and women at age 18, except for Orthodox women and men studying at a yeshivah. Deferments because of other study, critical occupations, or minor physical disabilities are rare. After completion of their service, men have to do 40 days of reserve duty each year.

To resist the draft or reserve duty is to defy a call to service that has the support of Israel's overwhelming majority, which draws one conclusion from recent history: *Ein Breira*—there is no choice; people have always wanted to kill the Jews and still do. Friends and allies, Israelis feel, can turn on you any time. Only in strength is safety.

Who are the War Resisters?

THE RESISTERS, then, are unusual people, marginal to Israeli life yet very much a product of it. Most of those we located and others we heard about are Sabras (native born), middle-class, of Ashkenazi (European) background.* Their reasons for resistance range from absolute belief in nonviolence to selective objection for political purposes. Some have fairly well-developed political ideologies; others are critical of recent Israeli policies but vague on alternatives. Whether absolute pacifists or not, all become war resisters by virtue of refusing military conscription. Methods of resistance vary from evasion to accommodation to direct confrontation. Here are four cases that seem representative.

The Path of Evasion

RONNI, OLGA, AND DAVID were waiting for us. Ronni apologized for the condition of the apartment. In his intense, articulate manner, he explained that they had been very busy and had not found time to clean up. A quick glance yielded clues about the ethos of the three young people. They embodied a style of life that would not have been at all unusual for parts of Greenwich Village or Haight Ashbury in the 1960s but was distinctly anomalous for contemporary Israel. The mattressés on the floor were virtually all the furniture in this small fourth-floor walkup in downtown Tel Aviv. The young men's bearded faces, the faded dungarees, the frequent talk of drugs, all testified to a countercultural bent.

As anarchists, these young people were totally opposed to the State of Israel and to

*We were greatly assisted in our efforts to locate resisters by members of the Israeli section of the War Resisters League, particularly Joseph Abileah and Yesheahu Shick. They received us warmly and expressed interest in Penina's earlier work on American resisters. See Penina Migdal Glazer, "From the Old Left to the New: Radical Criticism in the 1940's," *American Quarterly*, Winter 1972, pp. 584-603.

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any defense in its behalf. The establishment of the State of Israel, they believed, deprived Palestinians of their home, ending possibilities for both groups to coexist in peace. Israel itself they found to be oppressive and authoritarian. According to Ronni, in this highly stratified society socialist ideals were a joke.

The trio agreed that finding a way out of army service was both necessary and feasible. For Ronni, one possibility was to have himself declared psychologically unfit; another was to gain an exemption for drug use. He was not yet sure which method he would choose but was certain he could find a means to avoid conscription. Since he and his friends had little feeling of loyalty to the nation, they were willing to use means to evade service that other resisters shunned. They were not worried about bad publicity, future career opportunities, or effects on family or friends. Their ideals led them to reject a future in business or public life, and their ultimate intention was to leave Israel permanently to live in a country where conscription and war would not dominate their lives.

This tiny group represents the most extreme point of alienation. As we shall see in the next two cases, where professional or familial relationships do remain important, that the course of resistance can be quite different.

The Path of Accommodation

AVRAM had been an officer in the army. He had been wounded once and several of his friends had been killed. He felt that many of these deaths and injuries were unnecessary. As he came to feel more alienated, he defined more and more military decisions as incompetent and provocative, based on internal political needs rather than external threats.

After his discharge, he went to the university and became active in student politics. He was known as a maverick—a radical in a conservative student body. When the Six-Day War broke out in June 1967, he was unwilling to fight but saw few alternatives. Avram worked out a deal with a friend who was well-placed in the military and who agreed that he would mobilize Avram only if the situation became serious.

Most Israelis did not anticipate the quick and dramatic victory that followed the outbreak of hostilities on June 5. As events were mounting to a climax, Avram was mobilized and fought in the battle for Jerusalem. He was not emotionally moved by the unification of the city, but felt, rather, that the great loss of life and the way the attack was handled confirmed his antimilitary ideas.

After the war, the nation was triumphant but Avram felt great despair. He saw no hope in a situation in which there were no dissenters to the prevailing mood of "might equals right," and he found other young people apathetic and opportunistic, totally insensitive to the exploitation of Israeli Arabs and lower-class Jews. He and his wife soon left for graduate study in the United States, where they remained for several years. Here, for the first time, he was exposed to a group of radicals whose ideas were similar to his own.

Totally unlike its American counterpart, the Israeli university student body is comprised of veterans working full or part time, veterans who do reserve duty in addition to managing their jobs and families. In Israel, the university is an avenue of social mobility and technical preparation, but not a center for political activity or even for a youth subculture that can experiment with political ideas. By contrast, the major U.S. universities, at least in the late 1960s, were the locus of many groups that were challenging political, social, and cultural ideas. Avram was particularly attracted by university people who combined professional rigor and success with political radicalism.

After this experience in the U.S., Avram returned to Israel with a graduate degree, a responsible position, and new political energies. He no longer was a passive critic but an activist prepared to confront military authority. He decided to resist reserve duty in order to demonstrate his belief that the army had no right to administer the occupied territories and that Israel should withdraw from them.

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Within a few months he was routinely called for reserve duty. Realizing that he might well end up in jail, Avram and his wife said good-bye. He reported at the proper hour but told the officer in charge that he would not go. "I have been in the States for several years, have changed my opinions, and am now a conscientious objector. I'll go to jail." He stood waiting for the dramatic confrontation. But all the officer said was "*Beseder* [O.K.]. You're not going to jail so fast. Go home now and we'll call you later."

Avram was impressed with the cleverness of the army. The great confrontation hadn't come, and his relief was clearly mixed with disappointment. Two months passed before he was recalled. The same classifying officer was there, but this time accompanied by the chief commander of a special unit. The commander was known as a civil libertarian who had good credentials with many radicals.

He presented the situation very clearly. Avram had two possible choices: one led to jail where very little would be accomplished. The other led to the army, which is not unattractive. The army is the least criticized institution in the society, much less authoritarian than the political parties, and the most tolerant of different ideas. A good officer can, in fact, have considerable influence.

This argument was followed by a concrete offer to join this officer's unit as a researcher; Avram would be able to do whatever research he wanted. Clearly impressed, Avram agreed to a trial invitation to see what the unit was like. The commander invited him to lecture on repression and indoctrination to a group of army psychiatrists. Fine. This would be a good test. Avram gave a lecture designed to shock those "square shrinks." The hostile reaction from the audience convinced him he had made his point.

How would the head of the unit respond now that he had heard Avram's material? The commander invited him to give a second lecture to majors and lieutenant colonels. The agreed-upon subject would be: "Israel's military-industrial complex." Again, Avram felt that he had made an impact.

Avram agreed to serve in the unit, and now has been on this assignment for all his reserve duty. He continues to believe he is doing good on his own terms, although the Yom Kippur War raised basic questions about his political beliefs. He is less comfortable with his earlier definition of Israel as an aggressive nation. His wife and a friend both feel he had developed feelings of self-importance—or even chauvinism—during the 1973 war. He told us that he liked his assignment and believed he was doing an important job, but feels he has remained basically alienated from Israeli society.

Not all cases of resistance work out so smoothly. Nevertheless, the case of Avram reveals some interesting aspects of Israeli military interaction with conscientious objectors. Since there is no institutionalized procedure, the first line of defense on the part of the military is usually an attempt to win over the conscientious objector and find a place for him within the system. Frequently, a radical officer is the one to undertake this task, pointing out that the Israeli army is a citizens' army with as many officers from left-wing kibbutzim as from right-wing militaristic groups. The army is often willing to be flexible, to find room for nonconformists, especially where public confrontation can be avoided.

The flexibility on the part of army officials succeeded because Avram was not an absolutist. He is a radical critic who resisted in order to oppose Israeli policies. When he was convinced that the army was diverse enough to offer him an opportunity to make his views known, he agreed to serve. They appealed to him as a professional, a role in which he functions successfully in Israeli society. Furthermore, Avram made his stand alone. Not having a reference group of like-minded people who had a stake in his decision made it easier for him to compromise.

The Path of Political Resistance

GIORA NEUMAN is Israel's best-known war resister. Giora saw us in the evenings, after completing his alternative service work in a

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hospital outside Tel Aviv. He made clear from the outset that, far from being a pacifist, his resistance is rooted in criticism of Israeli foreign policy.

For Giora Neuman, 1967 to '73 were the crucial years. Israel's victory in the Six-Day War led it to act, he felt, like a mini-empire in the Middle East. The government and the people had come to believe that naked power—the big fist—could solve its international problems. If resistance developed anywhere in the occupied territories, he said, Israeli officials retaliated by blowing up houses. Giora objected to the political atmosphere, which he characterized as "arrogant."

By the time Giora was called to military duty in 1971, he was an active member of Matzpen, a small anti-Zionist, Marxist group. He and several friends of similar political persuasion decided to refuse induction. Giora believed such protest challenged the ideological underpinnings of the society and thus would anger the establishment. Four potential recruits wrote an open letter to the Minister of Defense explaining their unwillingness to serve. They avoided ideological polemics and focused their criticism on the Israeli occupation. One key sentence was meant to draw on an important Jewish motif:

> We cannot serve in an army of conquest because our fathers suffered so much from armies of conquest.

They included draft cards and distributed copies of the letter to the daily newspapers.

As they expected, the draft cards were returned by the Ministry with a form letter, which simply stated that the law obliged them to serve in the armed forces. Newspaper reaction was much more vehement: editorials portrayed them as hippies, kooks, agents of Fatah, or opportunists looking for a soft deal.

Induction dates varied for the four resisters, and this proved important for Giora Neuman's subsequent behavior. He was the last called. The others who had been called earlier resisted for a short time and were unable to continue, each of them reaching an agreement with the military. Neuman believes that his knowledge of what had happened to his friends enabled him to prepare himself for the shock of confrontation.

Several days after he failed to report, Israeli police came to his home. He went along willingly and they treated him quite well. At the induction base, the officer in charge tried to ignore the special circumstances of his case and attempted to rush him through the procedure. "Sign here, sign there . . . ." Forewarned about this tactic, Giora refused. He was referred to another officer who sentenced him to 35 days in jail, the maximum sentence permitted without trial.

For Giora, military prison represented the epitome of the military environment. The prison was dirty and rat-infested, characterized, he said, by shouting, yelling, inhumane treatment of people. The majority of the prisoners were men who had deserted or gone AWOL. They told Giora they had done so to earn money or to help their families in other ways. They were mostly lower-class (Middle Eastern) Sephardic Jews, who found it difficult to understand what Giora was doing there. They seemed to enjoy the friendship of a middle-class Ashkenazi Jew (of European origins) although they never understood his politics.

At the end of the 35 days, Giora was brought back to the base for a heart-to-heart discussion with a colonel who fascinated Giora by acting like a father and trying to understand his views. Finally, the colonel suggested that they might resolve the problem amicably by offering Giora a comfortable position in the army. Perhaps he might even become an officer.

When Giora refused, the colonel became furious and sentenced him to another 35 days, and this occurred five more times—jail, conversation with the colonel, a new 35-day sentence. The kind talks were always mixed with threats from the colonel, a huge man whom Giora found physically terrifying. It was obvious that the two of them could come to no mutually acceptable resolution.

As Giora's prison stays multiplied, his

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incarceration became a national issue. Petitions for his release were signed by academics, members of Hashomer Hatzair and others who disagreed with his actions but felt he should not be persecuted for conscientious objection. Finally, the military decided to have a regular trial, and Giora's parents convinced him to retain a defense attorney.

Just before the trial, the army made one last effort to resolve the case. The chief education officer, a general with a left-wing background, appealed to Giora Neuman as a friend. "I am a Marxist too. I come from Hashomer Hatzair. People like you should be in the army," he argued, "it should not be abandoned to right-wingers." The discussion lasted six or seven hours with Giora ultimately rejecting the appeal.

Fearing that a long prison sentence might result if no accommodation could be reached, family, friends, and his attorney urged Giora to find some way to come to terms with the military. As the trial approached, Giora became concerned that a compromise solution might give the public the impression that his primary concern was to gain an advantageous position for himself. In an attempt to avoid this, he set down his conditions for resolution: (1) he would not take the military oath because it required unconditional loyalty to the Ministry of Defense, (2) he would not bear arms, (3) but he would be willing to do alternative service for the good of the country.

The atmosphere at the trial was not emotional, and there were few quarrels about the issues. Giora felt that the prosecutor did not show any personal hatred. Giora submitted a carefully worded statement, focusing on his objection to conquest of the territories. He was sentenced, much to everyone's surprise, to only eight months in jail; the time he had already spent in prison and good behavior time were to be taken into account so that only one or two months remained.

The court's leniency was partially the result of the trial's having been altered from a political trial to a humanitarian cause. Petitions for humane treatment arrived, not only from famous international figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre, but also from some Israelis who agreed that he had been in prison long enough. However helpful and gratifying this support was, it did dilute the original protest Giora had set out to make, by ignoring or rejecting the substance of his political argument and focusing attention on excessive punishment.

The desire to leave the door open for further negotiation was another major reason for the court to decide on this relatively light sentence. A resolution regarding his military status still had to be reached, and lengthy negotiation ensued before the general who was representing the army and Giora Neuman could come to mutually acceptable terms. The final resolution, Giora explained, was typically Israeli. He signed the loyalty oath, which had been a point of great contention, and appended another paragraph disassociating himself from unconditional loyalty to the Minister of Defense. It was agreed he would work, without weapons or uniform, in a civilian hospital for three years. The military, for its part, refused to define his work stint officially as alternative service. And now Giora's only current contact with the military is in the form of a small monthly paycheck.

In retrospect, Giora believes he did the right thing because the military needed to have its supremacy challenged. On the other hand, he now feels that the Yom Kippur War has led Israelis to raise so many questions about the army that resistance to military service is less necessary than other, more effective means of public protest.

The Pacifist Path

PACIFIST CONFRONTATION with the military, unlike political war resistance, does not necessarily occur because the pacifists are interested in challenging Israel's foreign policy. Rather, pacifists clash with the military when it is unwilling to accept the claim that conscience will not allow the bearing of arms.

Until he was 17 years old, Uri never thought much about pacifism although he had become a vegetarian for health and conscience reasons

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several years earlier. He was promilitary in the automatic way that a son of an old Israeli family will be so. His brother was a major, and his family simply assumed that he too would have a distinguished service career.

As he turned 18, Uri began having doubts about Israel's attitudes toward the Arabs. He observed the destruction of several Arab villages near Jerusalem for what were defined as security reasons, and he wondered about the legitimacy of such action. Still, he went into the army as a matter of course. In basic training he decided that he would not be a fighter but would serve only as a medic. After gaining understanding from the officer in charge of his unit, Uri soon learned that even a medic must be trained to handle weapons. As a result of his good relationship with the officer, Uri managed to avoid some of the gun training, but in the end he refused to take the final tests involving the use of weapons.

Given 40 days of probation for his failure to take the tests, Uri was sent back to the classification unit to begin basic training again. The intervention of his officer had shielded him from harsher punishment. Nevertheless, Uri now refused outright to handle weapons and reiterated his stand that he would do only noncombat work; but events from that point on began to control him. Describing the classification unit as big and confusing ("it was easy to get lost in the shuffle"), Uri became timid when he should have been assertive. He was young and inexperienced and he made a serious mistake—he simply ran away from the base and went home. Three days later a soldier came for him.

Uri was judged as absent without leave rather than on grounds of conscience and was sentenced to 50 days' imprisonment, a harsh sentence by Israeli standards.

Uri's family was mortified by his imprisonment. His mother came to visit, but after Uri saw how ashamed she was, he told her not to come again. Uri's father and brother said they never wanted to see him again, and his girlfriend left him. In those hard days, he had no support.

When his prison term ended, he was sent back for reclassification and basic training. If he were to maintain his pacifist position, he knew he would probably be resentenced. Feeling alone, broken, and unable to face another prison experience, Uri accepted with resignation his brother's offer to arrange a transfer to his own scout unit. ("O.K.," he said, "do what you want with me.")

When Uri arrived at the scout unit, he was immediately given a rifle, and his fellow soldiers were totally unsympathetic when they realized that he would not fire his weapon. This time Uri went to his brother and appealed for help. "I cannot shoot a gun. I no longer have anything to lose. Do something or I'll go to jail."

For the first time his brother was convinced that Uri was sincere. Another arrangement was made. Uri was given the job of athletic trainer for soldiers, and his brother made certain that the officer-in-charge didn't give him a rifle. All went smoothly until the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.

On the first day of the war he was in Beersheva and helped carry the wounded from the helicopters to the hospital. It was a horrible time for him. He felt guilty and useless while his brother and friends were fighting and dying. Uri had to know what war is. On the fourth day of the war he went with an officer to bring supplies to the troops on the Sinai front. He went without a gun and on his own responsibility. Fifty kilometers before Suez the Egyptians strafed the convoy. Uri felt the fear of the instant before death. The entire experience was traumatic for him—the cemeteries of tanks, the endless dead bodies. This quiet, shy young man got into arguments for the first time. He trembled as he told about a fight where a fellow soldier slapped him as a result of a discussion of how many men had died. Uri had put the figure at 20,000 because he included 18,000 Arabs. This kind of talk was not accepted by soldiers in the heat of battle.

After the cease-fire was declared, Uri moved from unit to unit supervising physical exercise for soldiers. His experience had left

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him in a state of shock and he felt he had to get away. He escaped from the Egyptian side of the canal, which was still held by the Israelis, and hitched back home. Uri knew he was now AWOL but he simply didn't want to have anything more to do with the military.

After a few days his commanding officer, who was home on leave, came to Uri's house and said, "What are you doing? They'll send you to jail. Come back with me." Uri agreed and finished the last months of his service in a nonfighting unit.

But his problems with the army were not yet over; he still had to confront his reserve obligation. His case was especially difficult because of the seeming inconsistencies in his record. His brother had left his name on the roster of the scout unit, and Uri was still officially classified as a fighter. He was offered two combat-related positions despite his declaration that he would do only humanitarian work. During 1975 he was imprisoned for 35 days. Uri went on a hunger strike and ultimately received an exemption after submitting to a psychiatric examination. Earlier, he had been unwilling to accept a medical exemption because he felt it compromised his principles.

The case of Uri is poignant. He does not reject Israel or his family. Many officers treated him with kindness. Yet the absence of a system of alternate service falls hardest on young men like him, willing to serve their country but bound by conscience to those activities that they believe are nonviolent.

The Determined Few

ISRAEL HAS a very small number of war resisters. Despite some help from family and a very few friends, most war resisters who confront the military are isolated. They have few places to turn to for advice and counsel. Unlike in the United States, there is no multitude of little magazines writing about unpopular ideas. The War Resisters League —Israel's one pacifist organization—is not well-known, remains divided and inactive.

The pressure to conform breeds an intolerance against war resisters. It is the sort of intolerance that made an old man on a bus berate a war resister whose picture he had seen in the paper. It made another man try to prevent a vendor from selling a sandwich to a conscientious objector whom he recognized in downtown Tel-Aviv. One young man, imprisoned when he refused to do reserve duty in the occupied territories and out of the country during the Yom Kippur War, experienced the never-ending debt of resistance. Rising to speak at a political party meeting of left-wing doves, he was immediately shouted down with cries of "You have no right to speak, you didn't serve. Where were you when we needed you?" One of his strongest doubts about his decision to resist arises from his feeling that he has lost the right to criticize what he did not defend. Resisters' experience with the military, on the other hand, is not consistent with the social isolation and cultural intolerance they experience in everyday encounters in the civilian world. Israel is famous for its unwieldy bureaucracy. Hassling with the bureaucracy is a standard topic of conversation. But this is not the case in the military's treatment of war resisters. As Americans, we were impressed by the relatively direct way in which so many resisters were treated. They were not given a bushel of forms to fill out. Instead, fatherly officers were brought in to discuss the resister's position.

The army is a people's army and everyone is in it—left, center, right. To incorporate this wide spectrum of views, there appears to be almost a familial orientation. Officers of radical credentials try to convince critical young men to change their minds. At times, officers even talk of having a bad conscience in administering jail sentences. One officer came to Uri's house to help him avoid further imprisonment. Another pacifist called his officer a few hours after he was due to report and said, "I'm not coming. Send the MPs." "Do me a favor," the officer replied. "I don't have an MP available. Could you come down here yourself?" "O.K.," said the pacifist. Even in Giora Neuman's case, which particularly angered the Israeli establishment, there was a series of last-ditch efforts—hours of long

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conversation to try and change his mind. One can't imagine such things in the U.S. army.

By American standards, even the harshest jail sentences were mild. In World War I, United States courts issued life terms for conscientious objectors. Even more recently, at the time of the Vietnam War, resisters received two- to five-year terms. In Israel the terms were two weeks to a year. Imprisonment is often interrupted by new efforts and negotiations to achieve compromise—sometimes successfully.

There is, nonetheless, a tension that is irresolvable. The army is mandated by the society to incorporate everyone into the defense of the nation. If a resister is willing to compromise, as in Avram's case, accommodation is possible. But if lengthy conversations do not produce reconciliation, punishment must follow. The officer will debate the merits of the critic's arguments honestly and openly—but he will never change his own mind on the fundamental point: Everyone has to serve.*

From the time of its founding, Israel has refused to establish legal options of alternative service for COs. Natan Chofshy went to Ben Gurion in 1948 to urge legal protection for objectors. If not, he argued, they will be subject to the arbitrariness of each officer. Ben Gurion refused, as have all subsequent policy-makers: the rights of COs and other war resisters are not to be institutionalized. A country in continual danger had better not legitimize resistance to its national defense policies or opposition to its fundamental premise that there is no choice—everyone must fight.

A tank driver who had fought in some of the bloodiest battles of the Yom Kippur War captured the essence of this position:

> Of course, I am critical of the government. I don't believe they are doing enough to achieve peace. Why do I fight then? Because I do not doubt for one moment that the Arab leaders would destroy us if given a chance.

One former pacifist summarized the view of most critics when he said, "I have come to the conclusion that pacifism is too great a luxury for this nation. We cannot live in an ivory tower while we work and hope for peace." Like many Israelis, he is active in minority-party politics and promoting more peace initiatives, yet he no longer separates himself from the majority by refusing to serve.

There is very little likelihood that pacifists or even political resisters will have any serious impact on the political or military policies of Israel. The history of European nations or of the United States shows few instances in which military or foreign policy was directly influenced by resisters. Their impact on society has to be regarded in other terms. By their actions and ideas they can contribute to a culture of dissent and they can fight for legal options for minorities. As outsiders they have the leisure to experiment with new ideas, solutions, and strategies that may pave the way for future agents of political change. Whether or not Israeli war resisters will meet this challenge is still unknown. Their isolation and small number make their task difficult, yet the willingness of some to sacrifice for principles they hold may ultimately contribute to Israel's search for a better national life. □

*Indeed, in December 1974 the military authorities began a review of all persons who held exemption cards. The review was quite routine for the vast majority and resulted in continued exemption for most persons. This process, however, reopened the cases of a number of objectors and resulted in further confrontation with the authorities. As of December 1975, the Israeli section of the War Resisters League had information about the imprisonment of 17 resisters who, they charged, were serving longer sentences and receiving harsh treatment.

Eight of these were Jehovah's Witnesses, a small group that has been especially vulnerable. (War Resisters International Israeli Section, communication of Dec. 31, 1975.)

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The IQ Controversy

1: R. J. Herrnstein

On IQ, Occupational Status, and Equality

In his discussion of my work, Philip Green tries to rescue egalitarianism by sacrificing data. He will seem to have succeeded only to those who take his word for the facts of the matter. I will strive in this response to focus on the most relevant of those facts, suppressing my impulse to answer his *ad hominen* style of argument in kind.*

The message I would most like to convey to the readers of *Dissent* is that the findings on IQ and social status that Mr. Green disputes need not be taken as inimical to socialism defined as the public ownership of the means of production. But, as I'll try to show forthwith, those findings are profoundly inimical to egalitarianism, the idea that mainly the political system and our cultural heritage stand in the way of a society in which the members share wealth or status or access to goods and services in approximately equal measure, and that it would be desirable to make the necessary political and cultural changes. I believe that socialism's tendency toward egalitarianism explains its recurrent lapses into anarchy at one extreme or bureaucratic totalitarianism at the other. The findings that Mr. Green abhors and denies should instead be guiding him and other socialists toward the formulation of social organizations that do not, because of their inherent contradictions, quickly confront their citizens with the alternatives of political chaos and faceless regimentation. Mr. Green thinks that I describe these findings because they please me. Actually, they alarm me, and they alarm me precisely because political thinkers of good will (such as I take Mr. Green to be) stubbornly refuse to believe them.

It takes books to substantiate the critical findings, but the gist can be stated in a page or two. In a society with a division of labor, some people's labor will be more consequential than others', as judged by the members of the society. One familiar example is the contrast between a physician and, let us say, a postman. Both occupations serve useful social purposes, but an incompetent doctor is usually seen as more threatening than an incompetent postman. To be sure, there are many occupations in American society about whose social value or consequentiality opinions may differ. But however opinions may differ, they should not differ about the basic observation—that occupations are seen to cover a range of consequentiality, from more to less, in any conceivable modern society. There is, in short, a social consensus at any time about the value of different jobs. Mr. Green seems to scorn the social consensus when he writes "all rankings of occupational merit are completely arbitrary." In what sense "arbitrary," Mr. Green does not say. They are not arbitrary to the people who believe, for example, in the significance of the work done by physicians or engineers or airplane pilots. Nor are they arbitrary in being easy to change by direct social action. The perceived status of numerous common oc-

*R. J. Herrnstein refers to Philip Green's three articles on the subject of genetics, IQ, and equality—"Race and IQ: Fallacy of Heritability" (*Dissent*, Spring 1976), "The Pseudoscience of Arthur Jensen" (Summer 1976), and especially, "IQ and the Future of Equality" (Fall 1976), in which Green discusses Herrnstein's work in some detail.—Eds.

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cupations has been found remarkably stable, from the 1920s until now, in a number of industrial nations including Soviet Russia. Individual occupations rise and fall with shifts in technology and in society's fashions and needs, but the shifts are rare compared to the stability of the social consensus throughout the industrial world.

Next, not only do jobs differ in perceived status but people also differ, for whatever reasons, in the quality of their work. People are not interchangeable parts in the engines of society. Society typically responds to these two facts by rewarding best those who hold the more consequential jobs. Money is the obvious medium of social reward but there are also gradients of status, admiration, respect, and power. The various gradients are imperfectly, though considerably, correlated. Collectively, they comprise inequality, the target of egalitarianism. But the gradients of reward are society's way of translating the social consensus into competition for occupations, so as to improve the likelihood that better performers will land the more consequential jobs. One may reasonably question how good or effective an arrangement this is, but not, it seems to me, whether some arrangement or other is needed, given the underlying facts.

In summary, when society has a consensus about the values of jobs and when people differ in the quality of their work, then society tries to match the better performers with the more valued jobs.

What is Mr. Green's objection to this? I will try to answer all of his serious criticisms or, if I can't, acknowledge my inability to do so.

I HAVE DIRECTED ATTENTION to the correlations between IQ scores and socioeconomic or occupational status as evidence for the social mechanism just outlined. Mr. Green has doubts about IQ scores, about measures of status, and about the meaning of the correlations between them. Before taking his doubts in order, it may be worth pointing out that the foregoing comments about the distribution of social rewards seem to me so obvious that it constantly astounds me to find them disputed. Can it be doubted that inequality in status and wealth expresses to some extent a community's method, however unwitting or imperfect, for channeling people into occupations according to what I have been calling the social consensus? The argument must not really be about that obvious, qualitative observation, but about the effort to quantify it. If there is anything to argue about, it must be about the quantification, not about the simple observation that animates it. In short, even if Mr. Green remains convinced that he has demolished the formal data, he is left with the plain fact that social inequality tends to grow out of human diversity in any society with a division of labor.

Mr. Green says that people's variation in IQ seems important only because the testers have arbitrarily (he thinks maliciously) chosen a scale of measurement to make it seem so. Had they chosen, suggests Mr. Green, a scale with a standard deviation of 1.5 instead of the conventional 15, then differences would cease seeming important. In this claim, Mr. Green is right in the one sense that is probably irrelevant. It is true that a scale with larger performance steps per IQ point would give smaller IQ differences between people, but the smaller differences on the scale would then stand for larger differences in performance. If we measured height in yards instead of feet and inches, people would differ by fewer units but we would then use fractions or decimals to note who was tall or short and by how much. Summers, I bet, will seem as hot and winters as cold measured in Celsius, though the units are larger than Fahrenheit.

Green makes light of the intellectual difference between people and two standard deviations on either side of the mean (IQ 70 versus 130 by the standard scale). I wish he were right, but he is sadly mistaken. People with IQs of 70 are, by and large, at an overwhelming disadvantage in modern society. By existing methods of education, they hardly learn to read; they are victimized by advertising and merchandising; they suffer disproportionately from emotional stress and psychopathology; they usually lack the educational credentials required for satisfying or lucrative jobs. But an IQ of 130, though not a guarantee of occupational success or personal fulfillment, is demonstrably a help. One can imagine a society that does better than ours in compensating for low scores, but not when reformers insist on assuming, contrary to fact, that there is no problem to begin with.

The differences between people of high and low IQ, Mr. Green attributes to their environments. I will soon turn to the relevant data on the heritability of IQ, but first note a point that Mr. Green overlooks. Even if the heritability is small, the phenotypic differences are still whatever they

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are. That is to say, even if IQs of 70 and 130 just reflect different environments, the differences in intellectual performance would be just as real and just as socially significant. A person who fails to learn to read in an average school with typical instruction is handicapped, whether the underlying deficit was inherited, acquired, or some combination. The heritability question, then, is irrelevant to the range of intellectual performance in society at a moment in time, though not to the prospects for improvement.

The prospects for reducing intellectual differences enough to make them socially insignificant depend on heritability. The more heritable IQ is, the less it is equalized within a population by equalizing the environment, at least to a first approximation. There are genetic subtleties that could in principle produce exceptions to this assertion, as I and others have tried to spell out in some detail, but here I simply acknowledge them without further elaboration. The exceptions in principle have so far failed to be demonstrated in fact. When geneticists say that a trait has high heritability, they mean that the observed variation in the trait is the result of variation in the genes rather than in the environments in which the genes are expressed. They do not mean that environment plays little or no role, for the genetic substrate is always acting in an environment to produce the phenotype. Heritability, then, estimates the relative contributions of genetic and environmental variability to the observed variability of a trait within a population. The details of estimation are complex, statistical, and subject to an inescapable range of uncertainty for traits as multiply determined as the scores on IQ tests. Nevertheless, the recurrent estimate of IQ's heritability by dozens of workers all over the world has almost invariably been above 50 percent and more often above 60 percent than below. As human traits go, this would be considered an example of high heritability. Mr. Green cites with relative approval Christopher Jencks's lower estimate (i.e., 45 percent), but Jencks's method has now been shown to contain a technical flaw. When the data Jencks used are subjected to corrected versions of his own method, the result is a heritability of 60 percent or above, as Jencks himself freely acknowledges.

But for present purposes, I would prefer to bypass the technical issues in heritability estimation by retreating to a noncontroversial form of the argument, as follows. First, no empirical studies yet demonstrate a major impact on IQ of any environmental factor. We may speculate, as Mr. Green does, that there are countless subtle and unidentified environmental forces pushing IQs up and down, but at this point, five or so IQ points out of a practical range of about 100 is the limit for identified environmental factors, the rest is speculation. Second, most, virtually all, data on blood relatives is consistent with a substantial heritability for IQ. One can disbelieve the estimates by denying the data or by distrusting statistics or Mendelian genetics, but there would still be no basis for concluding the reverse—that the IQ is not heritable—simply because no existing data support such a conclusion. Given, first, the absence of demonstrated major control by the environment and, second, plenty of data consistent with major genetic control, I am proposing only that it is worth thinking about the possibility that the range of intellectual competence is as genetic as it seems to be.

THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE of intellectual diversity manifests itself in the data correlating IQ with occupational status. Mr. Green does not doubt the correlation, which is a fact beyond denying, but he doubts that it measures anything but the sociological biases of employers, who, he believes, hire people for positions that mirror the family background of the job applicants, signified by their academic credentials. I would agree with him that the biases exist and even that academic level is more highly correlated with occupational status than IQ. However, I do not share his opinion that a person's schooling is trivial for most occupational purposes. Moreover, schooling is correlated with IQ, so when status is correlated with the one, it can hardly avoid being correlated with the other. I have discussed these issues elsewhere and so will just summarize my views here.

In modern societies, the traits measured on IQ tests are channeled by schools. Children with high scores tend to do well; children with low scores tend to do poorly and drop out. The quality of school performance, as well as the sheer level of schooling, is predicted better by a child's IQ than by any other fact about him, including measures of family status. Occupational status correlates with schooling, therefore also with IQ. Mr. Green thinks schooling, rather than IQ itself, is the active agent in the correlation. I think he is mostly correct up to this point, but the next step in his argument is questionable at best. He thinks that IQ is

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immaterial, while I think it is crucial. I think that schooling channels people into occupations partly because educational credentials capture important human qualities, such as the cognitive abilities measured by the IQ. The credentials are no doubt imperfect, but I cannot believe they are empty. Mr. Green implies that the predictiveness of schooling is largely a reflection of what may be called credentialism, the "tendency of employers (and personnel directors looking for a cheap way to distinguish among otherwise indistinguishable job candidates) to require formal educational credentials of very doubtful applicability to on-the-job performance."

He finds the credentials dubious because of studies showing little correlation between IQ or schooling and performance in certain occupations. Mr. Green correctly reports the findings but has missed the point. To the extent that people land in an occupation because of their cognitive ability, the correlation between cognitive ability and performance within that occupation is diminished. For example, I would expect a diminished correlation between grades and IQ among students at Stanford or Yale or Harvard Law School. Since the admissions process filters out virtually all but the top fraction of a percent of the distribution of cognitive ability, performance at those schools reflects traits not so sharply prescreened, such as energy, health, interest in the law curriculum, etc. Throughout the span of occupations, some sort of filtering must go on. At every occupational level there is the natural attrition of people rising to higher status or slipping lower. Insofar as social mobility is correlated with IQ, it will reduce the correlation between performance and IQ within the occupation. A high correlation (typically greater than 0.70) has been the repeated finding between the average IQ of people in common occupations and the perceived status of the occupation. Much of this correlation reflects the schooling required for various occupations, but, once again, I would not dismiss schooling as credentialism. Mr. Green must also want his surgeon to know anatomy, his airplane navigator to know trigonometry, and his grocer to know how to add or, at least, how to operate his cash register. If learning the tools of a trade is at all correlated with IQ, then the network of correlations is not an accident, not even a bourgeois conspiracy.

The correlation between IQ and status shows (among other things) the social consensus implicitly channeling scarce mental capacities into consequential jobs. If the consequential jobs did not require intelligence (or whatever general human traits are measured by tests), the correlation might decline or disappear without harm. Perhaps in the future it will, but not yet. Mr. Green disputes my claim that technology has so far made brains more important in society, not less. I think it is easier to replace people's muscles and sense organs with machines than their higher mental faculties. Mr. Green argues, in effect, the reverse: "the generalization that technological progress routinizes work requirements is surely on safer ground than its contrary." Direct evidence is lacking, but indirect evidence again seems to support my view. The decreasing proportion of farm workers in the labor force in the 20th century has largely been replaced by white-collar, service, and clerical jobs, not by blue-collar or factory work. This implies a net gain in the intellectual requirements for employment, unless it should turn out that today's white-collar jobs are intellectually equivalent or inferior to 1900's farm work or that blue-collar work has greatly declined in its demands on intellect. This, I believe, is why modern societies are becoming increasingly concerned with the social costs of functional illiteracy and other intellectual deficits of the type that beset the lower quarter or third of the distribution of cognitive performance. Mr. Green's comments make it clear that he does not realize that such disadvantaged people number in the millions in the United States alone, perhaps because there are few of them in his immediate circle. But the 50 million Americans with IQs less than, say, 90 pose a social challenge of considerable magnitude.

For now and for a while at least, society will continue to need a way to guide people into positions that accord with their abilities. If and when technology superannuates us as workers, or education or science wipes out the differences in performance, society can become truly egalitarian. In the meantime, a gradient of social reward seems to me benign compared to direct coercion, if the gradient is no steeper than necessary to keep the allocation of ability reasonably productive. The result is social stratification, and to the extent that the required abilities are genetic, the stratification will produce a genetic gradient in society, parallel to the social one. This was the prospect I noted first in 1971 and the data collected since have made it that much clearer. Mr. Green would do his cause good if he learned to live with the facts, perhaps even to use them creatively. □

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2: Philip Green

Myths of Hereditarianism

I see that Richard Herrnstein has finally dropped the extreme claim, with which he first gained notoriety, that egalitarian reforms will have the effect of making class stratification even worse than it now is.

Having done so, he must confront on its own terms the democratic demand that we proceed with the equalization *process* of the last century. Oddly, he writes about this prospect as though all egalitarianism must be intransigently absolute. Why the (if anything) overly moderate egalitarianism of my articles should provoke such an excess of zealotry against "anarchic" total leveling is a puzzle—except on the assumption that for some reason or other Herrnstein is passionately committed to hierarchy, an assumption his language and mode of argumentation all too easily bear out.

Perhaps he is still trying to respond to Noam Chomsky's more radical egalitarianism, but even in that argument he misses the point. Absolute egalitarianism is certainly utopian in Marx's sense of the term—there are no active, existing social forces striving for it or heralding the changes in social psychology necessary for its realization. But what Chomsky was trying to point out is that thoroughgoing egalitarianism is not "utopian" in *Herrnstein's* sense of the term—that is, Chomsky argues that as far as we know there is nothing immutably present in "human nature," as opposed to the perceived exigencies of economic organization in our particular civilization and epoch, that makes equalizing impossible. In this Chomsky is certainly right and Herrnstein's contrary assertion is wrong, because it is based, as we shall see, on a misuse of genetics.

In any event, that is not the present dispute between Herrnstein and myself. Let us grant the trivial claim that at this stage in our history we lack the social invention and consciousness to reward people according to "needs"; to create in effect a complex, industrial/commercial society without division of labor or a money economy. So what? The real questions that then suggest themselves, several of which I addressed directly though perforce briefly in my last article, are: is such a complex economic structure manageable by means of a reward system that, without equalizing absolutely, distributes a range of what we now consider "middle-class" incomes? Can well-being be effectively randomized among various social groups in plural societies? Can blue-collar work, or nonprofessional work generally, be made more self-governing and enlightening than it is now, to the extent that active democratic citizenship becomes more than a myth for millions of people in all modern societies? Can we be productive enough to afford a generous welfare system that protects those who from no fault of their own can't do income-producing work? And would these small accomplishments be satisfactory middle-range substitutes for utopian vision?

About these serious questions of "equality," Herrnstein has never had anything to say and still doesn't. His sole reply, which constitutes nothing more than the endless rearguard action of the conservative ideologue, is that things are exactly the way they are because that's exactly the way they have to be: everywhere! And to prove it, Herrnstein points to the pseudoegalitarianism of the mythical free market. A "community," he tells us, blandly reasserting the notion of meritocracy, channels "people into occupations according to what I have been calling the social consensus." Right, he and I and the deans of the medical schools and the board of the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Secretary of the Treasury and an unemployed tool-and-die maker and a "welfare mother" trying to raise three children on a pittance and my plumber: we all get together and agree on who's going to get what. Speaking politely, this is a fiction. It is a *social structure* operating through institutions that "channels" people, not a consensus. As I wrote (and Herrnstein makes no reply), "income is simply a function of marketplace and political power, both of which are generated by a long train of historical circumstance that has not necessarily had anything to do with 'merit' or 'usefulness.'" And the "social consensus," so-called, to the limited extent that it may actually exist in this particular aspect of social life, is usually little more than resigned acquiescence in the way things are by people who had no hand in making them that way, but can't see their way clear to any painless alternative—not least because spokesmen for the established order keep assuring them there isn't any. Even so, our mutual valuations change over time, despite Herrnstein's dictum to the contrary, and they are not at all alike in all industrial

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societies, as studies of comparative income distribution and approaches to welfare and work demonstrate.

"Society," that is, doesn't channel anyone; people channel other people. (Interestingly, the free-market version of the labor market really might work in a genuinely egalitarian society, in that only if all "demands" had equal economic force behind them would the "law" of supply and demand actually distribute jobs and goods in accordance with individuals' desires.) The channelers may even be people who originally performed a historically "objective" social task (that was Marx's view, at any rate); but as the generations pass, their class and its descendants *mold* social channels, *promulgate* influential social symbols, *prevent* contrary views on ways of life from getting a full hearing—so what was once historically "necessary," if it ever was, becomes imposed. Not consensus but power dredges the channels; people who benefit from the existing way of doing things strive to keep it that way, and since they control a disproportionate share of resources and of access to communications media, they finally accrue much more power or even authority than it is abstractly necessary for them to have in a productive society.

Concretely, of course, a society, having been organized one way for years or centuries, will be difficult to reorganize without great upheaval and dislocations. In that sense the power of the powerful comes to seem and even to be "necessary"—but only because they helped make it so. Concretely also, in any society from the very worst to the best of the bad there will be some, maybe even many things that are being done the way they would have to be done anywhere under similar circumstances—so again, some of the power of the powerful comes to seem and even to be necessary. But most especially in the arrangement of the details of economic organization it is still political and economic power that does the arranging, not a force of nature, and channeling always has been and still is done by channelers, not by "the market" or "the consensus." The active force of channeling is visible wherever overt discrimination occurs (has Herrnstein never heard of discrimination?) but it is always taking place everywhere. Medical schools don't limit admissions in response to the market fact that doctors have high incomes; doctors have high incomes because (*inter alia*) medical schools have wilfully limited admissions. Giant corporations don't pay more to their executives than small corporations because the work they do is more important, but because the giant corporations have more money. Unionized workers earn more because the structure of certain industries gives unions market power, not because the work they do is more valuable. And so on.

Having disposed of all possibilities for social change by this resort to the myth of the consensual free market, as though that argument had never been dealt with, Herrnstein then gradually moves on to the proposition that the poor must always come to form a permanent, self-reproducing underclass. It's not clear whether Herrnstein means that the absolutely poor as a permanent self-reproducing underclass must always exist, *or* that the relatively less-well-off in any society must always form such a class, regardless of how "poor" they are. But, taken either way, the proposition stands or falls on hereditarian reasoning: social mobility helps the genetic cream raise itself from the (absolutely or relatively) lower class, and the genetic scum remains to interbreed and perpetuate itself.

IT IS DISHEARTENING to have spent almost 50 pages demonstrating that hereditarianism is a meretricious doctrine, only to be asked to do it all over again by someone who (as his reference to Jencks's value for h^2 and his last paragraph reveal) has paid no attention at all. I must therefore, briefly, repeat the main points:

(1) Any measure of heritability in *people* (and it doesn't matter if Jencks has reassessed h^2 to be .99) is *not* a measure of genetic transmission, because unlike domestic animals, the people have not been bred and raised under controlled conditions with relevant environmental constraints held constant. Heritability of a trait is the result of the interplay between environmental and genetic influences on variations in that trait for tested subjects. If the environmental influence is relatively unvarying—that is, if members of the tested group have lived in environments that influenced them both strongly and similarly—than the randomly expectable trait differences between them will *seem to be* accounted for genetically. Of the major studies of separated twins on which the allegedly high value for h^2 rests, the most famous (that of Cyril Burt in England) has been revealed to be fraudulent. As for the others, the "results" of all such studies are subject to the crucial proviso that their value for h^2 will be too high if the

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investigators assumed environmental *differences* among the members of the tested group when actually hidden or ignored environmental *similarities* were having a similar influence on IQ levels. That can be and almost certainly has been true even of studies of separated identical twins. I do not know of a single such study that has stood up to a careful reinvestigation from the standpoint of assessing its adequacy as a controlled experiment free of gross experimenter bias.

(2) In any event, we cannot generalize from any of these test groups, whatever *their* heritability index, to anyone else, because all the heritability measure does is tell us the unique relationship between environmental and genetic influence for members *of that group*. For people who live in environments that in some way or other especially torment or uplift them, there is no *prima facie* reason and no experimental evidence for believing that heredity has *any* influence on variation in their average IQs from those of other people. On the other hand, most of the average IQ differences among definable social groups are easily explicable by reference to differences in their average environments.

(3) To the extent, moreover, that there may possibly be a slight genetic influence on IQ or "intelligence" variation among groups, and a somewhat greater influence among individuals, no necessary social consequences follow, because human cultural traits are malleable *regardless* of the sources of influence on them. Herrnstein himself, without understanding what he is doing, has shown that this is so even for "physical" traits, in a passage in his original *Atlantic Monthly* article in which he points out that skin color in the U.S. is highly heritable but is not so in Norway. Despite the amusing inconsequence of the passage (he is comparing skin color at birth in the U.S. with skin color among adults in Norway), the point is useful: if we were convinced that tanness was goodness we could wipe out the "heritability" of skin color in the U.S. simply by the universal provision of sunlamps. So much for "h^2"!

(4) Though learning is obviously not nearly as easy as tanning, there is a large and growing literature from various nations (especially but not only the U.S. and Israel) showing that various forms of social and educational policy, from the improvement of nutrition to the simple cutting down of family size to complex programs of educational therapy, can have lasting impact on the expressed intellectual capacity of children with apparently irremediable problems. To the extent that conventional schools can boast of no such accomplishment, that is, first because they haven't tried, second because formal schooling meets only a small part of the needs of such children, and third because our understanding of the precise environmental causes of subnormal *expressed* intelligence and how to deal with it is just emerging from its infancy.

In short, there is no reason to believe that genetically based social classes or groups now exist, or ever did or will or must exist. On the whole and contrarily there is every reason to believe that when the children of those who perform poorly, perform poorly themselves, they most often do so for perfectly understandable *social* reasons, and not at all for "innate" genetic reasons. Herrnstein's reference to my treatment of "standard deviations" is a typical example of the way hereditarians befog the discussion of this issue. My point was not that the IQ differences we deal with aren't real but that those differences, and above all their *extent,* are not *innate* and should not be taken as innate merely because IQ tests are made up so as to distribute them on a bell curve. Like all hereditarians, Herrnstein is incapable of understanding that phenomena can be perfectly "real"—*socially* real—without being genetically indelible.

Herrnstein therefore, in sum, takes his stand on a doctrine that is scientifically untenable and the creation (largely) of ideologues. Why he carries this pseudoscience around with him like precious personal luggage is a question only he can answer. But as long as the case for the innateness *and* ineradicability of massive differences in intellectual capacity among large classes of people remains based on the shoddy reasoning and willfully irrelevant assertions of the hereditarians, egalitarians need pay it no attention.

UNFORTUNATELY, on the subject of occupation and IQ Herrnstein makes his own unique contribution to the lore of pseudoscience.

To begin with, I don't know why he thinks I agree with him on the correlation between IQ and occupational status. "Alleged" is what I called it, and "alleged" is what it remains. If it is evidence we are interested in, there is Jencks's summary, which is that "the correlation for white, non-farm men probably averages around .50." (Note that the exclusion of nonwhites, women, and farmers

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almost certainly inflates the correlation quite a bit, so the .50 is very overstated.) Jencks adds that "the correlation between a man's occupational status and his test scores is about the same as the correlation between his status and his father's status. It is *considerably* lower than the correlation between his status and his educational attainment." (My emphasis.)

So much, this time, for IQ and "status." I wonder when Herrnstein and Jensen are going to spare us their imaginative assertions about *that* correlation, or expose to the light of day at least one study that shows it. The study (or two, it's hard to tell) that Herrnstein describes in his *Atlantic Monthly* article and book is, as I suggested in my third article (in more generous language), incompetent.

As for the equally fabulous correlation between income and IQ that Herrnstein now suggests, it too must be discarded. Herrnstein's formula is IQ→ education→income. The last sentence quoted from Jencks in the paragraph above shows that to be a false formula, for if IQ *did* influence occupational status or income through education then the IQ/status correlation would be stronger than the education/status correlation, not "considerably" weaker. Maybe Herrnstein doesn't trust Jencks's findings, but since he gives us only his own opinion to replace them with, he gives in fact nothing. He is arguing in a circle. Moreover, Jencks himself knows perfectly well how to establish a correlation. As Herrnstein must be aware (since his analysis of diminished correlations is the same that Jencks makes) the passage I quoted from Jencks about the small impact of IQ on income-earning ability on the job, occurs *after* consideration—and careful, reasoned dismissal—of the possible effect to which Herrnstein now calls attention: else I would not have quoted it, since the point is so obvious; nor would Jencks have written it. Furthermore, I could have added the telling finding of Bowles and Gintis that "cognitive differences account for a negligible part of schooling's influence on economic success: individuals with similar levels of adult IQ but differing levels of schooling have substantially different chances of economic success," and that "schooling affects chances of economic success predominantly by the noncognitive traits which it generates, or on the basis of which it selects individuals for higher education." (In Gartner *et al., The New Assault on Equality.)*

But all this correlation-mongering is beside the point and proves nothing either way, and I regret having to make more of it than it's worth, being forced to do so only by Herrnstein's fertility in generating spurious correlations. The real point is that only someone remarkably unsophisticated about the workings of an industrial economy would think that theoretical physicists and chess players are or should be its most highly rewarded inhabitants, or that middle- or lower-range white-collar workers, real estate agents, political scientists, TV network executives, and so on ("consequential jobs?") generate more production of useful goods and services than skilled or even semiskilled industrial workers. Only ignorance of the world outside research laboratories (and perhaps within them) can allow Herrnstein so to overvalue "cognitive ability," when anyone who has ever dealt with a successful manager of any kind of physical or intellectual production knows that the traits that leap to the eye in such a person are decisiveness, drive, instinct, strength, vigor, shrewdness, application, "personality," manipulativeness, the ability to learn from experience, and only secondarily the kind of ablity that gets tested by IQ tests.

In short, it's our *knowledge* of how we actually earn our social living, and also of the way other, equally productive societies with differently graded reward systems earn theirs, that tells us Herrnstein's proposition is false. Our knowledge, e.g., tells us that in corporate bureaucracies, public or private, administrative featherbedding is the rule rather than the exception; that executives in large corporations get salary raises, not cuts, when sales drop; that from the 1920s onward the number of people employed in the administration of passenger railroading, and their salaries, went up up up while passenger miles traveled went down down down—the list is endless, the irrelevance of productivity to pay is clear.*

* Herrnstein's sociology continues to baffle me and, I imagine, the rest of *Dissent*'s readers. I know several estimable grocery store owners or empoyees who operate their cash registers quite nicely—that the only mistakes they ever make are in their own favor I take to be a sign of real intelligence—without showing any other signs of special "cognitive ability" at all, and in fact I should think the job not beyond the range of any person with an undamaged brain. Surgeons are generally considered among the *less* intellectually oriented members of the medical profession, and their job demands no more "cognitive ability" than that of any skilled craftsman. My family doctor is undoubtedly more intelligent than most

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TO REVERT briefly to the question of arbitrary or real value in work, the fact is that we can measure only *changes* in productivity (marginal increments), but can't measure productivity itself at all (especially white-collar or professional productivity) unless we find some independent baseline. But there is no baseline. "Productivity" is nothing more than the value added to a socially useful process. We've seen earlier how difficult it is to decide what's "socially" useful. As for the assessments of value, "arbitrary" is exactly what they are. Herrnstein makes no reply, I notice, to my critique of his own implicit valuations, and he does not objectify them with his vague references to occupational status; the number of occupations for which we can actually define what exactly gets done, *and* what it's worth to us, is minimal. To put it bluntly, do we know whether society would suffer more from a work stoppage by a random selection of 10 million well-paid white-collar and professional workers, 10 million less-well-paid blue-collar workers, or 10 million housewives? The question is rhetorical and ultimately unanswerable, but what makes Herrnstein think he knows the answer? I fear that like many people he never questions the social value of his own most prized possession—"higher mental faculties"—but I have sad news for him: what he and I do can in the aggregate be displaced by technological advance ("Sunrise Semester") a lot more easily than what spot-welders do; and when we have machines and systems that do what accountants and controllers do we'll still be trying to find human beings willing to do general maintenance work in factories, or to mine coal.

Herrnstein, in fact, does not dispute *anything* I said about the obvious independence of productive behavior from our particular American income arrangements. He does not answer Jencks's calculation that the possible genetic component in American income inequality is extremely slight. He ignores my references to rises in "IQ" keeping pace with "technological requirements," or to the dependence of employment prospects on the economic behavior of firms and governments, or to the simplification of work through routinization, or to the feeble intellectual requirements of many so-called white collar jobs, or to the possible gains to be made from devoting more resources to education and training, or from the implementation of workplace democracy.

In fact he manages, again, not to reply to or even deign to notice anything in my entire presentation of labor-market possibilities. He merely announces that "society" needs gradients of social reward "no steeper than necessary"—a mind-numbing truism to which Mao Tse-tung would have given eager assent, as will I (though the present Chinese leadership might think it a code phrase for "Gang-of-Four" radicalism). The conclusion that I came to, however, was that, given reward gradients "no steeper than necessary," and given progress on the fronts mentioned above, we could have within our grasp a society in which class would not distribute "benefits and penalties with a marked inequality," and thus need no longer be an "important influence" on our lives.

Does Herrnstein disagree that such a prospect is attainable? Apparently he does, but on no further evidence than that there are in the U.S. "millions" of functionally illiterate "disadvantaged people" who are presumably hopelessly (genetically) debarred from keeping up with the pace of modern technology. It is here, at last, that he reveals the great poverty of both his imagination and his knowledge. What he is giving us in his final comment, after all, taken together with his other comments about "disadvantaged" people and their genes, is the unoriginal message that the poor must always be with us. *That* proposition may have seemed reasonable when the New Testament was being set down, but now it is, to put it kindly, fatuous. Situational poverty—that of the elderly, the ill or disabled, the alcoholic—can of course exist anywhere, but it poses problems only for social policy, not for social theory. But as for the poverty that allegedly *must come* to "millions," by virtue of their productive incapability, though its existence in the U.S. is real enough, its necessity is a complete myth.

IN MY ARTICLE I dealt with the problem of human unproductivity at some length, of course. But let us look at it here from another perspective, that of the

surgeons; the sorts of things he does for us—diagnosis, e.g.—demand a great deal of conceptual skill; and his and his peers' contribution to the national health and thus to productivity is *much* greater than that of an equivalent number of surgeons. But the surgeons get paid more. As for mathematical navigators, I still wish Herrnstein would explain why they get paid much less than, say, successful p.r. men. What on earth is Herrnstein trying to say with these "examples"?

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costs of overcoming it. Just from the standpoint of middle-class self-interest the current cost to Americans of dealing with an underclass—the bulk of the costs, that is, of crime, crime prevention, and punishment; of welfare and social services taken up primarily by the poor; and of foregone production from those barred from productivity by the various miseries the cycle of poverty imposes on them—probably requires more onerous taxation than would the implementation of "full employment" programs combined with wage supplements of the kind proposed by Jencks and Lester Thurow. Thus even from an "incentives" standpoint modern poverty—the existence of a real lower class—probably imposes more strictly economic costs than it grants economic benefits. As Herbert Gans put it, we have so large a lower class because we derive *other* benefits from its existence and from our refusal to do anything about it—e.g., "dirty work" gets done by people without choice, and the rest of us are enabled to feel superior. Those "uses" of a lower class are real enough, but they are hardly eternal structural necessities.

Herrnstein seems to have no conception that poverty as an element in class structure is an aspect of social policy and social psychology, and that its impact can and does vary from society to society just as they do. Certainly his view will astonish, say, the Swedes, who are going to have to scurry around creating a mock-up culture of poverty to show him when he comes to visit. Where are Sweden's "unemployable" illiterates? Nowhere. In fact, the illiterates have to be imported from Southern Europe and North Africa, but far from being "unemployable" they practically get shanghaied to the more prosperous Northern European economies during periods of economic growth. The American disease, in other words, is not even a necessary corollary of welfare capitalism, let alone of a more egalitarian "post-industrial" society. Herrnstein, who seems to have only a smattering of knowledge about his own society, has utterly failed to get the latest news of the world elsewhere. To repeat, our ability to improve our social world is a matter of will and intelligence; the task is, yes, "of considerable magnitude," not least because of the need for the irrationally organized industrial world to find new arenas for productive activity by its inhabitants; but genes and the imaginary requirements of occupational status rankings have absolutely nothing to do with the difficulties ahead of us.

Finally, as a practicing social scientist who makes at least some attempt to look at the data even when they offer discomfort to his own predispositions, I am very disturbed by Herrnstein's next-to-last sentence. I have been working on this problem since 1973, and in that time not a single study has come to my attention that makes the hereditarian prospect "clearer"; nor will one find any such "data" in Herrnstein's own book—published in 1974! On the other hand, reports of findings that falsify the Jensen-Herrnstein thesis come to one's attention almost weekly, as indicated in Footnote 22 of my last article. (In Great Britain, the society where there is right now the loudest outcry against "to much equality" and its supposedly ill effects, the very unsocialist financial editor of the *Guardian* recently conceded that there is no evidence nor any reason for the belief that the absence of huge income differentials for managers has any impact at all on their job performance.) Claims like Herrnstein's are not social science, they are ideology given the weight of "authority" by the continual references the ideologues make to their own and each other's unsupported assumptions and misstated "facts." And though Herrnstein purports to be offering a cry of despair, what comes across most strongly in all his work is a counsel of hope: hope for comparatively well-off taxpayers that they don't have to support expensive programs of social betterment because nothing can be done for those people anyway, it's all in their genes. In his letter Herrnstein sounds at times genuinely interested in social change. If that is so then he ought to stop his destructive crusade; he is merely helping to make a bad problem worse, on false grounds. There may be reasons of class interest for turning one's back on egalitarian reform, but to call the pseudoscience of hereditarianism to one's aid is to traduce the pursuit of knowledge. □

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Nicolaus Mills

"Harlan County, U.S.A."

When Barbara Kopple first went to Harlan County, her aim was to film the Arnold Miller-Tony Boyle election contest for the presidency of the United Mine Workers. Fortunately, Kopple didn't remain true to her original purpose. She stayed and recorded the 13-month-long struggle (from July 1973 to August 1974) of the Brookside mine workers to win a contract from the Eastover Mining Company, a subsidiary of Duke Power. What might have been a solid, but limited, documentary became instead *Harlan County, U.S.A.*, a portrayal of the Brookside miners that records not only the details of their strike but, like the best of the new journalism, captures the viewpoint of the participants themselves. The result is a movie that holds our attention the way James Agee's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* does—by its ability to slow our gaze, to make us forget about narrative line and turn instead to scenes that focus on a single subject—or less than that, a face, an object, the sound of a voice.

Work

The screen is dark. We hear a warning cry. There is an explosion. Another cry, "All clear." And one by one the men step on a conveyor belt and are carried into the mine. More darkness. Then men working on their hands and knees. There is no room for them to stand, and as the camera closes in, we see that, in addition to all else, it is hot. Sweat is pouring down the cheeks of a young miner. Another close up. This time of a machine grinding into a coal seam. The noise is deafening. We see a man talking on the phone. His lips are moving. But the noise drowns out his words. Finally the camera pulls away. It pans the countryside for an instant, and we see the men come out of the mine—some on hauling machines, others on the conveyor belt for bringing up coal.

This is the opening of *Harlan County*, and it sets the tone for the entire movie. We know that the mine can never be a "good" place to work, that to descend day after day into this nether world cannot fail to take its toll, and that the sight of men riding (belly down) on the same belt that brings the coal out of the ground is but final proof of how they and their labor have become objectified. When, immediately following this opening sequence, Nimrod Workman, a retired miner, tells the story of how in the old days his foreman worried more about the company's animals than its workers — "You can always hire another man. You got to buy the mule." His story doesn't sound like ancient history. It goes to the essence of what we have just seen.

History

• *The camera closes in on a group of boys, lined up like school children posing for their class picture. But these boys are not school children They are the "Breaker Boys" from a 1911 Lewis Hine photograph. Their job is to make sure only the right size coal (no slag or rocks) comes out of the mine, and they look as though they have been burrowing into the coal itself. They have the glazed, unfocused look that in this century we have come to associate with the concentration camp. Only the boys' darkened faces (like minstrels who ran out of makeup) and their too-white eyes make clear what their real job is. The camera hones in on*

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one boy, his nose so blackened that it obscures the rest of his features. Then we jump to the present.

A ruddy-faced former miner is talking about his life as a breaker boy. He tells of a strike in which the issue was a 6½ cent wage and how the company gave in when everyone out on strike stayed together. There is no irony in his voice when he talks about the paltriness of the wage in dispute. It is the ability of the men to organize that he feels was—is—important, and as Kopple's narrative moves back into the past again and again (we see newsreels of John L. Lewis, of federal troops routing strikers), it becomes clear that what makes "Bloody Harlan" such a code word for everyone in the film is that the past has not really gone away. The Brookside strike, in which safety standards, medical insurance, the right to a union are at issue, is not a 1970s strike. It is the 1930s all over.

Union Meeting

• *At the meeting all the talk centers on one fact—the men working for the company have guns and every time there is a confrontation, the guns come out. Then the camera closes in on Lois Scott. An enormous woman in size and spirit, she has a tendency to dominate any scene in which she appears. Now she reaches into the bosom of her dress and pulls out a pistol. It is loaded, she says, and for use against anyone who threatens her. She shows it around, then daintily puts it back. And it disappears from sight with no bulge, no apparent discomfort to her. The gun might just as easily be a precious broach, shown to special friends from time to time but in general kept out of sight.*

Were we to read of such a gesture, it would seem ridiculous or else filled with such excruciating self-mockery that we could only take it as a sign of despair. But not so with Lois Scott. She is buoyed by her size, and she starts to laugh even before she reaches for her pistol. There is nothing self-hating about her gesture. It is the need for resourcefulness that she wants to demonstrate, and she succeeds. She will not minimize the dangers of the strike. Her point is simply that the fear of being shot can be dealt with if the Brookside miners will rely on their capacity to improvise. It is impossible for those in the room not to laugh with her, not to join her on the picket line.

Picket Line

• *It begins with a long profile shot of men standing behind a car, pistols drawn. We hear the click of their guns as they simultaneously pull back the hammers on them. It is a Brookside picket line. A reaction to weeks of being shot at and beaten up. A stalled car sits in the middle of the road. This time the Brookside workers are determined not to be dispersed, except on their own terms. The camera pans up the road, and, as far as the eye can see, cars are lined up bumper to bumper. Lois Scott confronts the sheriff with more defiance than ever. The women have a warrant for the arrest of Basil Collins (an Eastover foreman accused of threatening one of the strikers with a gun), and Lois Scott insists that the sheriff serve the warrant now. He is hesitant to do what she asks, but slowly, reluctantly he yields.*

We learn later that nothing happens to Collins (whom Kopple has photographed drawing his gun and driving through a picket line), but as this scene makes clear, Collins, as terrible as he is, is not the real issue. What is at stake in these early-morning confrontations is the capacity of the Brookside workers to stand together. They don't have to win each confrontation. All they need to prove is that they won't yield to the pressure that's being put on them. We never see this scene come to its final end—with the Brookside workers driving off. Nor is it logical that we should. It is the line of stalled cars that tells the real story, that and the sound of the women singing, "We Shall Not Be Moved."

Murder

• *It is night, and the camera zooms in on a shapeless white object that glistens in the dark. "That's what a scab does to a person when they're not working . . . . shot in the goddamn head." We never learn who is speaking, but what we are being show is part of the brain of Lawrence Jones, a young striker with a child and sixteen-year-old wife, who has been murdered in a shotgun ambush.*

It is both the most graphic and the most abstract scene in *Harlan County*. What we see on the ground has no recognizable form or shape, and yet this piece of flesh is more haunting than the picture we get of Lawrence Jones in his coffin, more haunting even than the scenes from the murdered Jock Yablonski's funeral. Kopple has, to use James Agee's words, caught the cruel radiance of what is, without dissection into science or digestion into art. When a miner later says, "A contract is what we're fighting for," we now know enough to hear him the way his fellow workers do—as a man

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saying much more, talking in fact about freedom from terror and brutalization.

Victory

• *The camera closes in on the Brookside changing room. It is three months after Lawrence Jones's death and the signing of a contract with Eastover. Now the men are concerned with the ratification of a national UMW contract, and we hear them talking tough, voicing their dissatisfaction over the no-strike agreement Arnold Miller wants them to make. There is a new vitality in their voices, and it contrasts sharply with the naked bodies we see. There is something almost fragile about the way the men look. They are too pale, too soft. Their heaviness—the looseness of men whose work makes other exercise impossible, whose diet relies principally on starches—seems overwhelming.*

Indeed, had we been shown this scene at the start of *Harlan County*, it would have seemed undermining. The defiance of the men would have appeared incongruous, too much at odds with their bodies. At the end of the film no such interpretation is possible, however, even though we know that the publicity from Lawrence Jones's death is what finally moved Eastover to sign a contract. Kopple has brought us to the point where we realize the strength of the Brookside workers does not depend on the tangible. It is their sense of history, the willed encouragement they give one another that accounts for their capacity to fight back.

At this juncture we are not fooled by the sign someone has pasted next to a mine elevator, "BE CAREFUL, BUDDY." We know that behind it there lies a tested and comprehending fury. If any comment is appropriate, it is the closing lines from Zola's *Germinal*, where he writes of the Montsou miners on their way to work after a strike, "Men were springing up, a black avenging host was slowly germinating in the furrows, thrusting upward for the harvests of future ages." Without recourse to glibness or melodrama, Barbara Kopple has made us see Harlan County in such a light. In the process she has, to be sure, evaded certain problems (we never, for example, learn much about those who go to work for Eastover, although their roots are the same as those of the people on strike), but her evasions are minimal. It is not the Maysles brothers, who gave her her start, to whom she must be compared, but Robert Flaherty. □

Irving Howe

Another View of "Harlan County, U.S.A."

I largely agree with Nick Mills. It's a stirring film, and some parts are splendid, especially those that show the workers and their wives talking among themselves about the strike. But there are also, I think, some serious evasions and failures, mostly having to do with the director's ideological preconceptions. E.g.:

(1) A flashback to John L. Lewis speaking. He's a great speaker, his words about the need for labor organization are moving, he comes out a hero. Later in the film Tony Boyle, Lewis's successor as head of the United Mine Workers, is shown to be the autocrat and crook everyone by now knows him to have been. But not a single phrase in the film makes clear that Boyle was Lewis's creature or that Boyle's dictatorship in the union merely continued Lewis's dictatorship. Why this reticence? Because Barbara Kopple doesn't know this or because she's committed to a simple good guys/bad guys approach? Might not the film have been richer in moral content if Lewis had been shown for what in fact he was: a great union leader *and* a vicious enemy of union democracy?

(2) There is much talk among the workers about the need for a contract—it's very impressive. But at no point, as I recall, does anyone tell us, what do they want *in* the contract? Fifteen cents more an hour, 50 cents, $5? Better working conditions? If so, which? Kopple seems so enraptured by the vision of working-class action, she lets herself be oddly indifferent to the realities of working-class need. Are we to suppose the miners themselves are indifferent to the terms of the contract for which they're fighting?

Toward the end the film offers sympathy to those people in the UMW who want to reject a new national contract negotiated by the Miller leadership; but we aren't given specific information as to the terms proposed or the terms desired. Such "details" may seem uninteresting or undramatic to young people who emerged out of the radical student milieu of the late '60s; if so, it suggests they still have a lot to learn about the workers they admire.

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(3) Perhaps the most serious flaw in the film is mentioned by Mills. The strike is long and the company stubborn; the strikers find it hard to develop a strategy for coping with the scabs. But only toward the end of the film, when we see a long line of old cars heading toward the mine, do we realize that these "scabs" are not imported strike-breakers but local workers who refused to join the strike. Ms. Kopple has deprived us of essential information—that the strike never managed to gain the support of all the workers involved. We never get a clear statement about this, we have to guess it ourselves; and I suspect that viewers without much labor experience might never guess it. That a portion of the workers refused to join the strike doesn't make it any the less valid—only more complex. But complexity is something Kopple isn't always at ease with.

Nor, for that matter, is the film as a medium. A "documentary" claims to be presenting historical reality, but out of a desire to make a dramatically neat film or to fulfill a romanticized vision of proletarian heroism, Kopple twists and suppresses portions of reality. All art, I'll be told, is selective, limited in viewpoint, and other such profundities. No doubt. But the more a work of art (and especially a documentary laying claim to the disciplines of reportage) yields to the pressures of historical complexity, the better it is likely to be as a work of art. *Harlan County, U. S. A,* though a moving and at some points very impressive film, doesn't yield enough. □

Nicolaus Mills Replies:

Irving Howe's comments go to the central issue that *Harlan County, U.S.A.* raises *as a film:* by what standards are we to judge it? Howe argues—implicitly and explicitly—that *Harlan County* must be viewed as a "documentary laying claim to the disciplines of reportage." And here is the source of our disagreement. I think he is judging *Harlan County* with only partially adequate standards. True, *Harlan County* is reportage in that it tells of real people and actual events. But it is not reportage in the traditional journalistic sense of giving both sides of a story in terms of an objective perspective. *Harlan County's* reportorial roots lie in the new journalism, which deals with fact but uses the tools of fiction (the language and point of view of the participants in an event, for example) to get at a felt truth.

In *Harlan County* the story Barbara Kopple wants to tell is principally that of those who went out on strike against the Eastover Mining Company, and when we see her film in these terms, the omissions Howe speaks of are far less damaging than he contends. In the case of John L. Lewis it would, for example, be good if he were put in proper perspective. But the short film clip we get of Lewis is there to show that the old strike issues are the new strike issues in Harlan County. An explanation of Lewis's past at this point would be distracting. The same logic holds for the details of the contracts the Eastover miners sign. We are told more about them than Howe indicates (in a scene that occurs on Wall Street and in a discussion the workers have among themselves while voting on the national UMW contract). But Kopple's real point here is that the value of a contract to the Eastover miners lies primarily in the sense of control they believe it gives them over their lives. In her film she is not oblivious to the details of the local or national agreements the Eastover workers sign. Rather she emphasizes what most concerns them—union recognition and a hated no-strike clause.

Howe's final point—that Kopple presents an inadequate picture of those who break the strike—is, as I indicated in my review, telling. Here, I again believe that she does better than Howe indicates, showing at a relatively early point in the film those who broke the strike sitting around a local gas station discussing the "Communists" in the UMW. But there is no doubt that Kopple short-circuits this subject. I think, however, that in the final analysis what this failure points up is not that Kopple chose to avoid "the pressures of historical complexity" but that she chose to accept the confines of "new journalistic" documentary. Given her pro-striker perspective, she could never have adequately shown the other side, and what she did in the end was stick to the medium she started out with, telling one story well rather than two stories inadequately. □

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Dennis H. Wrong

Casing the Country

AMERICA IN OUR TIME, by Godfrey Hodgson. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 564 pp. $12.95.

Godfrey Hodgson is an Englishman who first came to the United States as a graduate student in 1955, served as a Washington correspondent of the London *Observer* from 1962 to 1965, and has returned frequently for long stays in the past decade. *America in Our Time* is a superior example of the genre of contemporary history written by journalists who covered the events they describe and attempt to recreate them for a readership that also lived through them.

The book records the period from Kennedy's inauguration through the first Nixon administration. There is a bit of conventional evocation of the recent past in the "only yesterday" vein, some fairly hackneyed rhetorical belaboring of the symbolism of the careers and fates of various newsworthy or once newsworthy persons, and considerable overstatement of the long-range historical significance of the '60s, but most of this is contained in the first and last chapters. In between, Hodgson does an excellent job of retelling the major stories of the decade: the beginnings, intensification, and dissipation of black protest; the melancholy evolution of the Vietnam involvement; the brief explosion of the student and counter-cultural revolts.

I found Hodgson most enlightening on those subjects he presumably knows best firsthand. There is a highly informative chapter on the media, describing the new emphasis on TV news-reporting at the beginning of the '60s in the wake of the quiz-show scandals and the speedy rise of television as the public's major and often sole window on the world. Throughout the book the author remains sensitive to the role of the media in shaping and reflecting events and, especially during the Nixon administration, becoming, however inadvertently, political actors in their own right. A chapter on the "foreign policy Establishment" will convince anyone who needs convincing that there is such a thing, and Hodgson opportunely chose to interview none other than Cyrus Vance as a representative member. On the major issues of social policy involving the blacks and the poor, Hodgson summarizes succinctly the continuing debates centered on the Moynihan and Coleman reports, the IQ controversy, and Christopher Jencks on education and opportunity.

On topics that I know best first-hand, Hodgson is less reliable, notably on trends in the intellectual and academic world in general and in sociology in particular, especially during the late '40s and early '50s, which, it so happens, is also the only period when, owing to the accident of family connections, I had access to more than the *New York Times* in gauging what was going on in Washington. This was, of course, before Hodgson himself ever came to America, but the opening section of the book deals at length with the '40s and '50s as background to what came later.

HODGSON is not Lillian Hellman, but he too exaggerates the effects of McCarthyism on the intellectual community. He obviously didn't read Lazarsfeld's and Thielen's elaborate survey of

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its effect on professors, *The Academic Mind.* For example, Hodgson writes that in the '50s "students of literature shied away from the writers of social and political dissent to pore over the safe obscurity of Pound and Eliot, Yeats and Joyce." Pound, of course, was at that time in a Washington mental hospital after having been found guilty of treason, but, letting this pass, what "writers of social and political dissent" were "shied away from"? Upton Sinclair? Howard Fast? The Auden and Spender of the '30s—they hardly seem to have suffered neglect? I'm not just picking on an obviously shallow statement, for Hodgson's central theme in the book is that the troubles of the '60s resulted from the lack of an organized left, including the lack of a committed intelligentsia, to resist the ideology of the "liberal" center that became ascendant after 1954 and fell apart in the late '60s.

One can readily agree with Hodgson on most of the baneful consequences of the absence of a left, but he hardly seems to understand why this became especially conspicuous in the 1950s and thus falls back on the old chestnut of McCarthyite repression. There *was* repression in the civil service, especially the Far Eastern corps of the State Department, and, of course, in the easily frightened entertainment industry, but these are not necessarily the places where one would look first for leadership of the left. Hodgson confesses to sheer bafflement at the anti-Communism of so many liberal and radical intellectuals and trade union leaders in the late '40s. Obviously, he insists, there must have been "rather more complex causes" for this than their being "turned off by the Moscow trials and the Nazi-Soviet pact." Possibly, he suggests, it was "the sheer anti-intellectual stupidity of the Communist Party" (is *this* more complex?). He claims that an intellectual historian may find the answer in the "rich archive" of "the files of the *Partisan Review, Dissent, Commentary,* and the rest over a third of a century," although *Dissent* was in part created to dissent from the other two journals mentioned and Hodgson even echoes its own original statement of editorial purpose when he accuses—unjustly, for the matter was more complex—*Partisan Review* of "the bleakest Cold War anti-Communist orthodoxy." Nor is it true that "scarcely an intellectual with a shred of reputation could be found even to raise a voice against the outlawing" of the CP—*Dissent* protested, and there were others.

What a bore to have to go over all this again! But it is depressing that someone as intelligent and well-informed as Hodgson and too young, unlike Hellman, to have an axe of his own to grind about those days, should be so incapable of understanding that another Joseph, whose surname was Stalin rather than McCarthy, had more to do than the Wisconsin demagogue with the loss of confidence and defensive temper of the American left in the late '40s and early '50s.

Not that the absence of a strong left and the dominance of a "liberal consensus" were an entirely new development of the 1950s, as Hodgson too often suggests. He tacitly acknowledges this in prefixing a key chapter with a famous 1906 quotation from Werner Sombart on why there is no socialism in the United States. Communism as a menace has been defanged domestically and even abroad, but the political sociology of the United States seems to have remained much the same after the transitory turmoil of the '60s.

America in Our Time fails to rise above journalism to the level of interpretative history because, despite the author's shrewd assessments of particulars, its point of view is still largely that of the period it deals with. Hodgson for the most part simply reiterates the familiar debunking arguments of the late '60s aimed at the complacencies and rigidities of policy associated with the preceding decade. But we are now in the late '70s, the slogans, visions, and rages inspired by Vietnam and the various protest movements have lost credibility, and the present scene in many ways resembles 1960 more closely than 1970. The foreign policy Establishment may have been chastened by Vietnam, but the new President has drawn his chief advisers—Vance, Brzezinski, and Warnke—from its ranks. Carter's economic policies are in a familiar Democratic mold and have been shaped by the same liberal economists who advised Kennedy, although Carter's policies are even more cautious and centrist than were the policies of Kennedy.

Secure careers and personal self-fulfillment once again are the primary concerns of students and the young in general. Tom Hayden ran for the Senate; Eldridge Cleaver found God. Environmental concerns are here to stay, but the Club of Rome has modified its doomsday forecasts of 1971 and allowed that some economic growth is still feasible short of disaster. Watergate, the decline of George Wallace, and the election of Carter have ended the right-wing "backlash" against the '60s, just as the downfall of McCarthy made possible the liberal consensus that is Hodgson's chief target.

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THE EVENTS of the '60s undeniably taught some policy-makers and intellectuals to "pull down thy vanity." But what is the point of flailing away once more at the "end of ideology" writers and exposing yet again the hubris of the cold warriors and enthusiasts for world development under the direction of the United States? As so many others have done before him, Hodgson treats Daniel Bell as a representative spokesman of the consensus shattered in the late '60s. Yet Bell took as the text for his epilogue to *The End of Ideology* Machiavelli's remark that "men commit the error of not knowing when to limit their hopes." Hodgson thinks that America has at last learned this lesson from the '60s, but Bell, writing in 1960, thought it had been learned from the history of the two decades between 1930 and 1950. Unhappily for him, Bell wrote on the eve of disruptive events that produced an explosive resurgence of ideological passions, although many of the details, if not the mood, of his diagnosis look rather better today than they did a few years ago. Hodgson's much less nuanced contention that the 1960s marked a crucial watershed in American history amounting virtually to a loss of faith by Americans in their capacity to solve their social problems at all may look equally time-bound a few years hence. A national ethos that survived a civil war and a catastrophic economic depression is not so easily extinguished.

NOT THAT Hodgson's position amounts to a pessimistic conservatism. On the contrary, he argues that the new limits to economic growth now necessitate redistributist economic policies designed to achieve greater equality of condition as opposed to mere equality of opportunity. Most readers of this journal will certainly agree, although the claim that "only if a real transfer of resources has taken place has relative inequality been diminished; it is the relative, not the absolute, situation of the poor that must be changed if poverty is to be abolished" strikes me as being true by definition. Hodgson comes down hard and effectively on the effusions of Ben Wattenberg and others that the '60s raised just about everybody into the "middle class," but he also perceptively and sympathetically describes the persisting belief of American workers in individual opportunity, which made them so unresponsive to George McGovern and the New Politics. I think that I detect a trace of "the worse, the better" in the readiness of so many left-liberals today to proclaim the end of economic growth and the elevation of the politics of redistribution—the class struggle?—to the top of the political agenda. In continuing to advocate redistributist tax reforms and welfare policies, we cannot afford to forget that growth is still necessary to improve the lot of those who have not yet achieved the material comforts and spiritual afflictions of an upper-middle-class standard of living, even if growth can no longer be counted on to solve painlessly all of our social problems. □

Lewis Coser

The Need for Masks

THE FALL OF THE PUBLIC MAN, by Richard Sennett. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 373 pp. $15.00.

Some years ago in a much discussed book, *The Politics of Authenticity*, Marshall Berman argued for a politics of radical individualism, advocating the liberation of the person from the prison of convention and traditional restraint. The present volume, although it does not even mention Berman, may still be read as a response to his antinomian contentions. To Sennett, the private man whom Berman wishes to celebrate is in fact the isolated, the nonpolitical man. The cult of privacy and the quest for authenticity in the modern world, Sennett argues, have been accompanied by a decay of the public sphere and the atrophy of public capacities and powers.

Until the end of the 18th century, Sennett claims, public life was sustained and vigorous, especially in the cities. Men and women were able to transcend the limitations and constraints of private and family life. In the world of strangers in city squares or in the theater, people overcame their "natural" limitations to become truly cultivated human beings. By enacting public roles and wearing

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civilized masks, people fashioned that "artificial" world of stylized intercourse that marks advanced stages of cultural refinement. At present, however, according to Sennett, people are deprived of the sustenance of public intercourse, they experience strangers as threatening, and hence withdraw into a private shell of domestic intimacy and narcissistic self-absorption that makes them incapable of sustained public activities.

The contrast between Berman and Sennett, between the politics of authenticity, of nakedness and disclosure, on the one hand and the politics of public masks, of enclosure of the self, of the restraints of deference and demeanor on the other, has a long history. It goes back at least to those messianic medieval sectarians who advocated literal nakedness to recapture Adamite innocence in opposition to the elaborate clothes of the upper classes. When Rousseau attempted in the *Confessions* to disclose his whole private self, both reputable and disreputable parts, to the gaze of the public, he self-consciously laid the foundations for a truly radical assault against traditional culture and its pieties and conventions, as when he argued in the *First Discourse* that "The good man is an athlete who loves to wrestle stark naked; he despises those vile ornaments which cramp the use of his power . . . . "

Rousseau was soon answered by Edmund Burke who lamented that in the age of the French Revolution,

> all the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of moral imagination which [are] necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd and antiquated fashion.

Burke was rebutted in his turn by Thomas Paine who wrote in *Common Sense* that "Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence."

A modern scholar, Stephen Greenblatt, discussing the first images of America among Europeans, argues that the Indians horrified a ruling class "obsessed with the symbolism of dress," their nakedness being perceived as a token of a cultural void.* Yet that very nakedness was seen by the romantics as a sign of uncorrupted innocence.

Almost invariably those who stood for nakedness, disclosure, authenticity, belonged to the radical wing of the political spectrum, while the defenders of civilized masking and of the taming of natural man through the powers of convention defended conservative traditions. Curiously, this does not seem to hold in the present case: while Berman is indeed an impassioned spokesman for radical politics, Sennett is not a conservative. In fact, he probably holds values that, on other levels, are not dissimilar from those of Berman. This then seems a deviant case in the history of ideas, at least if we take him at his own estimate. But his nostalgia for a world we have lost, his resolute antimodernism may move him nearer to conservative positions than he yet realizes.

SENNETT DRAWS a parallel between the decline of Rome after the Augustan Age, and our contemporary predicaments. As Rome's public life withered, as the *res publica*—which had once been sustained by public intercourse, by ceremony and political debate in the forum and on the marketplace—became a formal obligation no longer sustained by emotion, people withdrew into the pursuit of private pleasures or sought in various mystical oriental religions "authentic" enlightenment and spiritual solace. In the same way, men and women today tend to withdraw from public committment in the quest for private emotional gain. What is more, with the destruction of the public dimensions of peoples' lives, their private lives also become distorted since they cannot by themselves sustain the whole person. Being unable to move with ease in public life, in the world of strangers, we put all the burdens of maintaining our sense of identity on a few people with whom we are intimately associated. But the small world of intimate *Gemeinschaft* cannot sustain this excessive burden so that the person is finally reduced to self-absorbed and narcissistic encapsulation. "As the family became a refuge from the terrors of society . . . people perceived the public domain not as a limited set of social relations . . . but instead saw public life as morally inferior." "Intimate vision is induced in proportion as the public domain is abandoned as empty."

Sennett attempts to document this general thesis with a series of interrelated chapters, dealing, inter alia, with the theater, with modes of dress and modes of address in public places in the 18th and 19th centuries and in our own age. The actor on the

*Greenblatt's paper appears in F. Chiapelli, ed., *First Images of America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

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18th-century stage, as Diderot argued, was not supposed to express his own feelings but assumed the mask that the playwright had created. Nor did the theater audience at that time express "natural" emotion. On both sides of the curtain, mutually understood conventions governed emotions and guided behavior. In similar ways, the clothing of the period made the body of the wearer into a "mannequin." Appearances were carefully manipulated so as to indicate the standing, rank, and status of the wearer. Dress in the street, just as speech in the theater, was an "artificial" contrivance that gave the impersonal realm of encounters with strangers a highly charged diversity of meanings, a playful intensity, that has been almost wholly lost in our day.

This colorful world of the 18th century was, according to Sennett, succeeded in the next by the grayness, the manufactured uniformity, the standardized wares of the age of a capitalist ascendancy. The modern bourgeois as we see him emerge in the novels of Balzac, possessed by a voracious appetite for possessions and mobility, operates on a scene in which no stable obligations and traditional styles guide behavior. Conduct now became a means of advertising and aggrandizing oneself. In the bourgeois Paris of the 19th century, the etiquette of the *ancien régime* counted for little, and public virtues were the butt of ridicule. Whatever affect the bourgeois still possessed was reserved for the domestic circle or acted out in occasional adventures and "affairs." The public expressive powers, which were so prominent in the preceding age, decayed. Dress became drab, uniform, and colorless as the department store displaced the individualized boutique or haberdasher. The bourgeois theatergoer became a passive spectator who, to use Bertolt Brecht's phrase, reacted to the play in a gastronomic manner.

In the 19th century and more so in ours, civility, i.e., the style of activity that protects people from one another and yet allows them to enjoy each other's company, suffered a precipitous decline. The wearing of public masks permits pure sociability, and shields oneself and others from the burdens of personal intimacy. With the decline of public ritual, in the drabness of modern devitalized city life, people either flee into the privacy of the family from encounters with others they no longer know how to control or they engage in ultimately vain efforts to express their authentic, their real, personality by striking through their masks. Both efforts are bound to collapse, being in the last analysis only sustained by the puny resources of naked and atomized selves. Modern men and women, so concerned with expressing their own feelings, it turns out, "are not very expressive people." Deprived of a public forum, they are "inhibited from exercising the capacity to playact." They become boring, and they are bored themselves. Hence they attempt to stimulate their jaded palate by ever-increased doses of private stimulants. In a world devoid of rituals, codes, and commonly understood signals, privatized people crave for authenticity but end up as casualties on the quest for a "liberation" that, being defined in private rather than public terms, must forever elude them.

IT IS not possible in a relatively short review to reproduce the often exciting documentation Sennett provides to underpin his main thesis, but I hope to have conveyed at least the main lineaments of his message.

Throughout the book one is struck by the author's tendency to think in blacks and whites, in either/or terms. He seems to lack what Else Frenkel Brunswick has called "tolerance of ambiguity." As a result, he has a tendency to provide only highly selective evidence that sustains his thesis while almost completely neglecting data that might put it into question. Let me give a few examples.

While celebrating the public spaces on which the 18th-century Parisian or Londoner allegedly executed his marvelously ingenious displays or civility, Sennett gives one no sense of the filth, the decay, the stench, and the sheer horror that disfigured city life in that century. Open places were progressively enclosed because they had become dumping grounds for filth and camping grounds for vagrants and beggars. The Act of 1735 for the enclosures of London's Lincoln Inn Fields, for example, reads in part:

> [This] great square . . . has for some years past lain waste and in great disorder . . . the same has become a receptacle for rubbish, dirt, and nastiness of all sorts brought hither . . . [and] many wicked and disorderly persons have frequently met together therein . . . . whereby many robberies, assaults, outrages and enormities have been and are continually committed . . . .

If open spaces led to such sustained abuses, and if enclosed places, by definition, were reserved for private rather than public uses, where then could the public life, so extolled by Sennett, flourish?

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Or take the theaters, another of Sennett's preferred loci of public display. Covent Garden and even more so the East London theater areas were commonly surrounded by taverns and whorehouses. In the popular theaters, moreover, "wine, punch, ale and spirituous liquors [are] being constantly sold at exorbitant prices, and there freely drunk during the said plays . . . . " "Mean, idle and disorderly people," so contemporary documents assert, "do commonly resort to said plays, and after the performance is over from thence go to the bawdy houses . . . or to other houses of ill-fame . . . . " Such documents, many of which can be found in M. Dorothy George's fine study, *London Life in the Eighteenth Century*, are never alluded to in Sennett's study, presumably because they cast a somewhat different light on the civility of 18th-century London.

Sennett ignores 18th-century drunkenness. In contrast, he makes much of it in the following century. Here he asserts that the bourgeoisie, now seeing itself threatened by the emerging working classes, actually fostered alcoholism among them so as to prevent them from engaging in subversive talk. "When the café became a place of speech among peers at work, it threatened the social order; when the café became a place where alcoholism destroyed speech, it maintained social order." Whoever can believe that alcoholism reduces the volubility and gregariousness of French workers then and now can, as the Duke of Wellington is said to have remarked on another occasion, believe anything.

To sustain his contention that the active public of the 18th century has been transformed into passive spectators in the 19th, be it in the theater or the boulevards, Sennett draws a picture of the later period with people sitting in the cafés "relaxing, drinking, reading but divided by invisible walls." Good heavens, there are literally hundreds of novels and other descriptions that show that they were also *talking*—even if that doesn't happen to fit Sennett's thesis.

One last example will have to suffice. Sennett provides an interesting analysis of the rhetoric Emile Zola employed in his famous open letter *J'Accuse*, defending the cause of Alfred Dreyfus. He concludes that it was mainly based on personalized and *ad hominem* arguments rather than on reasoned analysis of the issue. This is then used as evidence to sustain the thesis that by the turn of the century public discourse had decayed so that personalized invective had displaced civil argumentation. Sennett could hardly have found a worse example. What characterized the Dreyfus Affair above all was the general and abstract plane onto which the debate moved once it transcended the immediate issues at stake. The very term "intellectual" owes its present-day connotation to the Dreyfus Affair. The Dreyfus intellectuals defended universal and abstract values such as justice and the rights of men against the claims of the state and the social order. If ever a group of intellectuals engaged in a politics of conscience and enlightened discourse in 19th-century France, it was these people.

LET ME CONCLUDE by saying that Sennett's is among the most stimulating and thought-provoking works in social history that I have read in recent years. I find his thesis a powerful antedote to the sentimentalism of works in the Berman tradition. The more the pity, then, that instead of painting a full portrait, warts and all, Sennett has only a *pièce à thèse* so one-sided that it fairly cries out for correctives. Would that the author devoted his energies in the next few years to bring forth a panoramic vision of the eclipse of the public scene that takes account of the many contradictions and ambiguities that mark human history. He might then have to admit that the wearing of masks is still quite prevalent even in our days.

P.S. The work unfortunately is marred by a number of inaccuracies and plain errors of fact. For example, the German sociologist Helmut Plessner, who was born in 1892, began publishing in the '20s, and taught at Goettingen after World War II, is here described as a "younger member of the Frankfurt School"—with which he had no connections. Max Weber is said to have started working on his *Economy and Society* during a period in which he suffered from a mental breakdown and was incapable of any sustained intellectual activity, etc. Isn't careful checking of factual information a part of the civility with which authors are supposed to treat readers? □

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. —THE EDITORS

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Joseph Clark

In World War Two

ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL — 1939-1941: THE PARTNERSHIP THAT SAVED THE WEST, by Joseph P. Lash. New York: W. W. Norton. 528 pp. $12.95.

For some time, especially during the baleful years of the Vietnam War, there seemed to be little interest in, and less knowledge of, recent history. I remember an "alternate commencement" at the University of Chicago in 1968 where Noam Chomsky found a perfect analogy—America's war against Japan in World War II and the Vietnam War.

Since there is both continuity and discontinuity in American policy, we're fortunate to have Lash's *Roosevelt and Churchill*, which presents a comprehensive record of events based on the major ingredient of the historian's trade—the primary source. Despite his own predilections and aversions, he strives, with a great measure of success, to evaluate what happened as it happened. An admirer of both Roosevelt and Churchill in the fateful years 1939-41, Lash doesn't hesitate to describe their failures and, when either of them dissembled, to relate how they lied.

A presentation of the record as it happened does not have to be a tiresome recital of events; in this volume we have a drama-packed moment of history depicted with all the color and suspense of the years when Hitler (and Tojo) created an acute danger of totalitarian domination of all the world. In his introduction Lash tells how his approach evolved. The usurpation of power represented by Vietnam and Watergate directed attention to the "imperial presidency." On a television program in 1971 Lash was asked what the difference was between the presidential usurpations of power that took us into the Vietnam War and "Roosevelt's road to Pearl Harbor." His answer was that the threat of Hitlerism vindicated the course taken by Roosevelt. But as he "examined Roosevelt's conduct before Pearl Harbor more closely," Lash writes, "I realized I had done him an injustice—that at no point did he move without having public opinion with him and that a central feature of his greatness was his ability to mobilize public opinion to get from Congress the action that he deemed necessary."

IN THE PERIOD Lash chronicles there is more than the usual quota of history's diverting and disturbing examples of paradox. Here was the quintessential imperialist—Winston Churchill. Here was the patrician, often jingoist politician, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And here they become the saviors of democracy, effectively barring the way to the tripartite alliance of dictators that had taken over Europe, much of China and Southeast Asia, part of Africa, and was on the way to conquest of the world. Finally, a byproduct of the victory over the totalitarian axis was the liberation of the British colonial empire along with the freeing of the Dutch, French, and most remaining colonies.

Some of the beliefs that Roosevelt acquired in his jingo period were useful in later days when a just cause required a big navy, a draft, and huge armaments. In World War I Josephus Daniels, secretary of the Navy, was anti-imperialist and reminded the country that "an American tradition . . . more important than any naval heritage [was] 'the supremacy of the civil over the military authority.'" Roosevelt, on the other hand, as Lash points out, exhorted the country, after the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, "to trust the judgment of the real experts, the naval officers. Let us insist that Congress shall carry out their recommendations." Roosevelt advocated intervention in Mexico, "to clean up the Mexican political mess." But then it was Roosevelt in World War II who formulated the Four Freedoms and, with Churchill, proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, calling for self-determination for all people.

Perhaps the biggest paradox is that World War I, fought for conquest, domination, and territorial aggrandizement by both sides, paved the way for World War II, in which one side waged a struggle for freedom against totalitarian enslavement. But possibly a bigger paradox is Churchill himself, who opposed Russia's provisional democracy in 1917 because his real sympathies were with Nicholas II but strove mightily for an alliance with Stalin's Russia from 1938 on. The night before the Nazi invasion of Russia, June 21, 1941 (an invasion of which Roosevelt and Churchill had given Stalin

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accurate advance intelligence), Churchill said: "Hitler was counting on enlisting capitalist and right-wing sympathizers in this country and the U.S.A. . . . Hitler was, however, wrong and we should go all out to help Russia."

And what strange sharing of beds there was in the years when appeasement of Hitlerism and America Firsters were deterring the mobilization of this country. During the 1940 campaign, the doughty leader of the coal miners, John L. Lewis, made some sort of history when he broadcast for "Democrats for Willkie," a Republican front. But the laundered money that paid for that broadcast, Lash reveals, "came from the conspiratorial oilman William Rhodes Davis, who had floated the Göring peace feelers in October 1939." When the lend-lease bill was up in Congress, opposition was led by Colonel Lindbergh, Father Coughlin, Herbert Hoover, Joseph Kennedy, General Wood, and Norman Thomas. Then, as Roosevelt put it in one of his 1940 campaign broadcasts, "something evil is happening in this country when a full-page advertisement against this Administration, paid for by Republican supporters, appears—where, of all places? in the *Daily Worker*, the newspaper of the Communist Party." When the German armies were nearing Paris, an "interview" was composed for Karl von Wiegand, chief foreign correspondent of the superpatriotic Hearst newspapers, by the German foreign office, as Hitler's interpreter, Dr. Paul K. Schmidt, disclosed after the war. Hearst headlines proclaimed British and American fears as stupid, and affirmed Hitler's peaceful intentions.

DOGMAS AND ORTHODOXIES are not very helpful in explaining World War II. The rise of an aggressive totalitarianism in conditions of an advanced and modern industrial system determined the character of World War II. Such a threat created a worldwide issue and a dominant worldwide necessity—the military destruction of the Axis regimes.

Finally, there was the paradox that one of the two major totalitarian nations, the Soviet Union, was allied with the democracies, while the other, Nazi Germany, was responsible for mankind's peril. This alignment was determined by Nazi Germany, not at all by the Soviet Union. The record shows that virulent as was Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler in the '30s, it was surpassed in malignancy by Stalin's appeasement of Hitler, from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939 until the moment when Hitler launched his legions against the Soviet Union. To the credit of Roosevelt and Churchill they knew that victory over the Axis dictated an alliance with Stalin. But they were too often oblivious to the opportunities that arose from the alliance to meliorate the future threats of Soviet conquest and domination of a dozen nations.

Both Lord Beaverbrook and Averill Harriman, in the initial negotiations to bring aid to Russia, muffed the opportunity to assert the rights of Poland, and for that matter to establish the equal role of the democracies in the common struggle. Lash describes how, when the Western powers were offering aid to Russia, Stalin was demonstrating that even under conditions of a life-and-death struggle the Soviets would remain a closed system. From the outset, too, it was clear that Stalin would alternate lavish demonstrations of friendship with arrogant and brutal disdain for his allies. Lash cites British military leader Major General H. L. Ismay, who wondered "whether we were right when confronted with that kind of behavior to turn the other cheek as we persistently did throughout the war." Ismay affirms that it was right to give Russia all it needed to fight the Nazis and that the Red Army was making good use of allied material. But he questioned the right of Stalin to bully his partners. Ismay would have said to Stalin: "If you persist in your attitude of taking everything and conceding nothing in return, we will leave you to deal with your recent friend, Hitler, as best you can." Did that create the risk of Russia actually coming to terms with Germany? This was out of the question after Operation Barbarossa, Ismay says. "Stalin was a realist," Ismay emphasizes, "and knew perfectly well that the only alternatives open to the Russians were either to keep on fighting for their lives or to become slaves of Hitler."

A valuable aspect of the Lash book is his detailed and persuasive examination of how the accretion of presidential power in the period before Pearl Harbor, and the growing aid given to Britain, were entered upon only on the basis of a patient, gradual process of education. Roosevelt did not fool the people, he enlisted their massive support for the struggle against Hitlerism. Lash sums up the role of the two protagonists of the book in his discussion of the early exchanges between them:

> Without Churchill, Britain might have gone the way of France and, despairing of the United States, solicited a

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compromise peace with Hitler. Without Roosevelt, the United States might have pursued a "fortress America" policy, leaving the totalitarians free to destroy England and to consolidate their positions on the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. What emerges . . . is that among their respective associates Churchill and Roosevelt had the broadest vision and the bravest hearts. Therein lay their greatness. □

Henry Pachter

The Conspiracy of the Generals

THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE 1933-1945, by Peter Hoffmann. Cambridge: MIT Press. 846 pp. $19.95.

The title of this massive volume is a misnomer, and the claim of the jacket, that this is the "essential, surely final handbook on the subject" is unjustified. The author tells the story of the conservative-military conspiracy that collapsed with an abortive attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, and the subsequent massacre of the German nobility. But he is almost totally silent about the underground work of the labor movement that preceded the officers' revolt. Although it was not successful either, this earlier resistance can claim that it did not wait to denounce Hitler until defeat stared Germany in the face, and it was not conducted by people who had first served Hitler as price commissars, staff officers, financial advisers, and ideologists.

I am not denying that the conspirators of 1944 were idealists in their own way, or that their motivations were honest. But there are some confusing facts: Claus von Stauffenberg, who carried the bomb into Hitler's bunker, had marched with the Nazi flag at a time when his officer's oath pledged him to defend the flag of the Republic. The intellectual leader of the conspiracy, Carl Goerdeler, had resigned from his post as mayor of Leipzig when the Storm Troopers removed a statue of Felix Mendelssohn from a public square; nevertheless, after Hitler's bloody coup of June 30, 1934 (the so-called Roehm revolt), Goerdeler accepted the post of price commissar.

The officers and diplomats who had helped Hitler to prepare his war were honestly amazed and shaken when they found out that he actually wanted the war. Which only shows that these people were naive and blind: had they not participated in the militarization of German life and thought, in the systematic brain-washing of the German people during Hitler's "peaceful" conquests? Since Professor Hoffmann cannot explain what turned these former supporters of Hitler into enemies, he also cannot explain why their coup had to fail. He does not even try. Of the 846 pages, not one analyzes the conspiracy's failure. Instead, we learn about a thousand little malfunctions—telephones that worked for Goebbels but not for the conspirators, a general who could not keep a promise, etc. But the basic question, why Mussolini could be arrested without resistance while Hitler's generals would not break the oath they had sworn to a murderer, this question is not discussed.

Nor has this important problem been discussed in the vast German literature (Hoffmann's bibliography takes up 20 pages) on the myth of the 20th of July. According to this myth, the officers who tried to get rid of Hitler saved the honor of the German people. In a certain sense that is true: they proved that at least not every German was prepared to march and die with Hitler. But they also proved something else: there was nothing but a conspiracy, there was no popular movement, no revolution, no mass desertion. What there was must be characterized as an attempt to save as much as possible, not of honor but of territory.

Goerdeler and others tried to make a deal with Alan Dulles's office in Zurich: if we give you Hitler, will you let us keep the frontiers of 1939 and 1914 (yes, including the Sudeten area torn from Czechoslovakia at Munich, and Alsace Lorraine, with South Tyrol and other pieces of geography thrown in)?

SOME AMERICAN AUTHORS have raised the question of the social base and the political nature of the conspirators, but Hoffmann has decided not to

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include any of them in his bibliography. Not even a trace of the real problem is allowed to transpire. When the first German book on the Resistance appeared, George Romoser and the present reviewer took its author, Hans Rothfels, to task for the same omissions: lack of reference to the workers' opposition, and lack of deeper analysis of the conspiracy. At the time, Rothfels answered in a respected German magazine; that was 15 years ago, but Hoffmann's "final handbook" contains no reference to that debate. The bibliography lists Rothfels's answer but neither my article that had provoked it, nor Romoser's critique.

Hoffmann does not seem to know the names of any of the underground papers that were distributed by the workers' parties, not to speak of the organizations or the persons responsible. He does not know SAP, ISK, Trotskyists. Of the group New Beginning he knows its sectarian and totally inactive branch but not those who became effective after the split: Paul Hagen (Karl Frank), Sering (Richard Lowenthal), Neureither (Franz Borkenau). Of Willy Brandt he only gives the incorrect report that he fought in Spain, and of Fritz Erler he makes no mention at all.

Still less satisfactory is the treatment of the tenuous connections that did exist between the conspirators and the labor movement. Leber, a former minister of the Interior whom Hoffmann insists on calling "an ultrasocialist," was co-opted by Goerdeler on a personal basis, and though he can hardly have believed in the hair-raising utopias that the conspirators dreamed up at their meetings, he played along with another of their favorite games—distributing cabinet posts. Once he and trade union secretary Leuschner were arrested, the conspiracy had no labor contact. For once Professor Hoffmann's mind is blank through no fault of his own; there was nothing to report, and this, it seems to me, is the basic reason for the conspiracy's failure. It had no roots; it was the desperate last resort of people whom Hitler had uprooted. Their traditions would not have been able to give Germany a new future; their plans, lovingly outlined and preserved for posterity by Rothfels and Hoffmann, would have led Germany back into the past, not just before the Republic but even before the 19th century. □

The Vladimir Medem Book Committee

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TO THE READERS OF DISSENT:

- I can think of no better way to introduce this appeal than to cite the words of B. Charney Vladeck. In his eulogy at the funeral of Vladimir Medem, Vladeck, leader of the Jewish Labor Bund, declared: "He was a man. He was a personality. He was a world. Much—very much—will yet be written about him here and abroad. His own memoirs are a worthy memorial to his activity."
- It is these classic memoirs of the spokesman for the Jewish workers in Russia, Poland, and all too briefly in America, which now have been translated into English. Our committee is raising the funds for their swift publication. *We are asking your help.*
- An invaluable primary source on the Jewish and Russian revolutionary movements, the memoirs of Medem also provide penetrating characterizations—based upon first-hand contact—of a score of prominent historical figures, among them Lenin, Martov, Plekhanov, Luxemburg, Trotsky, Jaurés, Weizmann.
- The memoirs depict Medem's central role in the shaping of the national program of the Bund; and through Medem, they brilliantly convey the democratic ethos of this singular socialist movement, coupled with its strong personalist and ethical character.
- Ably translated by Professor Samuel Portnoy, of the Department of History at Florida Atlantic University, the memoirs will come to over 500 pages and are being published by KTAV.
- Can we count on your early and generous contribution? (Pre-publication subscriptions for single copies are being made available at $10.) Checks should be sent to the committee at the above address.

Fraternally,
Harold Ostroff, Chairman

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LETTERS

The Steel Union Election

Editors:

William Kornblum, writing in the spring *Dissent* on "Why the Insurgents Lost in Steel," offers some, but by no means all, the reasons why Lloyd McBride soundly defeated Ed Sadlowski in the Steelworkers' union election. As one who was associated with the McBride campaign, perhaps I can offer a few additional observations.

Kornblum suggests that the Sadlowski defeat hinged on poor showings in just three areas: Quebec, Texas, and "the Pittsburgh region." But it was a good deal more than that.

McBride's plurality, according to the official report of the tellers, was about 79,000 votes. Some 39,000 of the margin came from all of Canada. Thus the Steelworkers in Quebec contributed only about half the Canadian plurality for the winning slate. It is no particular surprise that Sadlowski did poorly in Canada. Lynn Williams, the director of the big central Canadian district—not the union's Canadian national director, as Kornblum stated—and a leading figure in the Canadian labor movement, could have been expected to give strength to the McBride slate north of the border. He did.

McBride did well, in addition, throughout the southern states—not just in Texas alone. There was very little about Sadlowski's campaign oratory or his rather astounding interview in *Penthouse* that would seem calculated to win support from Sunbelt workers.

It is not altogether surprising that Sadlowski fared so poorly in the basic steel mills where he and his supporters thought they had maximum strength. Throughout the campaign he appeared unable to get a steady focus on his criticism of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement between the union and the basic steel companies. At times he criticized that agreement—which substitutes arbitration for the strike method—because he said it imperiled the right to strike; at other times, his principal complaint was that it failed to provide for rank-and-file ratification procedures; and at still other times he suggested that employees of the basic steel companies would have had much greater rewards if ENA were abandoned and the strike weapon were available to them.

Some of these arguments may have appealed to romantic observers of the labor relations scene who, as part of the current nostalgia craze, long for the heroic "proletarian" struggles of the 1930s; but to steelworkers who have the union to thank for wage levels that bring their annual income in large numbers of cases to well over the $20,000-a-year level, the memories of 50¢-an-hour average wages in the depression years were less appealing.

The Experimental Negotiating Agreement does indeed put the strike method on the shelf, but for clearly defined periods of time; to steelworkers, however, who have vivid memories during the last 15 years of tremendous stockpiling before contract expirations, followed by long postagreement periods of unemployment while the stockpile was depleted, the ENA offers obvious advantages. Furthermore, in a union where only about 40 percent of the members voted in the election, despite urgent efforts by both teams of candidates, the issue of ratification voting obviously did not cut very deep. Finally, the extremely impressive advances in basic pay and benefits negotiated by President I. W. Abel, who retired on June 1, appeared as an indication to the union voters that ENA could not be as totally evil as Sadlowski tried to paint it.

The principal functional purpose of a union is to win economic progress and protection for its members. Sadlowski's effort to suggest that the Steelworkers under Abel had failed to do so, and that McBride would be no more productive, clearly could not fly. One can offer various theories as to why 60 percent of the union's members failed, or declined, to vote in the union referendum election. Yet one conclusion seems obvious: if dissatisfaction were bitter and widespread, more union voters might have cast their ballots. The nonvoters, it can be argued, were casting a tacit endorsement, for whatever reason, of the union's record and of its administration's probable future track record.

While Kornblum derides the union leadership's concern about pro-Sadlowski efforts of Joseph Rauh, Victor Reuther, and John Kenneth Galbraith, it is clear that they did have a considerable impact on the media. It was reflected in the large number of articles and television programs that enthusiastically reported how a Sadlowski victory would "turn around" both the union and the entire AFL-CIO into militant progressivism. In contrast, few reporters—except some of the more experienced observers of the labor scene—took notice of the somewhat less than brilliant record that Sadlowski had compiled in his very few years as director of the Chicago-northern Indiana district.

Messrs. Rauh, Reuther, and Galbraith constantly demeaned I. W. Abel—seeking to cast him in an image about half-way between those of Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa. Ralph Nader, whose credentials as an experienced observer of the trade union scene are exceedingly thin, joined in the attack on the union leadership. Mr. Rauh and Mr. Reuther, in a soaring flight of fancy, agreed that Ed Sadlowski reminded them greatly of the Walter Reuther of "30 years ago." Many others, including

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leaders of the United Automobile Workers, found the comparison overdrawn and ridiculous.

What does the Steelworkers' election show? Traditionally, any "opposition" candidate for national office in the union seems able to pick up about 30 percent of the vote. Sadlowski did a little better. On the basis of his record and the fuzzy nature of his platform, it is well—for the union, the labor movement, and the country—that he did not achieve a larger vote.

The new administration in the Steelworkers has brains, experience, integrity, and considerable imagination. Whether, as Kornblum suggests, the "insurgent" movement will flourish in the years ahead will be determined largely by the success, or lack of it, in the McBride Administration. On their record, the McBride group's future looks good.

HENRY C. FLEISHER
Silver Spring, Md.

More on Union Elections

Editors:

William Kornblum's article, "Why the Insurgents Lost in the Steel Union," raises many issues, to one of which I would like to respond. I refer to the way in which he handled the issue of the solicitation of funds by and from persons who were not members of the union. Mr. Kornblum's position was stated as follows:

> . . . I. W. Abel and George Meany made much of Sadlowski's solicitation of non-Steelworker funds. Such Meany followers as Albert Shanker also castigated Sadlowski for accepting financial help from "outsiders." Victor Reuther, Joseph Rauh, J. K. Galbraith, and Arthur Schlesinger—all of whom signed fund-raising letters for the Sadlowski side—have come under special attack by Meany, Shanker, and others. . . . Those named as "outsiders" are strenuously defending their rights to support the candidate of their choice in this important election. After all, Abel and his staff, along with other AFL-CIO officials, indeed made no secret of their opposition to the McGovern candidacy in 1972, and their massive financial support for the Jackson presidential campaign is public record. As it turned out, the Sadlowski campaign could barely afford to keep its Steelworker volunteers supplied with leaflets. . . .

Kornblum sees no distinction between the involvement of those who are eligible voters in an election contest and those who are not. Many labor leaders were delegate candidates to the Democratic National Convention. In the delegate elections, prospective candidates ran as supporters of one or another presidential aspirant, in accordance with legal requirements. Consequently, those labor leaders could be included in the convention electorate. Certainly, *qua* citizens, they were all included in the electorate in the general election the following November. However, Rauh, Galbraith, Schlesinger, and Reuther were not members of the Steelworkers' union and, as such, could not by law be part of that electorate. Kornblum does not see the potential dangers involved in the position he is defending.

If outsiders can use their influence and financial resources, it would be possible and justifiable for a group of wealthy New England racists, for example, to get involved in a Georgia election in an effort to defeat a Julian Bond or an Andrew Young. The principle that justifies the "good guys" according to Kornblum's perceptions becoming involved in an election where they are not part of the electorate would also permit the "bad guys" to do likewise in another contest.

Who is involved is not the issue, nor is the fact that the involvement by outsiders in Steel was not successful in raising huge sums of money pertinent to the principle at issue. The involvement hypothesized above relative to a possible Georgia election might raise considerable sums and accomplish its purpose.

Note that when numerous unions and church groups wanted to affect corporate policy and/or elections in the J. P. Stevens situation they bought blocks of shares in order to become part of the electorate. Likewise, Jewish and non-Jewish organizations interested in effectuating a change in corporate policy relative to the Arab boycott bought stock in order to become part of the electorate of the corporate structure. Beyond that, the latter groups can also, *qua* citizens, lobby in Congress for appropriate legislation to accomplish their goals. . . .

The issue is hardly the success or failure of a fund-raising drive, nor is it the social aim of a particular election, whether in government, the unions, professional organizations, fraternal societies, etc. The basic issue is that those who are not part of a particular electorate should endeavor to become part of that electorate, if possible, or to modify legislation to accomplish their purpose—or stay out of the campaign. To do otherwise is to intrude on generally accepted principles of democracy and law that have stood us in good stead these many years. To do otherwise is to run the risk of granting to monied interests outside of a particular electorate a disproportionate voice in the election outcome. Such a policy would run counter to the recent trend to place limitations on contributions in the general political arena and in the intent of such legislation as Landrum-Griffin, which mandates that political caucuses within unions raise funds from the caucus membership in election campaigns.

JULES KOLODNY
New York City

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WILLIAM KORNBLUM Replies:

I began my brief analysis of the Sadlowski-McBride election by saying that "months, even years will pass before the dust settles over the issues raised by the Steelworkers' 1977 International Union election." The comments by Jules Kolodny and Henry Fleisher are proof that at least in this prediction I was correct.

In the long run I might agree with Jules Kolodny's position that we should attempt to become part of an electorate we seek to influence. Indeed, in the socialist society of the future, I am sure there will be many more ways than now exist for all of us to work for the improvement of our lives as working people. In the meantime the influence over the affairs of the Steelworkers will continue to be monopolized by a small group of corporate managers and an equally small group of union leaders.

The procedures established in the Sadlowski-McBride campaign adhere closely to this pattern. The bulk of funding for the McBride slate came from contributions paid by union staff members. By the formalism of Mr. Kolodny's logic, these are legitimate gifts, since the staff men are also union members. But I would feel differently if over 75 percent of the McBride funds came from rank-and-file union members, who do not feel threatened about any staff positions.

Kolodny's faith in the sincerity of the incumbent Steelworker leadership should be commended. He does seem to believe that their use of the "outsider" issue was more than self-serving campaign rhetoric. I am far from convinced that he is right. After all, in the record of depositions gathered during the U.S. Department of Labor investigation of the 1973 USWA election in District 31, Joseph Rauh reminded I. W. Abel that he had contributed to Abel's 1964 campaign against David McDonald. Abel's response then was to thank Rauh for his contribution.

Henry Fleisher does not raise here the issue of "outside" influence in his comments. Over the years the public relations firm in which he is a partner has done a good deal of business with the USWA. But Fleisher's association with the campaign as a strategist and media adviser was that of a private citizen and friend of the candidates. So be it. The Sadlowski side also involved a number of their friends in the campaign; I am proud to be numbered among them.

The insurgent candidates expected losses in the South and in Canada. They hoped to do well enough there, however, to protect victories scored in the major industrial corridor of the Great Lakes basin. Yet, the terribly skewed results from Texas and Quebec made this virtually impossible. For example, Quebec's approximately 50,000 Steelworkers represent 20 percent of Canada's USWA membership, but their votes accounted for 50 percent of McBride's margin in that country. I suggest that Fleisher compare notes with Quebec Director Jean Gerin-Lajoie before attributing this degree of strength to Lynn Williams's role in the campaign.

As for the ENA and Sadlowski's criticism of it, I think Fleisher is incorrect in thinking the insurgents' criticism amounted to a failure of focus. An alternative position is that all of the criticisms are valid and deserved mention.

A point we probably could agree on concerns the voting behavior of Steelworkers who make more than $20,000 a year. Certainly, this minority of basic steel employees may have been less likely to vote for the insurgents than was the vast majority of workers whose incomes, even with killing amounts of overtime, does not approach that magic figure. Still, it is important to remember that the insurgents won handily in basic steel. The poor showing in the basic steel mills to which Mr. Fleisher refers is in fact a victory margin for the insurgents of about 60 to 40, rather than the 2 to 1 cushion that had been hoped for.

Mr. Fleisher's crystal ball tells him that the 60 percent of the union members who did not vote are content and were probably casting a "tacit endorsement" for the union's record. I hope for the good of Steelworkers in this country and in Canada that the McBride leadership does not believe this foolish assertion.

In most democratic electoral systems, a voter turnout of less than 45 percent is a sign of legitimacy problems, an erosion of the belief in the right of the leaders to exercise power in the name of the members. If anything, the incumbent officials in the union have the Sadlowski insurgents to thank for breathing some life into a dormant democratic structure. Wherever the insurgents were able to campaign, the turnouts were much better than average. Wherever there were traditions of local-level democratic competition, the insurgents generally won.

During the long campaign, I noticed that a number of platform planks that had previously been proposed by the insurgents had begun to appear in McBride literature. This was one sign that the insurgency was having a positive effect. Another issue that interested me a good deal was the promise of "due process" on the job, the guarantee for workers to retain their rights as citizens during disciplinary actions. The McBride campaign began supporting this position at the time of the union's Las Vegas convention.

Many of us wondered where this position fell out during the union's recent negotiations with the basic steel corporations. There was no mention of it in reports of contract talks, and it does not appear anywhere in the new contract language.

Perhaps this failure to press aggressively for so important a reform of *status quo* labor-management relations is one reason the basic steel local union presidents first voted 148 to 143 not to ratify the 1977 Agreement. This initial vote, taken before arm-twisting could reverse it, was also a no-confidence vote for the ENA. In any case, failures like this leave me less than sanguine over the future of democracy and justice for Steelworkers. □

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Boris Souvarine

Solzhenitsyn and Lenin

We don't know whether this article will be of interest to all our readers, but those who care about 20th-century history, and especially the history of radicalism, will surely find absorbing this detailed criticism of the scholarship and sources behind Solzhenitsyn's recent book on Lenin. Boris Souvarine is a man uniquely qualified to write such a criticism. One of the early founders of the French Communist party in the years after World War I, Souvarine knew well the leading figures of Bolshevism, including Lenin. Breaking some years later from the Communist movement, Souvarine became a distinguished historian, most notably in his pioneering biography of Stalin. His scholarly-intellectual criticism here is all the more noteworthy in that, politically, he has for many years been an opponent of Leninism. It is our hope to send this article (which first appeared in the French magazine Est-Ouest, *and is here somewhat abbreviated) to Solzhenitsyn with an invitation to comment.* —Eds.

Solzhenitsyn's most recent book, *Lenin in Zurich,** is presented as one that will enrich the great historical fresco begun with his *August 1914.* Although the author calls his current work a novel, he is careful to affirm its historicity by citing his sources. It must be said that they are not too adequate. They include: four volumes from Lenin's *Collected Works;* eight official German documents taken from Werner Hahlweg's *Lenin's Rückkehr nach Russland, 1917* (Leiden, 1957), which includes 100 documents; the biography of the Russo-German Social Democrat Alexander Parvus, by Z. A. B. Zeman and W. B. Scharlau *(The Merchant of Revolution,* New York, 1965); the partly mediocre, partly misleading book by Fritz N. Platten, Jr., about his father's trip across Germany with Lenin, in 1917; last, and hardly deserving of mention, a book by Willi Gautschi that derives from the above books and adds only malicious insinuations.

Solzhenitsyn further underlines the historical nature of his book by expressing his "gratitude" to the above-named authors

> for their close attention to events which determined the course of the twentieth century, but which have been carefully concealed from history and which, because of the direction taken by the development of the West, have received little attention.

His insistence on the historicity of his narrative and on the contribution of historians to its content is an explicit invitation for the book to be considered from the point of view of historical criticism, independently of a literary appraisal. Even without such an invitation, historical evaluation would have been inevitable since *Lenin in Zurich* deals with a 20th-century man whose stature dominates our era. . . .

Solzhenitsyn errs when he speaks of events that "have been carefully concealed" and have "received little attention." About Lenin's stay in Switzerland prior to his traveling across a Germany at war, and about his relations with German officials, an enormous body of writing has been produced over more than half a century. . . . From 1917 on, torrents of "exposés," denunciations, and accusations have passed Lenin off as an agent of the Kaiser, a German spy, a traitor who was shipped back to Russia in a "sealed" railway carriage so that he might betray his country in behalf of German

*Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New York: 1976; translated by H.T. Willetts.

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imperialism. There are numerous variations in detail: sometimes we are told that the entire train was sealed; sometimes it was an armored train; one important version introduces a "parlor car." The amount of German gold allegedly involved ranges from X to X tenfold. . . .

Even after 50 years, new contributions continually enrich this already superabundant bibliography. In the March 1974 issue of *Encounter,* Joel Carmichael accepts all the inaccuracies of his predecessors and adds a few of his own ("German Money and Bolshevik Honour"); he goes so far as to involve Trotsky, who had absolutely nothing to do with the affair. In *Novy Journal* (No. 115, 1974), Roman Goul paraphrases everything said previously by Melgunov, David Shub, Kerensky, George Katkov, and other respectable but not infallible Lenin haters, whose judgment is clouded by passion. . . . Contrary to what Solzhenitsyn says, nothing has been "carefully concealed"; everything has been done to attract attention.

It is to the point that the term "sealed" railway carriage long ago entered the vocabulary of people who have dealt with this controversial matter. Churchill adopted it in his memoirs, and even Trotsky did so in his memoirs (but in quotation marks). . . . Only recently (October 16, 1975), the Paris weekly *Pensée russe* evoked the "sealed" carriage in a eulogistic report on Solzhenitsyn's book. And in the book itself we read that at one moment Lenin dreamed of securing a sealed carriage in which to return to Russia via England and France (Russian edition, p. 227). No one knows why "sealed" has acquired a special and pejorative sense that is diametrically opposed to its real meaning (see below).

In his own, original way, Solzhenitsyn has added his contribution to the already long list of works that are more or less historical, more or less tendentious and contradictory, with hypotheses that never take the place of proofs. Of course, he by no means subscribes to everything said by the writers cited above. Had he done so, he would not be Solzhenitsyn. Yet his allusions and suggestions, perhaps unbeknown to him, do connect him with the aforementioned authors—something one could not fully appreciate from a mere abstract of such extensive materials. Furthermore, trite as they are, the references he offers to support the historical soundness of his account impress uninformed readers—which is to say most people. So, it is worthwhile to examine this documentation.

Solzhenitsyn's merits are exceptional and brilliant, his witnessing to the Soviet regime is unforgettable, his literary talent has won the admiration of every cultivated Russian; it is he who has caused to be heard beyond the frontiers of his native land the memorable cry of the conscience of a great people that has been tortured and martyrized: "Not to live in falsehood!" In homage both to his person and to his work, one owes him the truth also. *Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.*

The references to Lenin's "choice of words, his way of thinking and acting" do not have the conclusive value that Solzhenitsyn believes they have. In the 55-volume edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (still incomplete), one finds everything—and its opposite. In 1926 [the Russian Marxist scholar] David Riazanov said to me, "Emile Pouget once put together a brochure entitled 'Variations guesdistes.' We could compile another, made up of Leninist variations." The Russian philosopher G. S. Pomerants wrote, in a letter published in *Polititcheski Dnevnik* (Vol. 2, Amsterdam, 1975):

> The essence of the problem does not lie in the source of the quotation but in the degree of awareness of the person who chooses the quotation. One can select a quotation from the Bible to justify the Inquisition. One can select a quotation from Lenin to justify an anti-Soviet war.

A just observation, and one that applies also to *Lenin in Zurich.*

There are quotations and quotations: one's choice is conditioned by time, place, and circumstances. Lenin, for example, committed a flagrant misconstruction in quoting a phrase of Marx about religion: "opium of the people." During the 1840s, opium was esteemed as a *beneficial* medication. Marx, talking about human poverty, cast his thought in the mold of a phrase of Balzac's: "The lottery was the opium of the people"—that is to say, a tranquilizing drug. Lenin construed Marx's opium as a harmful drug. Almost no one had read what Marx actually said about "the opium of the people" in his "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law." Lenin's misreading has circled the globe; parrots repeat it. A further example: Lenin quoted Marx to justify the Soviet regime identified as "the dictatorship of the proletariat," whereas by this phrase Marx meant

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"political hegemony" resulting from "universal suffrage"—which has nothing to do with the monopoly of one party, the omnipotence of an "oligarchy," an inquisitorial G.P.U., and a Gulag Archipelago. . . .

Lenin did rail against his closest comrades, but sometimes he also praised them. He advocated democracy and then abolished every vestige of democracy. He extolled the Constituent Assembly and mercilessly dissolved it. He was against the soviets, for the soviets, then once again against the soviets, and finally for the soviets—but altering them in order to tame them. He had promised "the peaceful competition of parties within the bosom of the soviets" and then suppressed all parties, including his own. He postulated the extinction of the state and the suppression of the police, army, and bureaucracy; he created the most monstrous military-police-bureaucratic state that history has known. All this Solzhenitsyn knows, yet he relies on four volumes from a collection of 55; that alone dissuades one from following him step by step, opposing quotations to those he has chosen, for it would mean writing another book.

One observation that may strike the reader as surprising must be made at the outset: Solzhenitsyn is the victim of the tendentious and more often than not deceptive Communist historiography with which he has provisioned himself, no doubt by consulting the copious glosses that accompany the works of Lenin. This is particularly apparent in connection with the Zimmerwald Conference, at which, according to the novelist, ". . . the Zimmerwald left had emerged as a new wing of the international movement, and Lenin was no longer a mere Russian sectarian but its chief," adding that "the hero of the conference, in newspapers throughout the world, was [Robert] Grimm"; earlier, he attributes the conference's convocation to Grimm. All this is inexact. In fact, the initiative belonged to the Italian Socialist party, and the preliminary steps were taken by its emissary, Oddino Morgari, in Paris and in London, as well as in Switzerland.

Assuredly, Grimm was able to carry out extensive pacifist activities, thanks to his country's geographical position and political neutrality, and with the effective help of Angelica Balabanoff, who worked with him as the representative of the Italian Socialists (and who had the advantage of speaking five or six languages). Prior to the April 1915 International Conference of Socialist Women in Bern and a conference of pacifist youth that followed it—at both of which Lenin resorted to spokesmen to win a hearing for his discordant message, to which no one on the outside was listening—an Italian-Swiss colloquy had taken place in Lugano. This was the prelude to Zimmerwald. The work Grimm began subsequently was carried out under the aegis and with the constant collaboration of the Italians. Solzhenitsyn seems not to be aware of this.

Our novelist should have read the very sincere and truthful little book by Angelica Balabanoff, *Iz litchnykh vospominani Tsimmerwaldtsa* (Leningrad, 1925), to get an accurate idea of the conference, and also to be convinced that "the Zimmerwald left" enjoyed no importance for any length of time. (This book, by the former secretary of the Communist International, appeared in 1925, when the Lenin personality cult was already in full flower, although not yet as false as it was to become.) No one then assigned any importance to the so-called left, which went unnoticed before the Russian Revolution. The few followers Lenin had at the time of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences represented only themselves. In France especially, it was even thought that Lenin was some sort of Tolstoyan who on principle opposed all war. (Cf. Lenin's "Open Letter to B. Souvarine.") When it became known that he advocated civil war—whereas on the whole the Zimmerwaldians were militating for peace, not for war, civil or other—Lenin was considered a utopian or irresponsible except by his handful of partisans.

Solzhenitsyn's allusions to and evocations of the 1905 Revolution are equally contrary to historical truth. Influenced by *The Merchant of Revolution,* by Zeman and Scharlau, the novelist makes Alexander Parvus out to be "the Father of the First Revolution," and puts some extravagant statements into his mouth. For example, Japanese money allegedly was received by the Bolsheviks and supposedly sparked the mutiny of the sailors aboard the battleship Potemkin. Adequate refutation of statements such as these would entail a critique of Zeman's and Scharlau's book, the principal source for this chapter, in which the pseudo-Father of the First Revolution permits himself to mouth lucubrations while asleep on his feet. In a 1968 issue of *Contrat social* (Vol. 12, No. 4), I analyzed the collection of German documents

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Zeman edited as well as the Parvus biography—*The Merchant of Revolution*—he wrote in collaboration with Scharlau. That review required 14 in-quarto pages, and even so was not exhaustive; it would be out of the question to begin all over again here. One must confine oneself to reestablishing the truth on several essential points.

The two authors on whom Solzhenitsyn has relied were unable to avoid the habitual reef for biographers who make their main character the center of the history of his period, and they exaggerated beyond all measure in elevating Parvus to the principal in the 1905 Revolution. Because theirs is the first biography of the theoretician of "the permanent revolution," a man associated with Trotsky for several years, it is worthy of interest insofar as it is based on reliable documentary data; however, it will mislead the relatively uninformed reader insofar as it fills documentary gaps with malicious insinuations, particularly with regard to Lenin. The reality was quite different from what the biography *Merchant* and the biographical novel *Lenin in Zurich* make it appear to be.

The 1905 Revolution was a spontaneous and grandiose phenomenon; it spread throughout the Empire and lasted for more than a year. The Petersburg Soviet, on the other hand, was of regional and ephemeral importance, and had no significance such as that conferred on it retrospectively by the Petrograd Soviet of 1917. It lasted for some 50 days. Its president, Nosar (alias Khrustalev), was an unaffiliated socialist; he was arrested in December, and was succeeded by a quasi-anonymous troika, whose most active member proved to be Trotsky. The troika lasted barely a week. Parvus by no means enjoyed top billing; he was active primarily as a writer, collaborating effectively, as did Trotsky, with the *Russkaya Gazeta* and the Menshevik *Natchalo*. He later wrote the preface to a Trotsky pamphlet that was published in Geneva; how many copies reached Russia and who read them no one can say. In later years, the pamphlet provided a topic for discussion of "the permanent revolution" among theory-smitten social democrats without exercising the slightest influence on the real movement. (Solzhenitsyn gives an excellent six-line summary of it.) Trotsky mentions Parvus just once in his book about the events of 1905, which was written when the two men were very close.

Serge Witte observed later, "As for the Workers' Soviet, I did not attribute so much importance to it. Nor did it deserve much." A debatable opinion, but not negligible—indeed, quite significant. By 1917, Trotsky's prestige was such that in retrospect his brilliance was reflected back onto the ephemeral 1905 Soviet, the memory of which Communist literature enlivened by inflating it. Ten years later, in 1927, Trotsky was in disgrace, and this literature took a sharp turn: there was no more mention of the Trotsky of 1905 except to defame him, and even less of Parvus, who was always passed over in silence until he was resuscitated in Zeman's and Scharlau's biography and now in Solzhenitsyn's novel. It is true that the release of German archives furnished the wherewithal for gossip about this uncommon personality. But all the same, one must know how to read them.

There are documents and documents. Zeman's collection—*Germany and the Revolution in Russia* (London, 1958)—reprints 136, taken from German archives. Hahlweg, as I said above, provides only 100, and Solzhenitsyn contents himself with 8. But the Wilhelmstrasse documents are not the only relevant ones. We have also the *private* letters of Lenin to his family, to [Alexander] Shliapnikov, [Alexandra] Kollontai, Inessa Armand, Jacob Hanecki, Bukharin, Gorky, Radek, and others. These letters are revealing about Lenin's material situation up to the time he left Switzerland: his resources were much reduced after postal connections with Russia were interrupted; he sought paid work for himself and his wife; he was alarmed by rising prices, etc. So every accusation or insinuation about German gold is calumny pure and simple—at least until April 1917. On this score, Solzhenitsyn is irreproachable: he affirms that the Ulyanov couple lived in poverty, that Lenin's parsimony was such that he economized by not buying newspapers (he read them in the public library), etc.

But with Chapter 47 the novel begins to shape up badly. In the course of imaginary and improbable conversations, Lenin, who has rejected Parvus's offers of [German-supplied] money several times, then says to Parvus, speaking of his Polish Socialist comrade Hanecki, "He's yours." It is a particularly flagrant improbability that bodes ill for the chapters to follow.

Hanecki was no boy at the time (he was 35), nor

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was he in any way a subordinate; he was independent, and Lenin was in no position to give him orders; also, Hanecki and Parvus had known each other for a long time. Similarly, in connection with Bukharin, Solzhenitsyn writes: ". . . Lenin forbade his young comrade to associate with the shady Parvus, just as he forbade Shliapnikov to go near the dubious Hanecki." All this is inexact. Lenin could forbid neither Bukharin nor Shliapnikov. He counseled against their having connections with Parvus, which was normal on the part of an older man; he did not forbid. Lenin in Switzerland, the inspiration of "a tiny group, calling itself a party"—Solzhenitsyn *dixit*—was not yet Lenin in the Kremlin.

For that matter, our author constantly mistakes the relationships of Lenin with his partisans. Hanecki was not an intimate; in 1913, Lenin wrote to him, "Esteemed Comrade"—a conventional form of address. In 1914, it was "Dear Friend," for by then Lenin knew Hanecki better and they had done each other small favors. Whereas he writes to Kamenev "Dear Lev Borisovich" and to Safarov "Dear Georgi," the latter being a young man. Similarly, it is not true that Lenin addressed Zinoviev with the familiar pronoun form, *tu*. Apart from members of his family, Lenin addressed no one with the familiar form except occasionally Inessa.

To return to the German documents: George Katkov was the first to note one document that he believed—mistakenly—was decisive, and it is one that shortsighted Leninophobes have made much of: a telegram from von Kühlmann to the Kaiser, dated December 3, 1917—ergo, a month *after* the October coup—in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs claims credit for having financially aided the separatists (nationalists) and the Bolsheviks "through various channels and under different labels" (which is to say, camouflaged assistance given to beneficiaries who were unaware of the source?). He goes on to account thus for the wide distribution of *Pravda*. This tardy report is characteristic of the Foreign Minister, who here boasts after the fact and without proof of having played a part in events, knowing that his sovereign would be unable to verify anything. However, he gives himself away and discredits his story with the detail about *Pravda*. Without any external assistance whatever, the paper had been appearing *since 1912,* albeit intermittently and under various names depending upon confiscations. Its enormous success in 1917 was due to its unbridled propaganda in favor of an immediate peace. Money had nothing to do with it.

Kühlmann can say what he likes. I refuted his "document" *(Contrat social,* January, 1958) shortly after it was made public. At the time, I did not know that Sir Lewis Namier considered Kühlmann a "liar" (*Avenues of History,* London, 1952), but I judged his telegram to be an obvious way for him to push himself forward without risk of contradiction. Another message from the same source, dated September 29, 1917, appears in the collection; it contains a vaguer reference to "the Bolshevik movement," and a more precise and plausible reference to the Finnish and Ukrainian separatists. The "liar" does not dare mention the name of Lenin.

This name does appear 46 times in Zeman's collection, and not once is there any indication of any payment of money. Lenin is variously present and invisible; many people are interested in him, but there is nothing he can do about that and he pays them no mind. People other than Lenin do receive "German gold" (in actuality, paper marks), but what do they do with it? The first beneficiary of secret funds is Parvus, who deserves further attention (see below). The second is an Estonian nationalist and Social Democrat, [Alexander Eduard] Kesküla, who had been an unknown until then. Von Romberg [Baron Gisbert von Romberg], the German ambassador in Bern, says that this astute person "has managed to discover" Lenin's program in the event of a revolution but that the information must be kept very secret so as not to rob it "of its full value." (Report of September 30, 1915.)

To properly appreciate how intelligent and knowledgeable the German diplomat was—and how cheeky the Estonian—one may simply note that Lenin's program had been published in full in the *Social-Démocrate:* a portion of it appeared in the November 1, 1914 issue (No. 30), and the balance in the issue of October 13, 1915 (No. 47). The *Social-Démocrate* was sold at the time for 10 centimes. The publication dates are not definitive because the texts had originally been published in leaflet form. It is difficult to tote up the money Kesküla received for his services in "discovering" these already published documents; there is a matter of 60,000 marks, then a further 70,000, and then monthly payments. And so an investment of

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10 centimes brought a tidy dividend to the resourceful Estonian; for that matter, he could have economized on the 10 centimes since the leaflets were distributed free.

Let it be said in passing, the Romberg report specifies as point 5 of "the program" that Germany shall renounce any annexation of territory and any war indemnity. What obvious proof of connivance with German imperialism! But there is better still to come: to beef up "the program," Kesküla added an invention of his own—an alleged plan of Lenin's to invade India with a Russian army. Idiotic as this is, it did not make Romberg smell a rat; neither did it arouse the suspicions of the Chancellor, to whom the report was addressed, nor of the Lenin-haters, eager to exploit it, nor of Solzhenitsyn. After all, there it is in black and white: "invasion of India by Russian troops" (Point 7). An occasion, surely, on which to quote *Credo quia absurdum!*

Kesküla affirms that he saw Lenin once, in 1914. This signifies nothing since Lenin was an active propagandist and saw many unimportant people. . . . Kesküla also tried without success to compromise Shliapnikov, who later wrote, in *À la veille de 1917* (Moscow, 1923):

> An Estonian by the name of Kesküla presented me with letters of recommendation from the Estonian Social Democratic group in Switzerland, and offered me . . . money, arms, etc . . . .Always on my guard, I made inquiries, which proved that I was dealing here with disguised agents of German imperialism, and I rejected their offer. For that matter, it was a rule with me to refuse categorically every proposition that was in the slightest suspect.

Shliapnikov recalled "the strict instructions" he gave to the Bolshevik group in Stockholm "not to accept money from no matter whom except the Swedish Socialist party." About the slanders concerning the question of money, he wrote: "Since at that time everything was done through me or with my personal participation, the libels were aimed chiefly at myself, and I found them extremely painful. . . ." He gave a few very modest figures relating to Party finances. One must bear in mind that every reference to "German gold" necessarily implicates Shliapnikov, who was an upright man and above suspicion. (*Cf. Bulletin communiste,* Paris, 1924, Nos. 7 and 9.)

One comes upon this Kesküla again in a bizarre book by Michael Futrell, *Northern Underground* (London, 1963), which is to be read with caution and used only with full knowledge of the facts. It would be impossible in a few lines to disentangle what is factually true in it from what is false. The author quotes Kesküla as saying, "Lenin was my protégé. . . . It was I who launched Lenin." Such foolishness gives a clear enough idea of the Estonian charlatan, who goes on to pat himself on the back for having repaid the 300,000 marks the Wilhelmstrasse had advanced him during the war—but doing so in 1923, which, as Futrell observes, was a period of astronomical inflation. (Indeed, at the time a bus ticket cost a million marks.) All of this is making too much of this curious patron of Lenin, but the reason for doing so is the attention Solzhenitsyn pays him. . . .

Lenin was no paragon of morality. He did not claim to be, because for him everything that could serve the revolution was moral. . . . However, he was most careful not to let himself fall into disrepute with the Russian people whom he aspired to raise against the old regime and lead toward social revolution. Furthermore, in his fashion he was a man of principle, a dogmatist tempered by political suppleness but with very fixed ideas about people and things. This one must not lose sight of if one is interested in his connections with imperialist Germany, with "social patriots" and "social traitors," and most particularly with Parvus.

To charge Lenin with inexpiable grievances is more than legitimate if one considers only his pseudodictatorship of the proletariat—or his creating and then entrusting to Stalin a monstrous state apparatus for coercion that is without historical precedent. Solzhenitsyn has performed a distinguished service by proclaiming the truth about Lenin's liabilities. But this is no reason for thereafter relating stories that have nothing to do with history under the cover of writing a novel with historical pretensions. For example, in connection with Parvus.

Parvus was a Russo-German Social Democrat; an intelligent, cultivated man, an original thinker, and a talented Marxist writer; however, in no way did he play the major role in the Russian Revolution of 1905 that Solzhenitsyn attributes to him. Parvus grew weary of vegetating as a second ranker in Social Democratic Germany, where the bigwigs kept him on short rein; he left for the Balkans, and there devoted himself to highly lucrative "business activities." Trotsky, who knew him better than anyone else, wrote in *My Life:*

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> And yet there was always something mad and unreliable about Parvus. In addition to all his other ambitions, this revolutionary was torn by an amazing desire to get rich. Even this connected, in those years at least, with his social revolutionary ideas . . . .

For Parvus dreamed of a great Socialist daily newspaper in three European languages, in contrast to the banal Social Democratic press, and his dream would have called for a lot of money. . . .

Immediately after war broke out in 1914, Parvus took his position: he detested czarism above all else, and in German power he saw a providential means for destroying it. Also, for him Germany was the land of *Kultur*. In March 1915 he submitted a memorandum to the German government; it was a remarkable exposé of the weaknesses of the Russian Empire, which he proposed attacking from within. He suggested two methods: subvention of the revolutionary movement, and the financing of separatist trends among the national minorities. The Wilhelmstrasse people, in the government and on the General Staff, were ignorant in these matters, and they allowed themselves to be persuaded, for Parvus's arguments were impressive although he shamelessly misled them about the methods to pursue. First, he undertook to unite the diverse and deeply divided Russian socialist organizations and factions. Then he claimed to be in a position to utilize the clandestine apparatus of the Bolsheviks in order to introduce subversive propaganda into Russia. This would require a lot of money, he said; and he got it.

However, his offer to unify the disparate socialist groups and subgroups was either an absurdly utopian notion or an outright lie. Each and every one of them had unshakable reasons for existing separately, especially the Bolsheviks. Lenin was maniacal on the question of separateness; everything proves it, Solzhenitsyn knows it, and writes as much. Then why does he make a show of forgetting it by taking Parvus's charlatanism seriously? As for the Bolshevik clandestine organization, at the time it was reduced to almost zero. Proof of this is found in Lenin's correspondence with Shliapnikov, and Zinoviev confirms as much in his *Histoire du Parti communiste russe* (Paris, 1926): "The war brought about the almost complete destruction of the [Bolshevik] Party. . . . The Party was scattered and crushed." Bukharin put it the same way, as did Molotov in a conversation with Djilas. What's more, every subvention of the Bolsheviks would have had to pass through Shliapnikov, or at least be known to him. Solzhenitsyn has allowed himself to be led into error by Zeman and Scharlau, who have made undiscerning use of "documents" that do not document Lenin.

In document after document, we learn that Parvus imprudently announced the revolution in Russia for January 22, 1916, and that he claimed to have sent 1 million marks to Petrograd. (To whom? via whom? to accomplish what? Parvus can say what he likes, but there is no real trace of his actions.) Nothing happened in Petrograd on the date he specified, but the next year, in March, the Empire of the Czars collapsed to general surprise and without anyone's being able to claim credit for the event. Only the agonizingly long war and the failure of the ruling caste brought the old regime down. Of course, socialist activities over half a century were indirectly involved, but if one single individual contributed powerfully to bringing army, church, and state into disrepute, it certainly was Leo Tolstoi. At any rate, German money did not count; Parvus even less.

What were the connections between Lenin and Parvus? In a letter to Riazanov, Lenin wrote on January 9, 1915, "We have not seen Parvus." At that date, no one was aware of Parvus's contacts with certain German officials. In late May of that same year, Parvus approached Lenin in a restaurant in Bern; the two men went outside to talk, but as soon as Lenin got a whiff of Parvus's views, he sent him packing. It was finished between them. Zeman and Scharlau permit themselves to state that a conversation took place at Lenin's residence, and they give the address—Distelweg. Unhappily for them, on April 27 the Ulyanovs [Lenins] had changed lodgings and were living in the Waldheimstrasse (cf. *V. I. Lenine, Chronique biographique,* Vol. 3, p. 333). The Zeman and Scharlau book is filled with errors, inaccuracies, false allegations, and insinuations; my article "L'or et le wagon" points out a goodly number. Solzhenitsyn was not lucky in having recourse to a "fount" of such impure waters.

When, shortly after the snub, Parvus brought out his periodical *Die Glocke (The Bell),* Lenin described it as "a sewer of German chauvinism . . . an organ of renegades and vile flunkies," and he called Parvus "an adventurer [who has] fallen as

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low as possible . . . who licks Hindenburg's boots . . . miserable poltroon . . . incapable of an honest thought" (*Oeuvres Complètes,* Vol. 27, p. 82). Later on, Parvus's occasional impulses to approach Lenin were rejected with scorn. After October, Parvus pushed obtuseness to the point of wanting to go to Petrograd, but Lenin objected: "The cause of the revolution must not be soiled by dirty hands." And so it is with stupefaction that in *Lenin in Zurich* one reads imaginary conversations in which the exchanges between Lenin and Parvus are unimaginable. In addition, Solzhenitsyn invents a visit to Lenin's home by a certain Sklarz, when Lenin did not want to see him: "To make use of the services of people connected with the editor of *Die Glocke,* that of course I cannot do," he wrote on March 30, 1917 (*Oeuvres Complètes,* Vol. 49, p. 418). A respect for truth imposes limits on a novelist's rights, especially when contemporary events are involved, of which witnesses as well as unimpeachable documentation survive.

If it were a matter of literary technique, such as the interior monologue to which Solzhenitsyn so often resorts, it would nonetheless be essential that the speakers keep to an acceptable discourse. Parvus could tell fables and make boasts to German officials but not to Lenin—for example, about the 1905 Revolution. When speaking to Lenin he could not brag of having fomented strikes or of having caused a battleship to be blown up, or talk without rhyme or reason about Japanese money. Lenin was not one to listen to such foolishness. And he was always very miserly about his own time. Solzhenitsyn himself writes: "A single wasted hour made Lenin ill." Such a Lenin would not have endured losing one minute with a charlatan who, in talking of the revolution, asked "Aren't you afraid that mere slogans will be useless without money?"—and who allowed himself to say, "But you must have capital. What will you use to seize power?" Toward the end, Parvus did exhibit signs of megalomania, but in 1915 he was not crazy. And Lenin was not a man to speak to a "social traitor" who disgusted him, addressing him as Israel Lazarevich.

Accordingly, it seems that Solzhenitsyn does not doubt that money is the nerve of war; ergo, also of civl war. He should rather believe Machiavelli, who wrote in his *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy,* "Nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion which affirms it [money] to be the sinews of war. . . . It is not gold . . . that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; for while gold by itself will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you gold." (London, 1883, N. H. Thomson, translator—pp. 228-29.)

In point of fact, contending against a provisional government that lacked defenders, Lenin seized power with good soldiers; i.e., his professional revolutionaries, his Red Guards, and the Petrograd garrison whose members certainly had not read *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism* but quite simply did not want to go back to the front. And it was with his good soldiers that Lenin was able "to find gold" in bank vaults, public savings, etc., however studiously his detractors still seek for it in "documents" they distort to make them say what they do not say.

Professor Alfred Erich Senn has published an article, "The Myth of German Money During the First World War" (*Soviet Studies,* Vol. 38, No. 1, 1976), in which he refutes the too lightly voiced suspicions and the too hastily drawn conclusions that have allowed the elaboration of this "myth." He examines the works of numerous authors, and he shows that an impartial analysis of both the pertinent "documents" and related commentaries reveals the absence of any proofs. Following his own paths of study, Senn arrives at views that are compatible with those expressed by Alexander Dallin in rebutting the report George Katkov presented during a 1967 conference. (The proceedings of the conference were published by Richard Pipes in *Revolutionary Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).) Dallin clearly stated that Parvus duped his (German) money-lenders and that no serious evidence exists that his enterprises produced the results he boasted of. In an earlier article ("New Documents on Lenin's Departure from Switzerland," *International Review and Social History,* Vol. 19, 1974), Senn closely examined Parvus's Swiss bank records, and confirmed that they indicate "more investments than payments"; in other words, more personal receipts than payments to third parties. He also notes, in very moderate terms, "a strong tendency among Western writers to exaggerate Helphand's [Parvus's] activities in Switzerland from 1915 to 1917" *(op. cit.).* The analyses and observations of the two American professors are couched in the understated style appropriate to their academic background, and in substance are compatible with my own articles that have appeared over the last 18 years in *Contrat social* ("Un point d'histoire," Vol.

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2, No. 1; "Autre point d'histoire," Vol. 2, No. 2; and "L'or et le wagon," Vol. 12, No. 4). For reasons of space, I shall not contest a large number of other points Solzhenitsyn has taken from his tainted sources, and shall proceed to the "sealed railway carriage" that was not sealed; the "armored train" that was not armored; a parlor car that never existed; and the crossing of Germany by "three to four hundred" Russians en route to their homeland (Document No. 19 in Zeman), not by Lenin alone.

The majority of the anti-Leninist polemicists I have mentioned and those whom Senn refers to in notes to his paper on "the myth of German money"—not to speak of innumerable journalists—will have it that Lenin was sent to Russia in a sealed railway carriage by, variously, the Kaiser, Ludendorff, or Parvus. *There is not a word of truth in any of it.* Immediately after the March revolution was announced, Lenin redoubled his efforts to return home by way of France and England. And in this he was not alone. On this point, proofs leave nothing to be desired. He refused any passage via Germany (telegrams to Hanecki on March 28 and 30). He adjured his correspondent in Stockholm to hasten all steps in Petrograd so that the Soviet would exert pressure in London and Paris on behalf of those who had been proposed to make the trip. It was only when he learned that Chernov had left England with his papers in order yet had been turned back in France that Lenin grasped the necessity of passing through Germany (letter of March 30 to Hanecki).

As early as March 19, when socialists of various tendencies were meeting in Bern, Martov had advanced the idea of suggesting to Germany an exchange of Russians desirous of returning home for an equal number of Germans and Austrians then detained in Russia. This was unanimously agreed to. However, it was further agreed to obtain first the consent of the Petrograd Soviet. When no response was forthcoming, the impatient Lenin speeded up proceedings and formulated the conditions applicable to the trip: extraterritoriality; admission of all travelers without distinction as to political opinions; no examination of identity papers or of luggage, etc. A message from Captain von Hülsen to the Wilhelmstrasse dated March 30 stipulates that the project involved the transport of about "300 to 400" Russians "of all parties" (Zeman document cited above). There was no secret agreement with Berlin.

More resolute and more pressed than the others, who were still waiting for the Soviet's approval, Lenin left with a first group of 32 people (19 Bolsheviks, 6 Bundists, 3 Menshevik-Internationalists, and children). The train was not armored, the railway carriage was not sealed; it was an ordinary train, and the carriage was one of the second and third class. The German soldiers were politically stupid and apprehensive that dangerous individuals might escape en route, so they multiplied precautions and had three doors locked in order to maintain closer watch over the fourth and only other exit. The travelers declined to have any contact en route with German Social Democrats. Only Platten, who was in charge of the convoy as a Swiss citizen and a neutral, ensured their liaison with the authorities. Everything went off without Parvus, even if on his own he played the busybody.

Some three weeks later, tired of waiting for some response from the Soviet, a second group set out in the same way as the first; however, this time it numbered about 208 persons, including Martov, Riazanov, Bobrov, Lunacharsky, and Angelica Balabanoff. The latter emphasized that the original idea was Martov's and, in *My Life As a Rebel* (New York, 1932), wrote:

> The arrangement implied no compromise or favor on the part of either government. . . . The trains in which we were to cross Germany into Sweden were not sealed, as a stupid legend affirms, but we would not be permitted to leave the train while on German territory, and we were pledged to make no attempt to speak with German citizens when it stopped at the various stations en route [pp. 144 and 146].

Anyone who wishes to know the truth about this affair should read the Senn article mentioned earlier, "New Documents on Lenin's Departure from Switzerland, 1917." In it, Professor Senn presents and comments on 14 documents, 9 of which are in Russian and 5 in German. It would be to Solzhenitsyn's interest to read them. Here he would see that the Kaiser, Ludendorff, and Parvus took no part in the move, or in the effervescence of the entire Russian colony in Switzerland over this repatriation, and that nothing about it was concealed or confidential. . . . Had he read the Senn article, Solzhenitsyn would understand how ill-advised he was to rely on Zeman and Scharlau.

Far from being "carefully concealed from

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history" or having "received little attention," as Solzhenitsyn writes, the "events" he evokes have only too widely attracted the attention of unscrupulous historians, a good number of whom Mr. Senn mentions in his article on "the myth of German money." The Carmichael article in *Encounter,* referred to earlier, merits special mention, for the author pretends not to know that from 300 to 400 people traveled the same route as the first group of repatriates, and under the same conditions; and he does not hesitate to repeat that Lenin, having "accepted a sealed train" for himself alone, must have accepted German money. A blinding deduction from a luminous premise! And what was the solitary Lenin doing in his private train, wandering from one carriage to the next, his pockets stuffed with marks that "the Bolshevik groups in Russia" will make no use of, as Zeman and Scharlau admit? A mystery . . . Carmichael reveals, further, that Germany financed the Bolsheviks up until the collapse of her Eastern front, in November 1918. Which is to say, during the first year of the Soviet regime, when the Communists had nationalized the banks, seized public bank deposits, confiscated a quantity of private property, and laid hands on the Mint. And then came the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which stipulated that Russia pay a war indemnity of 300 million gold rubles. Such incoherence defies comment.

Another serious British review, *Survey,* published an article by David Anin (Vol. 21, No. 4), which appeared concurrently with *Lenin in Zurich.* In it one reads:

> According to Burtsev, as early as two years before the war (in May, 1912), Lenin negotiated with the Germans and promised them that in the event of war he would organize a defeatist uprising in Russia. Burtsev insists that Lenin had similar discussions with the Poles and other nations.
>
> [And at the end:] Another Bolshevik secret, the story of Germany financing Lenin, has been elucidated with the help of documentary proofs.

One can only wonder what Parvus went to Berlin to accomplish in 1915, since everything had been decided three years before. . . .

Obviously, Solzhenitsyn has not read the articles in *Encounter* and *Survey,* the Senn and Dallin articles, or those in *Contrat social.* Yet they feed a historical controversy that has lasted for more than a half-century, and that, in its fashion, *Lenin in Zurich* prolongs and adds fuel to. The novelist has dipped into sources that are partly questionable, partly doctored, in order to devise a portrait that bears little resemblance to Lenin.

Solzhenitsyn knows and says that the proposal that the trip be made on the basis of an exchange goes back to Martov, not to Parvus, much less to Ludendorff or the Kaiser, but he gives it a sarcastic twist; in a similar way, he wrongly interprets all the precautions agreed upon to safeguard the travelers' dignity. One can detest Lenin, but is that a reason for violating the truth? For example, in connection with the extraterritoriality clause that Lenin insisted on?

Extraterritoriality is a judicial fiction by virtue of which the beneficiaries are considered to be residing in their own country when actually they are elsewhere. Thus, the 300 to 400 travelers did not set foot on German soil. And had their railway carriages actually been sealed, that would only have underscored—entirely to their honor—the fact that they were not in Germany, rather than providing the basis for a valid grievance against them. So the obsessive use of the word "sealed" in a pejorative misconstruction is ridiculous. A writer of Solzhenitsyn's stature should not indulge in such vagaries.

Nor should he wrongly interpret the various conditions Lenin worked out in the interests of all the exiles who were in a hurry to get home. Nor should he suggest without any basis that the Mezhrayontsy (non-Bolshevik and non-Menshevik socialists) were also in the pay of the Germans. Nor should he continually multiply unfounded accusatory allusions that I refrain from refuting so as not to give this report the dimensions of a doctoral thesis. Certain pages should be contradicted line by line. But this would not only create confusion for the reader but would also be an ungrateful task, since one respects to the full measure the immense merits of the admirable author of "Matryona's House," and *The Gulag Archipelago.*

Lenin's reasoning was not wide off the mark when he set the conditions that were intended to keep the homeward-bound travelers politically in the clear. They were received in Petrograd with great ceremony by (Menshevik) representatives of the Soviet and by an enthusiastic crowd (mobilized by Shliapnikov and his comrades with the help of revolutionary exhilaration). The returning travelers had no trouble justifying themselves before public opinion and in the eyes of adversaries of good faith; the conclusive documents are all

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available, as is first-hand testimony, including Sukhanov's. Miliukov's paper, the *Rech,** saluted their return in these words: "A Socialist leader as universally known as Lenin ought to enter the arena, and we can only hail his arrival in Russia, whatever may be our opinion of his political doctrine." Is Miliukov also supposed to have dipped into Parvus's funds?

From the very first pages of *Lenin in Zurich,* one gains the impression that when Solzhenitsyn was staying in this same city he not only became excited by the idea of evoking the presence of Lenin in that ambience but also in writing imparted his own excitement to his main character, who in real life did not share it. Day and night, even in response to the smallest thing, Lenin seems to be whirling. In all this we do not recognize the real Lenin and his habitual self-control. Solzhenitsyn does remark incidentally: "Lenin might seem completely in control of his mind and his will. . . ." Why "might seem"? Lenin was always capable of facing up to adversity coolly. And as for the end of the novel, it is more than disconcerting; it is contrary to what even in historical fiction is permissible.

The eve of departure for Russia has arrived. Radek says to Lenin, "It comes to this, Vladimir Ilyich: six months from now we will either be ministers or we will be hanged." But Radek was an Austrian subject; he had neither a passport nor a visa to enter Russia, and the Russian frontier was well guarded—even by Allied French and British officers; Radek would have been able to go to Petrograd only after the October Revolution, which in April no one could have foreseen. As for Lenin, he could not have conceived of or admitted any projection of the future such as Solzhenitsyn puts in Radek's mouth. Lenin thought, as did Martov and the Mensheviks, that the ongoing revolution was a bourgeois revolution; he disagreed with Trotsky and the theory of "the permanent revolution." The countersign he proposed was "All power to the Soviets"—that is, to the SRs and the Mensheviks who formed the immense majority. It was not until mid-June that he was to raise for the first time the theoretical candidacy of his party to take power, and it was in September that he judged the moment opportune to make that a fact. In April and during the trip back to Russia, he expected to be jailed on arrival at the frontier or in Petrograd. The final dialogue between Lenin and Radek is without the slightest historical foundation and thereby transgresses the limits of historical fiction. . . .

Throughout *Lenin in Zurich,* the reader comes upon hints of certain themes that one may suppose will be developed in the "knots" and chapters to follow. The temptation to discuss them is great, but greater still the need to confine myself to a single thread, which is pregnant with meaning—the one that attributes to Lenin only "a quarter of Russian blood." "Just because a quarter of his blood was Russian, fate had hitched him to the ramshackle Russian rattletrap. A quarter of his blood, but nothing in his character, his will, his inclinations made him kin to that slovenly, slapdash, eternally drunken people."

This blood-and-race theme rings a bell for us. Other allusions in the narrative indicate the importance Solzhenitsyn accords it. Evidently, the point is to explain Lenin's thought and actions by bloodlines, by the genes and chromosomes transmitted by parents and grandparents of Kalmuk, German, Jewish, and also Russian stock—not to forget the Swedish woman Lenin's great-grandfather had married.

Ever since Marietta Chaguinian, the historiographer of the Ulyanov family, discovered tangible proof of Lenin's mother's Jewish ancestry (proof that by some miracle eluded the G.P.U. in its minute investigations), this indelible stain, which was rigorously concealed by order of the Stalin Politburo, has set incorrigible Moscovite tongues wagging (covertly, of course). Still, none have taken the matter very seriously. A few sceptics would like to know what physiological phenomenon accounts for the fact that Alexander Ulyanov, Lenin's brother, who was similarly supplied with the same quarter of Russian blood, behaved with such gentleness and delicacy, even toward adversaries, in contrast to Vladimir's curt brusqueness. If one understands the implication correctly, when Lenin advocated the right of national minorities to separate from Russia, it was his foreign blood speaking; but when he sent the Red Army to put down the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Turkestan, it was his quarter of Russian blood that was operative. In that case, a host of troublesome questions arises in the realms of politics, history, and culture—but according to

*Miliukov was the leader of the Kadets, a bourgeois liberal party.

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what criteria? (I am and shall be loath to take the idea of "blood" in the sense in which Solzhenitsyn intends it.)

In fact, how is one to measure the parts of Russian, German, Lithuanian, and Baltic blood in the Romanoff dynasty? What to say of Pushkin, who was descended from an Abyssinian black? Or of Lermontov, who was Scottish of origin (Learmonth)? Was Karamzin not of Tartar stock? Similarly, those fervent Slavophiles, the brothers Aksakov. Herzen's mother was German. The Bakunins came from Hungary. Petitpas, the master choreographer in Petersburg, arrived there straight from Marseilles. Serge Witte is of Dutch origin. Korolenko, with a Polish mother and a half-Polish father, also had only a quarter of Russian blood. A good topic for an academic dissertation. However, to the best of this layman's knowledge, the classification of the various types of human blood, in biology and in pathology, is not determined by criteria of race or nationality.

Postscript

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE to analyze and comment on *Lenin in Zurich* without examining the sources Solzhenitsyn dipped into to write his historical novel—or, more exactly, his novel with historical intentions. Similarly, it is difficult to disregard the indications of themes—brief but nonetheless suggestive—that in the present work are preludes to pages to come. . . .

About the entirely legal trip of "the 300 to 400" persons repatriated across Germany: in addition to the information given above and the varied documentation in Lenin's works (including notes and appendices), one has available Krupskaya's *Memories of Lenin* (London, 1930) and Fritz Platten's account. Furthermore, the Georgian socialist Mikhail Tskhakaya, one of the first group of 32, has testified to the vain efforts of the German Social Democrats to make contact with the travelers. This material is found in collections dedicated to the memory of Lenin.

About the trading—ergo, financial—activities of Hanecki, Kozlovsky, and other Russian and Polish Socialists in the Baltic, and about their profitable dealings between the Scandinavian countries and Petrograd (more or less legal, sometimes skirting the black market, cheating with the customs people), Michael Futrell's research (cf. his book) is fully persuasive. An intense traffic was carried on in the Baltic Sea to evade the German blockade. Hanecki & Co.'s export-import business made it possible to introduce quantities of urgently needed items into Russia without a license: medical supplies, hygienic supplies, thermometers, hypodermic needles, contraceptives, rubber gadgets, etc., which in small volume had great sales value. Telegraphic messages make it evident that the transfers of funds between Stockholm and Petrograd were payments related to business and had nothing to do with Parvus's political wheeling and dealing. (The figures are so modest that clearly they do not concern the Wilhelmstrasse's millions.) Hanecki and his friends, as militants enjoying temporary prosperity, helped the Party somewhat out of their own pockets, a fact that conceals no mystery.

The autobiographies of Shliapnikov, Radek, Hanecki, and other *dramatis personae* in the *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Granat* were not written to satisfy any partisan purpose, and they contribute indirectly toward establishing the truth about Parvus's connections with the Bolsheviks' office in Stockholm. Radek's wife, as well as Hanecki's, typed and hectographed the office's information bulletin and handled the mailings. Then what were Parvus's millions for? The funds that von Kühlmann flattered himself he had transmitted to the Bolsheviks "by various channels and under different labels"—where did they end up?

Let us hope that Solzhenitsyn will refrain from consulting the long-famous 70 Creel-Sisson "documents," published in 1918 in the United States on the recommendation of "experts" who knew nothing about the material. I have denounced them as false for some 50 years; in his *Memoirs*, Thomas G. Masaryk also demonstrated their falseness (quoted in my book *Stalin,* p. 165); and George Kennan disposed of them once and for all in his masterly study "The Sisson Documents," which appeared in 1956 in the *Journal of Modern History.*

And may Solzhenitsyn take care not to use the writings of Gregory Alexinski. This ex-Bolshevik of the left, who entered the service of the Rumanian security forces, was the author of *Les amours secrèts de Lénine* (Paris, 1937), in collaboration with a French writer whose good faith was abused. Alexinski was a clever forger; he had imitated Lenin's handwriting to produce some letters to a fictitious "Madame de K—," which he tried to sell to Columbia University. To his chagrin, Boris

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Nicolayevsky was consulted as an expert, and declared that they were false. The book was a flop, but it did spark several imitators, whose accounts I settled in the article "Faux et faussaires," in *Contrat social* (Vol. 12, No. 4, December 1968). Notwithstanding, many "Soviet experts" rely on such authorities.

SOLZHENITSYN also has no valid reason for incriminating the Mensheviks and Mezhrayontsy who had the good luck to find paid jobs with the research institute that Parvus established in Copenhagen; whatever other purposes Parvus may have had in mind, its purposes were indicated in the name—the Institute for Research Into the Consequences of War. Zurabov, Perazitch, Groman, Chudnovsky, Uritsky, and others were sincere militants and devoted to their cause, no matter what one may think of their political orientation.

Recently, Solzhenitsyn addressed an appeal to his "dear compatriots" in exile, asking that they supply him with documentation on the events of 1917. How will he be able to screen the evidence he will receive from those few who survive? While waiting, it would be to his advantage to read Sukhanov, an attentive and impartial observer of the two revolutions that took place in the capital in 1917. He would see there that Lenin was not wrong when he affirmed that "the masses," who wanted peace and land, were much farther "to the left" than the Bolsheviks; also, that in July he truly was pressured on his left by the Kronstadt sailors and the Putilov workers—it being understood that while this applies only to Petrograd, it was there that the decisive action was played out in October. Any impulse to explain this in terms of German money will, on reflection, appear puerile and absurd to Solzhenitsyn, whose sincerity is beyond question.

Last, he should familiarize himself with Pierre Pascal's *Journal de Russie, 1916-1918* (Lausanne, 1975), with a preface by Jean Laloy. It is comprised of notes and observations made day by day at first hand in Petrograd and in the provinces by a French lieutenant on detached service. Pascal was a fervent Catholic, a lover of Russia and of the Russian people, their language, and their culture; his notes were transcribed for publication more than 50 years after the events they record. Pascal wrote thus on July 20, 1917: "They accused Kozlovsky of having 2 million francs on deposit. He said, 'Go to the bank and see.' Several tens of thousand were found." On November 7, Pascal wrote: "M. Putilov told me he had voted for the Bolsheviks." And on October 3, 1918: "Troubetskoy, the monarchist, is a Bolshevik. . . . Merejkovsky is a Bolshevik." I do not suggest that these people are to be suspected of having been indoctrinated by Lenin but that they then embodied the feeling of a nation worn out by a hopeless war and dead-end chaos. Lenin did not create this state of affairs; he knew how to take advantage of it for his fanatical designs.

Miliukov had proclaimed that the war must be pursued until Constantinople was conquered. The Provisional Government, by terms of its secret treaties, was sworn to solidarity with the Allies until a final victory was won. It postponed *sine die* decisions that the peasants and soldiers were awaiting with mounting impatience. The Czar and the Government fell for the same reason—their fidelity to their alliances. Had they informed the Allies that it was absolutely essential they be freed of their treaty obligations, history would have taken a different turn. What has an insignificant Parvus got to do with the historic cataclysms of 1917?

Pierre Pascal, who is also the author of *Avvakum et les débuts du raskol,* the translator of Dostoievsky and of the Old Russian version of "The Siege of Jerusalem," from Flavius Josephus's *History of the Jewish War,* and who is a professor of Russian studies at the Ecole des Langues Orientales and at the Sorbonne, is the author of a pertinent article, "Octobre et février ne sont qu'une Révolution" (*Révolution prolétarienne,* November 1967). He shows—he proves—that Lenin's decrees following the October coup responded to the unsatisfied aspirations of the people who had spontaneously carried out the February-March revolution. This does not excuse the totalitarian despotism that was established subsequently, or the enslavement and the Gulag Archipelago. In a résumé, Pierre Pascal, who was an exceptional witness to the revolutionary agony, writes that October was a moment of truth, and that it was welcomed not unjustifiably with joy by people and poets, by Alexander Bloy, by Serge Essenin, by André Biély. And Pierre Pascal concludes: "For neither among the people nor among the poets nor in the October decrees was there a trace of Marxism"—in the sense intended by Solzhenitsyn.

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